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ESSAY

ASKING JURORS To Do THE IMPOSSIBLE
Peter Tiersma*

I.

Introduction

Being a juror has never been easy. Several hundred
years ago, English jurors were confined "without meat,
drink, fire, or candles" until they had finished their
deliberations.' If they failed to reach a verdict before the
judges left town (English judges would travel from the
royal courts at Westminster to various cities to try cases),
the jurors were supposed to be placed
in a wagon and
"carted" to the judges' next destination. 2
Today, the rigors of jury service are more prosaic.
Jurors are paid almost nothing in most jurisdictions, so
unless they work for the government or have an employer
who will pay them for not working, being on a jury can be
a substantial financial hardship. Arranging for childcare
and even finding a parking space near the courthouse are
further annoyances. Judges and court administrators have
worked hard to alleviate these burdens. 3 I would be an
ungrateful guest at this symposium if I failed to mention
that the courts of Tennessee have enacted a number of

* Professor of Law and Hon. William Matthew Byrne, Jr. Chair,
Loyola Law School.
I J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 88-89

(3rd ed. 1990).
2 Id.
3 See A.B.A. PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, http:/www.

abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2009) for some proposals to alleviate these problems. See also G.
Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79
JUDICATURE 216 (1996).
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significant jury reforms. 4 Nonetheless, for many citizens it

can still be quite burdensome to perform this important
civic duty.
Once a jury is empanelled, the difficulties continue
and may even worsen. Our legal system commonly asks
jurors to do things during trial and deliberations that are
either quite hard to do, or may actually be impossible. In
the rest of this article I will list some of the difficult or
impossible tasks that we expect jurors to perform.
I will end by proposing some solutions. Sometimes
all the legal system can do is honestly admit that it
sometimes expects jurors to do something that no human
being can accomplish. On other occasions, it may need to
break down a complex task into smaller parts, accompanied
by clear instructions in plain English. I anticipate that
some of the other speakers at this symposium will advance
other ideas.
II.

Travel Back in Time

Jurors are routinely told that their job is to decide
"the facts," or "what actually happened," or simply "the
truth.",5 Sometimes the "facts" of a case relate to an
existing state of affairs. However, more commonly, the
jury has to decide what happened in the past. Typically,
the truth is a hotly disputed issue, and each party's
narrative may be at least partly accurate, making it
necessary for the jury to reconstruct the facts based on
incomplete or conflicting evidence. Even more difficult is
Neil P. Cohen & Daniel R. Cohen, Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U.
MEM. L. REv. 1 (2003). On the issue of the comprehensibility of jury
instructions, which is my main area of interest, the changes in
Tennessee have been more procedural (mostly involving timing and
providing written copies) than substantive. Id.
at 49-59.
' See Judicial Council of California, Criminal Jury Instructions, No.
104; Revised Ariz. Jury Instructions (Crim.), No. 1 [hereinafter
4

Calcrim].
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to try to determine the contemporaneous mental state of
those who participated in the events.
The legal system therefore often expects jurors to
travel back in time and, once there, to ascertain exactly
what happened and the intentions of those who made it
happen. Doing so with complete confidence is impossible,
of course.
The law's answer to this problem is to redefine "the
truth" as that state of affairs that the jury finds is more
likely than not to be true, or clearly and convincingly true,
or true beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, the legal system uses legal
presumptions and the burden of proof to resolve factual
indeterminacies. If what actually happened is unclear, the
party who has been assigned the burden of proof will
probably lose its case.
Standards of evidence and burdens of proof are a
reasonable solution to the impossibility of traveling back in
time. Yet they are to some extent inconsistent with the
system's insistence that jurors must determine "the facts,"
"the truth," or "what really happened."
My impression is that jurors are sometimes
distressed by this rhetorical dissonance. It is not unusual
for them to return to court for additional instructions on the6
burden of proof or on the meaning of reasonable doubt.
Most judges are afraid to try to explain it, and they are even
more reluctant to give the jury examples to illustrate the
concept. Some of the difficulties could be resolved by
using clearer language to explain the burden; many existing
instructions are quite convoluted and full of archaic
language. 7 Illustrations from cases that have been upheld
on appeal might also be helpful.
All the same, sometimes we should probably just
admit to jurors that they cannot really travel back in time.
6

See People v. Ruge, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
194-95 (1999).

7 PETER TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE,
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Absolute truth is unattainable, so they should just do the
best they can. It is not unusual for judges to admit as much
to juries that have deadlocked, as is the case in Illinois: "In
a large proportion of cases absolute certainty cannot be
expected nor does the law require it." 8 Why not say so
right at the beginning of every trial.
III.

Divine the Future

We are not yet finished with time travel. The law
also expects jurors to be oracles or fortunetellers.
Obviously, traveling to the future is even more difficult
than transporting oneself to the past. It truly is impossible.
The issue occasionally arises in the criminal
In capital cases, for instance, jurors may
context.
sometimes need to decide a defendant's future
dangerousness. The question arises more often in civil
trials, especially with respect to damages. For example,
juries may have to predict what type of employment a
badly injured teenager would have obtained once he grew
up and how much money he would have earned from the
time that he would have begun work until he would have
Once it has made this
retired, absent the injury.
prediction, the jury typically needs to predict what the
so
interest rate or rate of inflation will be in future years
0
they can properly reduce the amount to present value.'
Likewise, where a woman's husband is severely
injured and can no longer perform household tasks or
provide affection or engage in sexual relations in the future,
a jury may need to predict how many hours a week he
would have worked around the house, absent the injury,
8

11. Pattern Instructions, No. 1.06.

9 See Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F.Supp. 1187 (Dist. D.C. 1996). A
judge decided the Athridge case, but it could just as well have been a
jury.
10 See, e.g., Tenn. Pattern Jury Instructions, Civ, No. 14.54.
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how much affection he would have provided, absent the
injury, and the quantity and quality of the sexual relations
that the couple would have had, absent the injury. Then it
must place a dollar figure on these activities. Most
jurisdictions further require that compensation for
household services also be reduced to present value, but not
the damages for lost affection and sexual relations.
In the Arizona Jury Project, which involved videotaping
around 50 civil trials (including deliberations), one of the
cases required calculating the plaintiffs probable life
expectancy, which was complicated because the plaintiff
was in poor health and greatly overweight before the injury.
One juror aptly commented: "we need a crystal ball." ' 1
Again, the burden or standard of proof can be
helpful, but at the same time it is bizarre to think that a jury
can decide that more likely than not a badly-injured
teenager would have become a brain surgeon at age 29
earning $150,000 per year until she retired at age 67. The
preponderance standard makes little sense in this context.
The jury might decide that this is the most likely outcome
in light of the evidence available to them, but it is not
accurate to say that this specific outcome is more likely
than all the other possible options.
The best approach, once again, is to be honest with
jurors and to admit that no one can predict the future. Tell
them that someone has to decide these difficult questions,
that they have been selected to be that "someone," and that
they should do the best they can based on the evidence that
they received.
IV.

Ignore the Obvious

There is a popular expression that goes, "Don't
think of a pink elephant." Of course, the first thing that you
" Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on
Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REv. 1857, 1873-74 (2001).
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will think of is a pink elephant. It is hard to ignore the
to suppress a thought tend only to make it
obvious. Efforts
2
more salient.'
Jury instructions occasionally admonish jurors to
ignore the obvious. In just about every criminal case,
judges tell jurors that the fact that the defendant is on trial
is not evidence that he might have committed the crime.
This is a bedrock principle in the common-law system of
justice. Yet as a factual assertion, it is hard to justify. If it
is really true (as defense lawyers are wont to suggest) that it
is no more likely that the defendant committed the crime
than any randomly-selected person on the street, our
criminal justice system would long ago have collapsed. No
doubt, police and prosecutors are sometimes stupid,
corrupt, or politically-motivated, but as a factual matter the
defendant in a criminal case is much more likely to have
committed the crime in question than the average local
citizen.
There is research indicating that jurors do not
always comprehend traditional instructions on the burden
of proof and the presumption of innocence.13 Part of the
reason may be that, as noted above, these concepts
contradict ordinary logic. Whenever legal concepts are
counterintuitive, it is that much more important to convey
the information as clearly as possible. Understandable
statements of the presumption of innocence are therefore
critical.
In addition, as research by Shari Diamond and
Jonathan Casper suggests, an admonition is more likely to

See Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101
PSYCHOL. REv. 343 (1994).
13 Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches
Us about the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
589, 600 (1997).
12
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be effective if you explain the reason for it. 14 I would
therefore tell jurors that because the defendant is on trial, it
may seem logical that he is the most likely person to have
committed the crime in question. Nevertheless, I would
continue by pointing out that the police and prosecutors can
and do make mistakes, and that therefore the presumption
of innocence is an important legal principle that requires
the state to prove that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Similar issues arise when a criminal defendant is
physically restrained. California judges inform jurors that
they should not speculate on the reason for the restraints
and that they should not discuss it or consider it for any
purpose. 15 Yet it is very hard to ignore something that is
Logically, the defendant is
potentially so relevant.
dangerous or he is a flight risk. Either conclusion is
relevant information, especially if he is accused of having
committed a crime of violence.
Instructing jurors to ignore a defendant's restraints
is clearly the right thing to do. Of course, it would be
better to avoid the situation entirely by devising a less
obvious way of controlling the defendant. Technologies
like "stun belts" (which deliver an electrical shock) may
sometimes be an acceptable option, although their use is
subject to accidents and possible abuse. 16 When a visible
restraint is the only option, judges may have no choice but
to tell jurors to ignore the obvious.
Judges also tell criminal jurors not to consider
They are simply to decide guilt or
punishment. 17
innocence. For the most part, this seems reasonable
Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the
Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury,
14

26 LAW& SOC'Y REV. 513, 534 (1992).
15
16

17

Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 204.
People v. Mar, 52 P.3d 95, 97-98 (Cal. 2002).
Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 200.
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enough. Yet what has changed the situation recently is the
passage of "three strikes" laws in some jurisdictions, which
require judges to impose draconian punishments for a third
offense. If that offense involved serious violence, most
people would probably not object to a long prison sentence.
Yet sometimes defendants have received very lengthy
sentences for minor third offenses. 18 If prosecutors and
judges do not have the good sense to ensure that the
punishment fits the crime, we may need to rely on jurors to
do so.
V.

Forget You Ever Heard This

Related to ignoring the obvious is the direction to
forget that you ever heard certain information. This creates
the conundrum of "unringing the bell." For example, a
judge may tell jurors that if she ordered testimony stricken
from the record, they should disregard that testimony and
proceed as though they had never heard it. 19 Trial lawyers
are keenly aware of how difficult it can be to ignore
potentially relevant evidence, so they sometimes make a
strategic decision not to object to such evidence in order to
avoid highlighting it.
Perhaps even more problematic is ordering jurors to
consider evidence only for a limited purpose.
Consider
State Farm Insurance Company v. Campbell, one of a
series of Supreme Court decisions aimed at reining in
punitive damage awards. The Court held that under the
Due Process Clause, juries, when setting the amount of
punitive damages, should not be allowed to consider
evidence of a defendant's conduct outside the jurisdiction.
" See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, & SAM KAMIN,
THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA: PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY (2001).
19
20

Calcrim, supranote 5, at No. 104.
Id at 303, 345 (corpus delicti).
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Yet they can consider out-of-state conduct on the question
of whether the defendant's behavior in the case before them
was reprehensible (for instance, to prove that the
defendant's conduct was not an isolated incident).21
Prior conviction evidence presents similar difficulties.
It can generally be used only on the issue of credibility, not
guilt. Yet studies show that limiting instructions have
22
As Shari Diamond and Neil
limited effectiveness.
Vidmar have concluded, it is "psychologically challenging,
and probably impossible" to use a defendant's criminal
the defendant's
record on the issue of whether to believe
23
testimony, but not to decide his guilt.

In fact, there are indications that a limiting
instruction can make the inadmissible evidence more
salient than when the evidence is admitted without such an
To the extent that these evidentiary
instruction. 24
prohibitions are required by the Constitution, there is
probably no alternative. Judges will have to ask jurors to
engage in very difficult or perhaps even impossible mental
gymnastics.
What would make this task easier, in my opinion, is
for the judge to specify the evidence or statements to which
the instruction applies.2 5 For example:
You have heard evidence that defendants A, B, and C
went to the gun store to buy a semi-automatic weapon. You

21

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422

(2003).
Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 162
(2007); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of

22

Limiting Instruction: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to
Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43 (1985).

Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 11, at 1864.
M. Cox and S. Tanford, Effects of Evidence and Instructions in Civil
Trials: An Experimental Investigation of Rules of Admissibility, 4 Soc.
BEHAV. 31 (1989).
25 See bench notes to Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 305.
23

24
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may consider this evidence only against defendants A and
B, not against C.
Clearly,
limiting
instructions
are
extremely
problematic, even if made as informative as possible. Have
you ever tried to forget something? It often seems that the
harder you try, the more deeply it is etched in your mind.
VI.

Do Not Discuss This Case With Anyone

Jurors are routinely told that they should not discuss
the case, or any of the people involved in it, with anyone,
including their families.26 Of course, it is possible for
people not to talk about a particular subject. Spies and
government officials with security clearances are probably
accustomed to uttering "no comment" every time a friend
or family member asks how their day at work went.
However, this is extremely unnatural for ordinary people.
It must be very hard for someone to sit on a jury all day and
then return home for supper, refusing to tell her family
what happened.
This "silencing" rule applies to conversations with
other jurors as well. The instructions generally stipulate
that jurors should not discuss the case among themselves
until they begin their deliberations. 27 This is also strange.
During the length of the trial, the only people that jurors
can have a conversation with (during meals and breaks)
tend to be other jurors. About all they have in common is
their experience on the jury. It is only natural that they
would want to comment on what a witness said or what
they think of a particular lawyer.
It makes sense to tell jurors not to discuss the case
with outsiders, difficult as it may sometimes be, since
talking about the trial might lead to attempts to influence
their decision. The prohibition against discussing the case
26

Calcrim, supranote 5, at No. 10 1.

27

, ,
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with fellow jurors is harder to defend. A strong opponent
of the rule has been Judge Michael Dann of Arizona, who
argues that it reflects an outdated model of jurors as passive
recipients of information served to them by the lawyers and
witnesses, with jurors being expected to suspend all
judgment until the deliberations begin. As he points out, it
is highly unlikely that average
human beings can process
28
information in this way.
The situation has slowly begun to change. The
recently-adopted ABA Standards Relating to Jury Trials
recommends giving civil jurors a limited right to discuss
the evidence during breaks in the trial proceedings, but only
if all jurors are present and they reserve judgment about the
outcome until they have formally deliberated.29 A few
jurisdictions, most notably Arizona, have begun
30
experimenting with allowing pre-deliberation discussions.
A noted group of jury researchers, including Shari
Diamond and Neil Vidmar, videotaped some of the trials as
well as the deliberations in one of these jurisdictions. They
concluded that when jurors were allowed to discuss the
evidence, they used the opportunity to fill in the gaps in
their knowledge,
review testimony, and clarify
misunderstandings. The juries that were allowed to discuss
the evidence also showed a better understanding of expert
testimony. Although the study also identified some

28

B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights".

CreatingEducated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1262-64
(1993).
29 A.B.A., supra note 3, at 13(F).
30 ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(f). For some other jurisdictions, see Shari
Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis, & Beth
Murphy, Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3-4 and n. 7 (2003). For a discussion
of the Arizona jury innovations, see Janessa E. Shtabsky, Comment, A
More Active Jury: Has Arizona Set the Standardfor Reform With Its
New Jury Rules?, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 1009 (1996).
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the researchers rendered
potentially negative consequences,
31
verdict.
positive
a generally
It is time to put an end to the unrealistic view of jurors
as passive recipients of carefully filtered information.
Letting them discuss the case before deliberations is one
way to do so.
VII.

Base Your Decision Solely on the Evidence

Judges also typically tell jurors to base their
decision only on the evidence presented in court. 32 They
prohibit jurors from doing any research, consulting a
dictionary, or using the internet or other reference
materials. They also tell jurors not to conduct experiments
or visit the scene. 33 It is an attempt to create a hermetically
sealed universe, in which access to information is strictly
controlled, and jurors-as noted above-are enjoined to do
nothing but sit back and listen. There are often good
reasons for restricting information in this way, but to some
extent, it conflicts with the basic duty of jurors to decide
the facts.
Jurors may need to decide whether an
intersection of two streets is safe based on photos and
testimony of an engineer, rather than taking the most
logical course of action: driving through the intersection to
see for themselves if it seems safe.
Not only should jurors decline to do any research,
but also they are generally forbidden from considering any
3 Diamond et al., supra note 30, at 74-76. Similar conclusions were

reached by Valerie P. Hans, Paula L. Hannaford, & G. Thomas
Munsterman, The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial

Discussions: The Views of Trial Participants,Judges, and Jurors, 32
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 (1999).
32 Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions, 54, 60

(2003).
33

Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 101; Prosecuting Attorneys

Association of Michigan, Jury Instructions, http://www.paamtraffic
safety.com/www/jury-instructions_2.htm (last visited Mar. 29 2009).
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evidence they might accidentally encounter or discover. A
juror who stumbles upon such information may not share it
with other jurors. 34
These rules are also very
counterintuitive. Although I have never been allowed to
serve on a jury (perhaps for obvious reasons), I am forced
to sit through the selection process every two or three
years. One morning, when I arrived in court for jury
selection, I made a stop at the bathroom and encountered
the defendant, who was accused of possessing a small
amount of heroin. His breath had a strong smell of alcohol
to it. Had it been a public intoxication or drunk driving
case, and had I been selected, could I really be expected to
ignore this "out-of-court" evidence?
The net effect of the "closed universe" of the
courtroom is to require jurors to decide what happened
based on what in some cases is incomplete information.
Either jurors must ignore relevant evidence, or they must
decide "the truth" knowing they do not have access to all of
the facts.
VIII. Forget Everything You Ever Learned
As we discussed in the previous section, jurors are
expected to operate in a closed universe with access only to
specified information. At the same time, they are expected
to bring certain knowledge and capabilities with them.
They need to speak and understand the English language,
and can be excluded if they do not. They are expected to
have and use their common sense, knowledge of the world,
and their experiences as members of our culture and
society. For instance, jurors are often expected to draw
inferences from the facts, but doing so invariably requires
knowledge about how the world works. Tracks in the snow
are evidence that a rabbit has passed over the snow only if
34 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 101; Ninth Circuit Criminal Manual of
Model Jury Instructions, supra note 34, at 60.
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jurors know that there are animals called rabbits, that they
can move themselves forward, and that they leave a certain
type of impression in the snow when doing so. Thus, the
Ohio instruction on circumstantial evidence explicitly
invokes the "common experience of mankind. 35
It is clearly acceptable and, indeed, desirable for
jurors to take certain pre-existing knowledge and
experience into the courtroom. Yet tensions can arise when
the notion of the jury as inhabiting a closed universe, with
strict rules of admissibility of evidence into that universe,
conflicts with the jurors' pre-existing knowledge. The law
then requires jurors to ignore certain aspects of their
knowledge and experience. This can be very hardperhaps impossible-for many people to do.
Although jurors must be able to speak English, they
are sometimes expected to temporarily forget the normal
meaning of certain words. Psychologist Vicki Smith has
examined this phenomenon. Almost every English speaker
is familiar with the term burglary, for instance. In common
usage, it means something like "breaking into a house or
perhaps other building and taking something with an intent
to steal." The legal meaning is quite different: to enter a
house or building without authorization while intending to
commit a felony inside. 36 Legally, therefore, breaking into
a house with an intent to kill the occupant, but taking
nothing, would be a burglary.
Smith asked research subjects to list the features
that they associated with various crimes. 37 The most
common feature associated with burglary (54%) was that
something of value was taken. 38 This is consistent with the
35

Ohio Jury Instructions, No. 405.01 (2006).

36 Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations

of Legal Concepts, 61 J.PERSONALITY & SOC.
(1991).
17 Id. at 859.
" Id.at 861.

PSYCHOL.

857, 857-61

23

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 119
ordinary meaning of the word burglary,but it is not a legal
element of the crime in most jurisdictions. Smith also
asked participants about assault. Around 90% of them
believed that an assault involved a physical attack, even
though this is-once again-not a legal requirement (it is
an element of the related crime of battery). 39 The two most
common features that her subjects listed for a kidnapping
were that there was a ransom demand (63%) and that the
victim was a child (60%).40 These are likewise not
elements of the crime, legally speaking. 4 1 Smith's results
and analysis are more complex than I have suggested, but
they clearly show that jurors have pre-existing knowledge
and concepts that differ from legal requirements.
Smith also found that jury instructions did not alter
the results significantly; the effects of pre-existing
knowledge persisted even after subjects were instructed on
the law.42 Her subjects continued to be heavily influenced
by the ordinary meaning of words like burglary, assault,
and kidnapping, even after hearing the instructions. 43 This
raises the question: could instructions that are more
comprehensible do a better job in dislodging previous
knowledge?
Mathew Curtis and I have done some research on
this issue. We presented undergraduate students at the
University of Southern California with the state's old jury
instruction on circumstantial evidence, which is phrased in
traditional legalese. Other students received the revised
instruction, which had been drafted to state the law in
ordinary language, to the extent possible, and which in

39 Id.
40 Id.

41 Id.
42

Id. at 866.

43 id.
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The circumstantial
addition contained an example. 44
many people
because
evidence instruction is interesting
seem to believe that such evidence is equivalent to weak
evidence. Legally speaking, it is evidence that is based
upon an inference, and it can be either weak or strong.
After they read either the old or new instruction, we
presented participants with factual scenarios that required
them to decide whether the evidence was direct or
circumstantial. It turns out that the ordinary meaning of the
phrase heavily influenced both groups of participants.4a
Those who received the old instructions in legalese had an
overall correct response rate that was very close to chance.
The participants who received the new instructions did
significantly better, but they still had substantial difficulty
distinguishing the two types of evidence. 46 Our results to
some extent confirmed Smith's conclusion. It is difficult to
overcome pre-existing knowledge. Yet instructions written
in plainer English are more effective than those in
traditional legalese.
The law not only expects jurors to forget the
ordinary meaning of words, but it sometimes demands that
they forget their native language entirely. To be exact,
when there is testimony by a witness or the defendant in a
foreign language, judges typically inform jurors that even if
they understand the original testimony, they must follow
the English translation provided by the interpreter. Judges
sometimes add that such a juror may not retranslate the
testimony47or point out to other jurors that the interpretation
is wrong.

Peter Tiersma & Mathew Curtis, Testing the Comprehensibility of
Jury Instructions: California's Old and New Instructions on
CircumstantialEvidence, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 231 (2008).
41 Id. at 256.
44

46 Id.

47

See Calcrim, supranote 5, at No. 121.
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Of course, if you understand Swahili, it is humanly
impossible to ignore what the witness is saying in Swahili
and to listen only to the English translation. It would also
be very frustrating to have the judge essentially issue a gag
order forbidding you from telling the other jurors that the
interpreter made a mistake. Imagine that you, as a speaker
of English, decide to retire in Spain and learn to speak
Spanish well enough to serve on a jury. If a witness
testified in English, would you be able to close your ears
and listen only to a bad translation of the testimony into
Spanish?
Of course, interpreters are generally qualified
professionals who tend to be very offended if someone
questions their translation. Yet they are not always well
qualified, and even excellent interpreters can make
mistakes under pressure. The best compromise may be to
tell jurors to follow the translation, but if they believe that
the interpreter made a mistake, to inform the bailiff or some
other court official.48
IX.

Be a Lie Detector

Jurors are supposed to decide what happened, at
least when the facts are in dispute. To do so, they need to
determine the credibility of witnesses. 49 Unfortunately,
50
human beings are not very good lie detectors.
Furthermore,
mechanical lie detectors are not much
51
better.
Perhaps the reason that we leave the credibility of
witnesses up to the jury, even though it may be difficult or
48

49
50

See id.
See Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 105.
See ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: THE PSYCHOLOGY

OF LYING AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

(Wiley

2000).

The seminal case is Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923).
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impossible for them to determine who is telling the truth, is
that the collective judgment of twelve ordinary citizens is
probably as accurate as the decision of a single judge or a
machine. Some day there may be a reliable technological
solution, but for now a jury can sniff out the truth as well as
any of the alternatives currently available. The jury's
decision may not always be factually correct, but it is
legally correct by virtue of the mere fact that it was made
by a jury.
X.

Follow My Instructions

Judges almost always tell jurors that they must
52
follow the instructions, even if they disagree with them.
In other words, the instructions are not just suggestions.
They constitute the law that governs the case. Until about a
hundred years ago, juries had a certain amount of power, or
at least some discretion, to decide what the law is. Today it
is well settled in almost all American jurisdictions that the
judge decides what the law is, and the jury determines the
facts. How nullification fits into this picture is hard to say
exactly. The general rule seems to be that the jury has the
power to nullify, but does not have the right to do so. The
prevailing view is also that the judge should not inform
53
them that they have this power.
Of course, if the jury has to follow the judge's
instructions, it must remember them. This is problematic if
they were only conveyed orally, especially if the legal
standards are fairly complex. Even if it receives a written
copy, a jury has to understand the instructions. A wellknown study by Robert and Veda Charrow involved
playing 14 pre-recorded civil jury instructions to people
who had been called for jury duty, but who did not serve.
They were then asked to paraphrase the instructions as best
52 Calcrim, supranote 5, at No. 200.
53

People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209 (Cal. 2001).
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they could. Roughly speaking, about one-third to one-half
of the information conveyed by the instructions made its
way into the paraphrases. 54 The rest, presumably, had been
forgotten or was not comprehended.
Obviously, jurors cannot follow instructions that
they cannot remember or did not understand. For this
reason, several experts have recommended that juries
should always receive a written copy. Whether to provide
written copies is usually left to the discretion of the trial
judge, and many prefer not to do so. Some judges are
actually prohibited from providing copies of the
instructions, most notably in the New York criminal courts.
Perhaps they fear that jurors will fixate too much on the
exact text, or that they will focus on one part of the text to
the exclusion of others. This is not an unreasonable
position. People tend to interpret written materials much
more literally than speech, and they tend to focus on exact
words, at least when the author seems55to have taken great
care in formulating the words of a text.
American judges, whether individually or as part of
a jury instruction committee, spend a fair amount of time
drafting the precise text of jury instructions. Directions to
the jury are quintessentially written texts. It is therefore
problematic when they are delivered purely by word of
mouth. As compared to spoken language, writing is much
denser (more information is conveyed in fewer words),
there is less repetition, the language is more formal and
56
difficult to understand, and the syntax is more complex.
Written language is meant to be read, not heard. Readers
54

Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language

Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79

COLUMB. L. REV. 1306 (1979).
55 Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1187, 1274 (2007).
56 Peter Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory
Interpretation,76 TUL. L. REV. 431 (2001).

28

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 124
can take as much time as they need to figure out what it
means.
When people listen to spoken language, on the other
hand, they have to process it immediately, because usually
more speech is on its way. As a result, they may not
understand or remember the exact details of what the
speaker said, especially if the message is complicated.
Hearers tend to remember only the gist of what was said,
not the exact words.
The message is that if judges want jurors to
remember and apply carefully formulated and complex
instructions, they need to give jurors an exact copy of the
text. On the other hand, if a judge wants the jury to decide
the case on relatively general or straightforward principles,
and the case is legally uncomplicated, delivering the
instructions orally should be fine. In an English case that I
once observed at the Old Bailey, the judge's instructions on
the law consisted of telling the jury that rape involved
sexual intercourse without the woman's consent, and that
the jury had to be "sure" of its verdict. The judge was not
reading from a written script, so there would have been no
written copy to give to jurors. Nor would there have been a
need to provide jurors with written instructions.
Accordingly, if a judge delivers only oral
instructions, she should keep it simple. The instructions
should truly be oral language. If the instructions are long
and complicated enough that the judge has to write them
out and read them, he or she should give a copy of those
written instructions to the jury. Because almost all
American judges these days read carefully drafted written
text to jurors, they should normally give the jury a copy of
that text.

29

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 125
XI.

Read My Mind

Just as the factual information given to jurors may
sometimes be incomplete, the same may apply to the
instructions.
Critical information may sometimes be
missing, or the instructions may contain an ambiguity. If
the jury asks for clarification, the judge might57provide it or
he might just re-read the original instructions.
One of my colleagues at Loyola Law School of Los
Angeles, Christopher May, served on a jury and afterward
wrote a short article about his experience. As expected, the
jurors had trouble correctly understanding some of the
instructions, although they certainly understood the gist of
the matter. What surprised him was that the problem was
not limited to comprehension of the meaning of words and
sentences.
He found that jurors-even when they
understood the instruction-had little idea what to do with
the information. 58 Presumably, jurors know what the end
product of their deliberations should be, but how do they
get there? What should they do first? Then what should
they do?
I would assume that most judges give jurors a
general overview of what they can expect during the trial.59
Beyond some general admonitions, they tend to be quite
coy about how jurors should approach deliberations.
Consider homicide. In many cases, jurors must process
two or three options, such as first-degree and seconddegree murder or manslaughter. In California, at least,
judges refuse to give the jury any advice on where to start
or how to proceed, although our new instructions do

Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 223-24 (Autumn 1989).
58 Christopher N. May, What Do We Do Now?: Helping Juries Apply
57

the Instructions,28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 869 (1995).
59 See Calcrim, supranote 5, at No. 100.
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include a general summary of the how the different types of
homicide relate to each other.
Judges also hide the ball on some other issues,
sometimes because they fear that they will slant or bias the
matter in some way. A good example is the California
instruction on evaluating the credibility of eyewitness
identifications.60 The instruction starts with a long list of
basic principles, such as how well the witness knew the
defendant, how well she could see him, and so forth.
Almost all of these principles are relatively self-evident.
Still some potentially important information, which may be
less obvious, is missing. One of the last items on the list is
whether the witness and the defendant are of different
races. Research has shown that cross-racial identifications
are much more problematic than those within a race. 61 The
California Supreme Court has acknowledged the point. 62 It
seems to me that this is one of the critical issues that the
instruction is meant to address. Yet all the instruction does
is hint at this conclusion, rather than state it directly. If
jurors want to know why it might matter that the witness
and the defendant are of different races, they need to guess,
or do some independent research (which is strictly
prohibited!).
Or they need to read the judge's mind.
XII.

You Be the Judge

Sometimes judges ask juries to make legal
decisions. An example is a California instruction involving
assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer who is
lawfully performing his duties. It specifies that the officer
is not lawfully performing his duties if he is making an
60

Id. at No. 315.

Sherri Lynn Johnson, Cross-RacialIdentificationErrors in Criminal
Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 934, 936 (1984).
62 People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 717-18 (Cal. 1984).
61
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unlawful arrest or using excessive force. 63 In order to
decide whether the officer was "lawfully" performing his
duties, jurors are referred to another instruction that
explains, in great detail, when an arrest or detention is
permissible and how much force the officer is allowed to
use in specific circumstances. 64 This, of course, requires
jurors to be informed of concepts like "probable cause" and
"exigent circumstances." Such issues can be hard enough
for judges to determine. It is asking many ordinary jurors
to understand and apply the rules of criminal procedure.
Surely, they must be thinking, "Doesn't the state pay the
judge to make these decisions?"
On other occasions, the law expects jurors to
understand and apply constitutional law. Thus, California's
stalking law contains a defense if the accused person was
engaged in constitutionally protected activities. Jurors may
therefore be called upon to decide whether specified
conduct, which would otherwise constitute stalking, is
protected by the Constitution. 65 This is, once again, the
sort of decision that is normally made by judges, and even
they find it difficult to draw clear lines in this area.
Perhaps special interrogatories, which simply ask
jurors to decide whether certain facts are true or not, would
be a better solution. The court could then assess, based
upon those facts,
whether the constitutional defense should
66
available.
be
Jurors, like judges, may also need to understand the
intricacies of the law of evidence. California has an
instruction dealing with a non-expert witness giving an
"opinion" on some matter. Once they have figured out
63
64
65

Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 860.
Id. at No. 2670.
Cal. Pen. Code, § 646.9(f) and (g) (2008); Id. at No. 1301.

This solution may not be practical in states, like California, which
are extremely reluctant to allow special interrogatories in criminal
cases. See People v. Perry, 499 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1972).
66
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which part of the testimony was an "opinion," jurors can
67
give it "whatever weight they think appropriate,"
although they are not told what an "opinion" is in a legal
sense. The average person will probably understand it as
defined in the American Heritage Dictionary: "A belief or
conclusion held with confidence, but not substantiated by
positive knowledge or proof., 68 If that is what jurors think
an "opinion" is, they should give opinions no credence
whatsoever!
Judges could make life easier for jurors by
specifying which parts of the witness' testimony were
"opinion" from a legal perspective. They might tell jurors:
"The bartender at Pete's Place testified that the defendant
was drunk when he left the bar on the night in question.
The law refers to this as 'opinion testimony.' There are
special rules for evaluating opinion testimony...."
Another judicial function that jurors must
sometimes perform is statutory interpretation. Whenever
judges instruct jurors using legalistic language that it is
taken verbatim from a statute, they are inviting-perhaps
even requiring-jurors to engage in statutory interpretation.
For instance, a California law makes it illegal to possess an
incendiary device "in an arrangement or preparation,"
language imported verbatim into a criminal instruction. 69
What in the world is a device in an arrangement or
preparation? If the judge does not explain it, jurors will
have to figure it out on their own. In other words, they will
have to interpret statutory language, an activity that is
usually considered the exclusive domain of judges.
Occasionally, appellate courts have held that jurors
should not interpret statutes. In Godfrey v. Georgia, a jury
67 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 333.
68 American Heritage Dictionary of

the English Language 1233 (4th
ed. 2006).
69 Calcrim, supra note 5, at No. 1550,
based on Cal. Pen. Code § 453
(2008).
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sentenced the defendant to death for a murder that was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim." 70 The Supreme Court overturned the
penalty because the judge did not explain what these terms
meant. 7 Notice that this phrase is quite ambiguous. Is it
enough if a murder is horrible, or does it also have to
involve torture? In other words, does the phrase "in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim" modify only "inhuman," or both
"horrible or inhuman," or does it in addition modify "vile"?
The judge did not interpret the statute for the jurors, leaving
them to their own devices. They could have decided that
the statute merely required that the crime be "horrible," an
adjective that could be applied to any intentional killing.
Likewise, a New Jersey court has held that "[a] court's
obligation to guide the jury includes the duty to clarify
statutory language . . . when clarification is essential to

ensure that the jury will fully understand and actually find
[the elements of the crime]. 72
Yet, as Lawrence Solan has pointed out, many
courts have approved instructions that mimic statutory
language, without any further explanation.73 Indeed, it
remains common practice for jury instructions to track
statutes verbatim, or almost verbatim. Much statutory
language is reasonably comprehensible, of course. When it
is not, jurors will have to place their own gloss on it.

70
71
72

446 U.S. 420 (1980).
Id.

State v. Alexander, 643 A.2d 996, 1000 (N.J. 1994).

Lawrence Solan, Jurors as Statutory Interpreters, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1281, 1307 (2003). See also Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning,
Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury
Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1998);
Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
877 (1999).
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Several academics, including Solan, give at least
cautious approval to having jurors interpret statutes,
arguing that it will allow the jury to acquit when "the
prosecution is more aggressive than the74ordinary meaning
and the jury's sense of decency permit."
What many judges seem not to realize is that when
they give the jury instructions that are full of legalese, as
happens when they parrot the language of statutes or
judicial opinions, they invite the jury to interpret that
language as they think best. This is, as Solan and others
75
admit an invitation to engage in a type of nullification.
Personally, I have very conflicting views on giving jurors
this power. The notion that juries are champions of justice
and bastions against oppression is certainly an attractive
one. Yet the rule of law is also an extremely important
value, one that the power of nullification undermines.
This is not the time or place to debate nullification.
My point is simply that if we want jurors to follow the law,
we need to ensure that the jurors understand it. Otherwise,
judges will be delegating their power of statutory
interpretation to the jury. You can be the judge as to
whether that is a good idea.
XIII. You Be the Expert
In addition to sometimes having to perform the
functions of a judge, jurors may be called upon to be
experts in a number of disparate fields. They may have the
assistance of expert witnesses at times, but on other
occasions, the jury simply has to figure it out as best it can
(without doing any research, of course!).

74 Solan, supra note 75, at 1311.
75 See generally id
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A.

Lexicography

The legal system expects jurors to have an immense
vocabulary.
Jurors must function like lexicographers
(scholars who study the meaning of words and compile
dictionaries). Of course, they have no training in this very
specialized field. Moreover, lexicographers have a large
number of reference works at their disposal. Jurors, in
contrast, commit misconduct if they look up words in a
dictionary or conduct a search for it on the internet.
Perhaps the most troubling example is contained in
death penalty instructions. They often tell jurors to
compare "mitigating" to "aggravating evidence" in order to
decide whether a defendant should be sentenced to death or
life in prison. Yet "mitigate" is a relatively unusual word
outside the law, and even people familiar with it sometimes
confuse it with "militate." Nonetheless, several courts have
held that it is a word of ordinary meaning that does not
need to be defined.76 If that were true, why is it that in at
least ten published capital cases, six of them from
California, juries have
asked the judge to explain the
77
meaning of this word?

"Aggravation" is indeed an ordinary word, but its
legal meaning differs dramatically from how ordinary
people generally use it. For the average person, to
"aggravate" is to annoy. Your neighbor's loud stereo
music can be very aggravating, but this is not a reason to
have him executed.
The list of examples of highly unusual or literate
vocabulary is long, so I will limit myself to a few additional
illustrations. Some criminal jury instructions use the word

76

Peter Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors

Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1, 13; Tiersma, supra
note 7, at 233-40.
77 Tiersma, Dictionariesand Death, supra,note 78, at 15-17.
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"importune," for instance. 78 If you are familiar with older
translations of the Bible, you may know what this word
means: "Do this now, my son, and deliver thyself, Seeing
thou art come into the hand of thy neighbor: Go, humble
thyself, and importune thy neighbor. . . ."79 Today, most
people would probably call the sheriff if they thought you
were importuning your neighbor.
A way to determine the rarity of "importune" is to
compare its frequency of occurrence with "beg," a close
synonym. Today, the internet is a convenient way to do so.
Using the search engine Google, and limiting ourselves to
English websites, we find the word "importune" occurring
just over 373,000 times. 80 "Beg" occurs around 31 million
times. 81 Of course, the internet is constantly changing and
the number of hits will probably increase over time. The
ratio of one word to the other is likely to remain roughly
the same, however. In this case, '"beg"
occurs around 83
82
times more often than "importune."
A printed resource is The Educator's Word
Frequency Guide.8 3 It is based on a corpus of over 17
million words, containing over 150,000 word types (i.e.,
distinct words). The corpus consists of samples of text
from textbooks, literature, and popular works of fiction and
nonfiction. In this large corpus, the verb "beg" occurs 538
times, whereas "opportune" occurs 4 times. Thus, "beg" is
84
about 134 times as common as "importune."
Colo. Jury Instr., Criminal 7:35; 5 Conn. Prac., Criminal Jury
Instructions § 5.3 (4th ed.); 11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim.
WPIC 19.01 (3d ed.); NJ J.I. CRIM 2C: 11-3a(3).
79 Proverbs 6:3 (New American Standard Version).
80 Search conducted by author on Jan. 15, 2009.
78

81

Id.

82

Id.

83 SUSAN M. ZENO ET AL., THE EDUCATOR'S
WORD FREQUENCY GUIDE

(1995).
84 In each case, all variants
of the word were counted (beg, begged,
etc.).
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There are many other rare words used in jury
instructions. A few examples follow. The number of
Google search results is in parentheses, followed by a slash
and then the number of occurrences in The Educator's
Word Frequency Guide):
captious (in the reasonable doubt instruction 85)
(306,000/1)
extenuate (in death penalty instructions 86)
(220,000/4)
inveigle (in kidnapping instructions) (141,000/3)
preponderate (used for civil burden of proof 87)
(294,000/0)
Obviously, we should not be talking to jurors using
terminology that is so extremely rare in ordinary speech
and writing.
The words below are similar in meaning to those
above, and they give an impression of the number of
occurrences of more common words:
petty (31,200,000/240)
reduce (205,000,000/1720)
entice (5,500,000/23)
likely (278,000,000/1918)
I was surprised by the relatively low frequency of
"entice," which I thought was a fairly normal word.
Although not nearly as rare as "captious" and
"preponderate," the low number of results on the internet is
fairly consistent with its relatively rare occurrence in the
corpus of The Educator's Word Frequency Guide. If
possible, it would make sense to use "persuade" instead, for
which Google reports over 17 million hits, and the word

The word "captious" was part of the Tennessee reasonable doubt
instruction, State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 522 (Tenn. 2004), but
has recently been deleted, Tenn. Pattern Instructions, Criminal 2:03.
85

86

87

Cal. Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 8.85.
Id., No. 2.50.2.
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88
frequency guide reports 543 occurrences.
Word frequency is only a rough indicator of how
likely it is that jurors will understand a word. Yet it can
provide some useful insights. Because the internet is
essentially a huge corpus, which is easily accessed by
means of search engines, it has become possible for almost
anyone to conduct a frequency count. You, too, can be an
amateur lexicographer! Of course, jurors are forbidden to
conduct this sort of research, or even to use a dictionary.
For that reason, the legal system should use words of
relatively high frequency, words that jurors can understand.

B.

Etymology (and Historical Lexicography)

A jury may also need to have expertise in
etymology (the study of the origin of words) and historical
lexicography (the study of what words meant in the past) in
order to properly perform its task.
In California, it is illegal to manufacture an
incendiary device. 89 The word originally meant "to make
by hand," as indicated by the presence of the Latin root
manus "hand." 90 The modern meaning is "to make or
process goods, especially in large quantities and by means
of industrial machines." 91 It sounds very odd to say that
someone manufactured a cake or a basket or a birdhouse,
unless those objects are made in mass quantities by
machine. A modern juror might well think that the
defendant is only guilty of manufacturing incendiary
devices if he was mass-producing them.

88

Search, supra note 82.

Calcrim, supranote 5, at No. 1550.
90 Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modem
89

English (4th ed. 1966) 195-96 (etymology of "fact" at paragraph 3).
91 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1067
(4th ed. 2000) (definition of "manufacture").
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Statutes relating to forgery commonly use terminology
that jury instructions use in an archaic sense. Often they
define the crime as "uttering" or "publishing" a false or
counterfeited "instrument." 92 The word utter is related to
out, and it originally meant something like "to put out or
forth." Today it refers exclusively to sending out speech by
means of the vocal chords, except in instructions, where its
old significance still holds sway. Much the same is true of
publish, which originally meant "to make public," but
which in modern English is used mostly in the sense of
making public by printing. The meaning is currently being
extended to placing text and images on the internet, but the
older meaning of publish, which is the sense in which it is
used in forgery cases, is fairly archaic. It would sound very
odd if someone said that she "published" a poem by doing
a poetry reading or by giving a few handwritten copies to
some friends.
Some jury instructions use the word subscribe in an
outdated sense, to mean "sign."
Originally, the word
referred to writing something (Latin scribere "write") at the
bottom of a document (Latin sub means "under"). Today it
refers primarily to ordering a periodical or pledging money
to a good cause. For the average person, a subscription is
no longer a signature, but a contract to pay for the receipt
of a periodical.
Finally, the phrase abandonedand malignant heart can
still be found occasionally in instructions for murder.
Malignant is sometimes still used in its original sense of
"evil" or "pernicious." When used in a medical sense (as
the word heart suggests), it usually means "cancerous."
The adjective abandoned seems to mean something like
"uninhibited" in its legal sense, but that sense has largely
been lost in modem usage. Not only are these adjectives
used in an archaic (or, at least, extremely unusual) sense,

92

Cal. Jury Instructions, Criminal, 15.01.
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but the notion that emotions and intentions arise in the heart
is also highly anachronistic.
We should leave etymology and historical
lexicography to the real experts in this area.
C.

Economics

Economics is another field in which juries may have
to master, both in criminal and civil cases. In tax cases,
jurors may be asked to decide whether the defendant had
unreported taxable income. They may need to apply the
net worth method, the bank deposits method, the cash
expenditures method, or the specific items method. 93 For
instance, under the bank deposits method, jurors must
decide that the defendant engaged in an activity that
produced taxable income, that the defendant regularly
deposited money in bank accounts, and that the money did
not come from nontaxable sources. Nontaxable sources
include gifts, inheritances, and loans. 94 Considering that
many people cannot even calculate their own taxes, it
seems a lot to demand that jurors calculate someone else's.
In the civil context, present value calculations
present another example of where jurors need to function as
economic experts. Typically, juries are required to reduce
certain economic damage awards (those intended to
compensate for a future expense) to present value. This
requires that juries predict what the inflation and the
interest rates will be in future years. That is impossible, of
course, even for Nobel-prize-winning economists.
Assuming jurors can make an educated guess
regarding interest rates and inflation, they still need to
know how to do the calculation. As illustrated by the

93 Calcrim, supra note 5,
94

Id. at 2843.

at No. 2842-45.
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Tennessee instruction, judges
typically explain the concept
95
in relatively abstract terms.
Present cash value" means the sum of money
needed now which, when added to what that sum may
reasonably be expected to earn in the future when invested,
would equal the amount of damages, expenses, or earnings
at the time in the future when the damages from the injury
will be suffered, or the expenses must be paid, or the
earnings would have been received. You should also
consider the impact of inflation, its impact on wages, and
its impact on purchasing power
in determining the present
96
damages.
future
of
cash value
It can help a great deal to provide an example or
illustration. Bethany Dumas suggests the following:
If you know that a person will need $1,000 five years
from now, you would normally not give him the $1,000
now, but if you were requiredto give him money now, you
would give him only the amount which, when invested,
would equal $1000 in five years. 97How much that money
should be now is for you to decide.
Special verdict forms might also be worth using. Such
forms might ask, "How much will the Mr. Akbar need for
future medical treatment?" The next question could ask
jurors to decide what the rate of inflation is likely to be in
the ensuing five years. The judge could then do the math,
but since judges are also not economists, they would
probably invoke the assistance of an accountant.
D.

Other areas of expertise

There are several other areas in which jurors need to
make decisions that we would normally leave to experts.
95

Tenn. Pattern Instructions, Civil, No. 14.54 (8th ed. 2008).

Id.
Bethany K. Dumas, US Pattern Jury Instructions: Problems and
Proposals,7 FORENSIC LlNGUISTICS 49, 61 (2000).
96

97
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Some instructions relating to sexual crimes, for instance,
require jurors to become specialists in human anatomy.
Jurors may need to become gun experts to deal with
weapons offenses or they may have to distinguish between
types of drugs if the case involves controlled substances.
Finally, they may need to be statisticians. Jurors presented
with DNA evidence may have to decide questions of
statistical probability, for instance. The available research
generally concludes that they do not comprehend such
issues very well.98
Given our legal system, there may be no way to
avoid having jurors act as experts from time to time. It is
usually not impossible for them to do so, but it can surely
be difficult. Juries obviously need some guidance from
comprehensible jury instructions and expert testimony. We
are making progress on the goal of producing more
understandable instructions. Now we just need to figure
out a way to persuade expert witnesses to explain their
fields of expertise more clearly.
XIV.

Helping Jurors Do the Impossible

I have already mentioned some solutions to the
problem of asking jurors to do the impossible. I anticipate
that other participants in this symposium will elaborate on
these solutions or offer additional ideas. What follows is a
summary of some ways to ease the burden on jurors.
A. Find Someone Else to Do It
If it truly is impossible for jurors to do something,
an obvious solution is not to ask jurors to do it in the first
place. Of course, how judges interpret the scope of the
right to trial by jury will limit what can be done in this
respect. Logically, however, it seems silly to have juries be
98

Vidmar & Hans, supra note 22, at 182.
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the judge when a judge is available and qualified to make a
decision, such as whether an arrest or detention was legal.
Having juries comprised of experts in highly
technical areas may also make sense on occasion. If a case
involves tax fraud, a jury made up of accountants might not
be a bad idea, or we might have the case decided by an
ordinary jury, but ensure that two or three accountants are
also on the jury. Lawyers will probably object. They often
seem to strive to exclude from the jury anyone who knows
anything about the subject matter. Still, what could be
more sensible than having a few economists on a jury that
needs to decide a complicated case involving damages
resulting from price-fixing?
In reality, most American judges would be very
hesitant to allow specialized juries. Unlike English judges,
99
who can keep an overly complex case from the jury,
American judges sometimes have juries decide very
complicated issues. They apparently have a great deal of
confidence in the ability of jurors to understand the
evidence. Moreover, there is a real danger that specialized
juries will be biased toward one of the parties, or that they
are not representative of the community. What are called
"special juries" were once relatively common in the United
States, but
because of concerns such as these they are rare
00
'
today.
Thus, juries will have to decide some very
complicated factual issues, which require them to make
sense of expert testimony. The research on this issue, as
summarized by Vidmar and Hans, suggests that juries do
indeed find it hard to process highly technical evidence, but
that they do their best and for the most part do a credible
job. 10 Moreover, a study by Lynne Foster Lee and Irwin
Horowitz suggests that certain reforms, such as allowing
at 37.
100 Id. at 68-69.
101 Id. at 153-57.

9' Id
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jurors to take notes and giving them some instructions
before the evidence is presented, helps jurors to make sense
of complicated information and to base their decisions upon
the evidence. 10 2 On the other hand, when the language in
even
which the information is presented is highly complex,
0 3
pre-instructions and note taking do not suffice.1
What happens when jurors do not understand the
testimony of experts? Research by Joel Cooper and others
10 4
suggests that jurors shift to "peripheral processing."
They focus on factors like the experts' credentials and rate
of pay. 105 Thus, they tend to follow the conclusions of the
experts who have the best 06
credentials and charge the most
1
testimony.
their
for
money
Although it may sometimes be possible to have a
judge or jury of experts decide a specific issue or even an
entire complicated case, a jury of ordinary citizens is likely
to remain the standard. Because ordinary jurors are not
experts on the law, the legal system needs to ensure that it
is explained to them in a way that they can comprehend.
Since they cannot be experts in economics or medicine,
such testimony must be presented in an understandable
way. If that is not feasible, we should probably let the
experts decide the case.
B. Find an Alternative Solution
Some things are impossible not just for juries, but
for anyone. Predicting the future is the best example.
Because no one can know the future, it may make more
102

Lynne Foster Lee & Irwin Horowitz, The Effects of Jury-aid

Innovations on Juror Performance in Complex Civil Trials, 86
JUDICATURE 184 (2003).
103 Id.at 188.
104The research

is summarized in Vidmar & Hans, supra note 22, at

180.
Id.

105
106

Id.
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sense to wait until the future becomes the present (as with
damages for future lost wages or medical costs). There is
already a trend towards allowing periodic payments or
some kind of trust fund or structured settlement approach,
where damages for lost future wages can be paid over time,
and the expenses of future medical treatments can be
distributed when they are incurred. It not only eliminates
the difficulty of estimating the amount of future economic
losses, but also the need to make a present value
calculation.
This solution will not work in all areas. Not only is
it impossible to predict how much pain someone will have
in the future, but it is impossible with any certainty to place
a dollar amount on the pain that someone is suffering right
now. In such cases, the law seems to be using jurors to
legitimize a calculation that no human being can really
make, but that must nonetheless be made. The resulting
decision is correct not because jurors can predict the future
or place an economic value on pain, but because a jury of
twelve citizens made it.
C.

Explain Clearly What the Jurors are
Expected to Do

If the law expects jurors to perform difficult or
impossible tasks, it needs to tell them what to do in a way
that makes sense to them. I have a watch with a digital
display that tells me time, the day of the week and the date.
It has four buttons that change the display, start and stop a
stopwatch or countdown timer, place phone number into a
phonebook, access the phonebook, and so forth. The four
buttons have to be pressed in a particular order, and often
multiple times, to achieve any one of these goals.
Whenever the time changes, I need to adjust the clock.
Although embarrassed to admit it, I cannot figure out how
to do this without consulting the manual. Six months later,
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I have forgotten how to do it and again have to pull out the
instructions. The procedure is not intuitive, with the result
that it is virtually impossible for me to set the time on this
watch without assistance. Fortunately, the instructions are
reasonably clear, as long as I read them carefully and do
exactly what they tell me.
The moral is that what started out as an impossible
task may become completely doable by means of clear,
step-by-step instructions. This lesson applies to juries also.
What might be impossible for a jury to figure out on its
own may become entirely feasible if the jury receives
understandable directions. I have elsewhere laid out some
general principles for preparing comprehensible jury
instructions, 107 so the following is merely a short summary.
1. Speak plainly
The most obvious requirement for drafting
understandable instructions is to use ordinary language to
construct relatively short and straightforward sentences.
Jurors should not have to be lexicographers. Nor should
they have to be experts in syntax.
2. Speak concretely
A second basic principle is to make the instructions
as concrete as possible. Statutes are typically abstract
principles of law. Jurors will need to apply those principles
to the facts. The judge's instructions should help them so
do.
One way to be more concrete is to insert the names
of the parties whenever possible. Many current criminal
instructions track statutory language by referring to "a
107Peter M. Tiersma, Communicating with Juries: How to Draft More

Understandable Jury Instructions (National Center for State Courts,
2006).
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person" (when they really mean the defendant) and
"another person" (when referring to the victim). They also
tend to speak in the present tense ("a person commits
murder. . . .") when the jury's task is to decide what
happened in the past. It would be more informative for the
judge to tell the jury that Jane Jones is guilty of murder if
she intentionally killed Sam Smith and did not act is selfdefense. Of course, the law of homicide is complicated,
but it should generally be possible to state legal principles
in concrete terms that make sense in the context of the
specific case that the jury must decide.
3. Be positive
Jury instructions tend to waddle in negativity.
Perhaps the best illustration is the short phrase, "innocent
misrecollection is not uncommon."
If we count the
prefixes un- and mis- as negatives (as we should), this0 8fiveword clause has no less than three negative elements.'
California's old reasonable doubt instruction is
another example. It began: "Reasonable doubt is defined as
follows: It is not a mere possible doubt. . . ."" 9 When the
instruction got around to defining what a reasonable doubt
is (as opposed to what it is not), it once again did so in the
negative: "It is that state of the case which.. .leaves the
minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say
they feel10 an abiding conviction of the truth of the
'
charge."
Of course, tinkering with the reasonable doubt
instruction is fraught with peril.'11 In many jurisdictions
reforming it may require legislative action. Yet it seems to
me that all that need to be said is that jurors, after carefully
108Tiersma,

supra note 7, at 66.

109 Id.at 194-96.
110

Id.

1 See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 69 P.3d 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App._2003).
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considering all the evidence, must be "firmly convinced" of
the truth of the charge. 112 However the standard is defined,
it should be done as positively as possible.
4. Tell the jurors what to do
As mentioned, a judge should speak plainly,
concretely, and positively to the jury. Yet much of the law,
even if explained in the most understandable language,
remains conceptually very complex. The best way to
ensure that someone completes a complicated task is to
break it down into smaller and more manageable tasks,
along with step-by-step instructions that explain what to do
first and what to do next.
Consider the directions for a CD or DVD player.
Suppose that (as is often true), they merely explain what
the function of each button is: "button A turns the power
off and on; button B is used to play and pause the disk;
button C selects the output channel," and so forth.
Experienced users of such equipment will have no trouble
figuring it out, but many people would not know where to
start. It is far more effective to specify what you need to do
to accomplish a particular goal. For instance, to play a
DVD disk, you should
turn the player on by pressing the power button;
press the eject button to open the tray that holds the
DVD disk;
place a disk in the tray;
press the eject button again to close the tray; and
push the "play" button to start viewing your DVD.
And, of course, an illustration of the device that points
out the location of each button would also be very useful.
In the case of jury instructions, judges should not
just read a list of abstract legal principles. They also need
For a case requiring such language, see State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d
970 (Ariz. 1995).
112
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to tell jurors what to do with the information. Thus, a judge
might advise jurors that they first must decide whether the
defendant committed murder. To do that, they need to
consider the elements for murder and determine whether
each of those elements is true beyond a reasonable doubt.
If so, they need to decide the degree of murder. If not, they
should proceed to the manslaughter instruction and repeat
the process.
An even better way to accomplish this goal is by
means of verdict forms. The committee that created
California's new civil instructions crafted an extensive
series of such forms. Their use in criminal cases is likely to
be more controversial, but when available they can greatly
simplify the jury's task. Imagine being given a copy of the
Internal Revenue Code and directed to use it to compute
your tax. This would be impossible for just about anyone.
Yet quite a few people can determine how much tax they
owe using Form 1040, filling in the blanks, and making
some simple computations.
5. Explain why you are asking jurors to
do something
If a judge is asking jurors to ignore the obvious or
forget about something, they are more likely to comply if
they believe that there is a good reason for the judge's
request. Rather than simply commanding jurors not to
draw an inference from the fact that the defendant in a
criminal case did not testify, the instructions will be more
effective if they explain that the right to remain silent is an
important constitutional principle, that its purpose is to
protect people from coercion, and that for this reason the
defendant can choose not to take the stand. Furthermore, if
the defendant decided not to testify, the jurors should
respect this decision by not assuming that this choice is
evidence that he committed the crime.
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6. Use illustrations and examples
Any competent teacher realizes how important it is
to include pertinent examples and illustrations. Not only do
they help students understand the material, but they also
serve to make the course less dull. In law school classes,
we use not only actual cases but also many hypothetical
scenarios.
Although there are some exceptions, 113 judges tend
to be very leery of examples or illustrations. It is certainly
wise to be cautious in this regard, because a badly-chosen
example may do more harm than good. Nonetheless, they
can be quite effective in illuminating difficult concepts. If
a jury is to have any hope of distinguishing direct from
circumstantial evidence, or reducing damage awards to
present value, an example is almost certainly essential.
7. Answer the jury's questions
Finally, why not let jurors-after they have received
their instructions or before they begin deliberations-ask
the judge any questions they might have about the law
governing the case or the procedures they should follow in
reaching a verdict? Of course, they can ask questions
during their deliberations, but the process is usually quite
cumbersome. Typically, the presiding juror or foreman
must write the question on a piece of paper and give it to
the bailiff, who in turn hands it to the judge. The parties
and attorneys are then summoned back to court and
allowed to argue how the question should be answered.
Then the jurors return to court to receive an answer.
It would be much easier to invite the jurors to ask
questions in open court before they leave to deliberate.
Admittedly, this is a fairly radical suggestion. Yet consider
At medieval universities,
once again the classroom.
13

See Ninth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions, 1.05, comment.
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professors would read from a book or from their notes to
their students (this is what "lecture" meant originally). The
students, who could probably not afford to buy many
books, would write down what the professor said. That
was it. Questions were not encouraged.
It sounds a lot like
114
modem jury instructions, doesn't it?
It is very rare to find a teacher today who does not
allow students to pose questions. Not only do questions
give teachers an opportunity to clarify the material, but they
also provide important feedback on how well the students
understood it. Maybe the time has come to bring the
instruction ofjuries out the dark ages.
Any questions?

114

ROBERT

S. RAIT,

LIFE IN THE MEDIEVAL UNIVERSITY

44-45 (1918).
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ESSAY

JURY REFORM: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM?
Nancy S. Marder*
I.

Introduction

In his essay, Asking Jurors To Do the Impossible,'
Peter Tiersma identifies several ways in which jurors have
difficult, if not impossible, roles to play and suggests
several steps that courts could take to aid jurors in
He offers a number of
performing these roles.
recommendations, such as having judges instruct jurors in
plain and specific language, allowing jurors to ask
questions about the instructions, and explaining to jurors
the reasons for certain rules.2 His recommendations are
sensible, and courts would do well to follow his advice.
With the exception of his call for the creation of expert
juries in technical cases, 3 I agree with his
recommendations, though I think there are good reasons to
go even further than Tiersma does with several of the
reforms he proposes.
Although Tiersma's recommendations provide a
useful starting-point for courts, courts should engage in
those jury reforms that foster any of the following three
basic principles: (1) courts should be honest with jurors; (2)
courts should give jurors the tools that they need to be
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I want to thank the
Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy for inviting me to participate in
"The 2009 Summers-Wyatt Symposium: Asking Jurors To Do the
Impossible." I also want to thank Jeremy Eden for his comments on an
early draft of this essay and Lucy Moss for her library assistance.
l Peter Tiersma, Asking Jurors To Do the Impossible, 5 TENN. J.L. &
POL'Y 105 (2009).
2

Id. at 142-45, 146.

3 Id. at 139-40.
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engaged in the trial and deliberations; and (3) courts should
seek jurors that are broadly drawn from the community.
Jurors from all walks of life will bring an array of
In
perspectives and approaches to jury deliberations.
addition, only if the process of selecting jurors appears fair
and above-board will the parties and members of the
community accept the jury's verdict even when they
disagree with it. If courts follow these three basic
principles, then jurors would be better able to perform their
job even though it is difficult, and at times, seemingly
impossible. To the extent that Tiersma's recommendations
are consistent with these principles, they should be
followed. However, to the extent that his recommendations
fall short of having courts carry out these basic principles,
his recommendations need to go further. Only one of his
recommendations-his call for the creation of expert
juries-should be rejected. Although jurors would be
better off with most of Tiersma's reforms than without
them, it would be a shame for courts to miss an opportunity
to undertake the kind of reforms that would truly aid jurors
in the performance of their difficult role.
I begin by looking at Tiersma's jury reforms that
are consistent with the above principles, but that should go
even further. Reforms that are consistent with these
principles will lead jurors to perform their job more
effectively and will lead members of the community to feel
more satisfied with juries and the verdicts they reach.
Then, I consider the one jury reform-the creation of
expert juries-that Tiersma suggests, but that should be
rejected because it would limit who could serve as jurors
and would undermine the effort to seek jurors drawn
broadly from the community.

55

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 151

II.

Courts Should Be Honest with Jurors

Tiersma identifies several moments when courts do
not level with jurors. These include when courts fail to
instruct jurors on the jury's power to nullify,4 when courts
fail to inform jurors whether a case is a "three-strikes"
case, 5 and when courts fail to acknowledge to jurors that
they are being asked to perform a task that is particularly
difficult, if not impossible. 6 In several of these instances,
Tiersma recommends that courts should be honest with
jurors. I agree with this approach. In one instance,
however, when judges instruct jurors that they must follow
the law and do not tell them that they have the power to
nullify, Tiersma is undecided about the steps courts should
take. 7 In this situation, I think courts should be honest with
jurors and instruct them on the jury's power to nullify. 8 In
three-strikes cases, Tiersma suggests juries may have a role
courts to
to play. 9 I agree, and would go further and urge
0
cases.'
three-strikes
about
be honest with jurors
A.

Instructing Juries on Nullification

One instance when courts are not honest with jurors
is when they instruct jurors that they must follow the law,
but do not instruct jurors on the jury's power to nullify.
Id. at 122, 130.
' Id. at 112.
6 See id. at 108-22.
7 Id. at 130.
8 For a detailed discussion of nullification and why courts should
4

instruct juries on their power to nullify, see Nancy S. Marder, The Myth
of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U.L. REv. 877 (1999).
9 See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 112.
10 See Nancy S. Marder, Juries,Drug Laws & Sentencing, 6 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 337, 341-52, 372 (2002) (describing juries' responses to
three-strikes cases in California and suggesting that courts need to
inform jurors about three-strikes cases rather than leaving jurors to
learn by happenstance).
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Tiersma is ambivalent about nullification and does not take
a stand on whether juries should be instructed on this
power.'1 My recommendation is that courts should not tell
jurors that they must follow the law, when in fact they have
12
the power in their capacity as a jury not to follow the law.
Rather, courts should tell jurors that they have the power to
nullify. Of course, courts can draft the instruction carefully
so that jurors know that this power must be exercised only
in rare circumstances. 13 This information needs to come
from the court; otherwise, some jurors will have heard of
nullification, but others will not and those who are
unfamiliar with the concept will feel at a disadvantage and
will be uncertain
whether or not this power really belongs
14
to the jury.

Chief Judge Bazelon, writing in dissent in United
States v. Dougherty,15 urged courts to instruct jurors on
their power to nullify. In his view, courts had to trust
jurors: "Trust in the jury is, after all, one of the
" See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 130.
12 See Marder, supra note 8, at 957 ("[N]ot
only are jurors not told of
that power [of nullification], but they are told the exact opposite: They
only have the power the judge has described.").
13 Id. ("Admittedly, courts must proceed carefully
so as not to foment
nullification. Nullification should be reserved for compelling cases.").
One model for an instruction on nullification could borrow from the
language of John Adams, who would instruct juries, in part, as follows:
"It is not only [a juror's] right, but his [or her] duty .. .to find the
verdict according to his [or her] own best understanding, judgment and
conscience .... " Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal
Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 582, 605 (1939) (quoting 2 LIFE AND WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 253-55 (C.F. Adams ed., 1856)).
14 For an example of a case in which some members of
the Fully
Informed Jury Association ("FIJA") informed several jurors of the
jury's power to nullify, resulting in a deadlocked jury, a mistrial, and a
subsequent indictment for jury tampering and criminal trespass, see
Turney v. Alaska, 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997).
" 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing the case of the "D.C.
Nine," who broke into the Dow Chemical Company offices and
vandalized them in protest of Dow's manufacture of napalm).
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cornerstones of our entire criminal jurisprudence, and if
that trust is without foundation we must re-examine a great
deal more than just the nullification doctrine."' 16 After all,
jurors are entrusted with life or death decisions. If jurors
are informed of the jury's power to nullify, they would not
only have knowledge but also guidance about when to use
it. 17 His dissent did not persuade his fellow judges on his
panel, who suggested that if jurors were told of this power
they would use it excessively. 18 The majority, in an
opinion written by Judge Leventhal, reasoned that it was
better to let jurors discover this power on their own
in the
9
nullification.'
for
out
call
to
seemed
that
cases
few
One difficulty if the court does not instruct jurors
that they have the power to nullify is that when jurors find
out afterward, they will feel deceived by the court. The
court should not be in the business of deceiving jurors.
Jurors try to perform their job responsibly and ably. They
also try to follow the court's instructions. When they are
told one thing and not told another, only to find out the
truth later on, then they will feel that they have been misled
by the court. It is important that jurors not feel this way
and that they return to their community feeling satisfied
with how they have been treated by the court and how they
have carried out their tasks as jurors. If the jury functions
16

17

Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1143 ("The instruction would speak in terms of acquittal, not

conviction, and it would provide no comfort to a juror determined to
convict a defendant in defiance of the law or the facts of the case.").
18 Id. at 1134 ("[T]he advocates of jury 'nullification' apparently
assume that the articulation of the jury's power will not extend its use
or extent, or will not do so significantly or obnoxiously. Can this

assumption fairly be made?").
19 Id. at 1136-37 ("[Ijt is pragmatically useful to structure instructions
in such ways that the jury must feel strongly about the values involved
in the case, so strongly that it must itself identify the case as
establishing a call of high conscience, and must independently initiate
and undertake an act in contravention of the established instructions.").
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as a "free school,, 20 as Alexis de Tocqueville presciently
observed, then it is important that jurors learn positive
lessons from this experience.
One former judge, B. Michael Dann, who served as
a superior court judge in Maricopa County, Arizona and
who was a catalyst for jury reform in Arizona both in his
own courtroom and in his role as head of the Arizona
Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of
Juries, 2 1 has written about the need to inform jurors of the
jury's power to nullify. 22 Courts routinely instruct jurors
that they "must" convict if they find that all of the elements
23
of a crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judge Dann argues that this mandatory instruction
"invade[s] the province of the jury and violate[s] the
constitutional guarantee of an 'impartial jury."' 24 Instead,
he offers an instruction that judges could use that would
inform jurors about the jury's power to nullify while
teaching jurors that this power should be exercised
sparingly.
The language is straightforward and explains
to jurors that the jury can act consistent with its conscience
20

1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

252 (Jacob
Peter Mayer & Max Lerner eds., 1966) (13' ed. 1850).
21 This committee summarized its recommendations in a report entitled
The Ariz. Supreme Court Comm. On More Effective Use of Juries,
Jurors: The Power of 12 (1994), available at www.supreme.
state.az.us/jury/Jury/jurylgl .htm. Arizona adopted eighteen of the
committee's fifty-five recommendations. See William H. Carlile,
Arizona Jury Reforms Buck Legal Traditions, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 22, 1996, at 1.
22
B. Michael Dann, "Must Find the Defendant Guilty" Jury
Instructions Violate the Sixth Amendment, 91 JUDICATURE 12 (2007).

Id. at 14 ("[A] substantial number of state and federal trial judges
use the strongest term 'must,' or its equivalent, when instructing the
jury on its duty to convict if all the jurors agree that the law's definition
of the crime has been met by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.")
(citation omitted).
23

Id at 12.
25 See id. at 18-19 (providing instruction).
24
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and can acquit a defendant whose guilt has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, but that this power must be
26
exercised with great care and only out of good motives.
He urges judges to adopt his version, or to construct their
own, as long as the instruction tells jurors that the jury can
return a verdict of not guilty, even if the defendant's guilt
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but that this
should only be done in the exceptional case. Judge Dann,
though now retired from the bench, is still in the forefront
of jury reform; as of now, no federal circuit supports27 an
instruction on jury nullification, nor do any state courts.
B.

Informing Juries about "Three-Strikes"
Cases

Although Judge Dann recommends instructing
jurors on nullification, no judge has taken a public stance in
favor of instructing jurors on three-strikes cases. Courts in
California, where three-strikes cases are prevalent, 28 do not
26

Id. at 19 ("You should exercise your judgment and examine your

conscience without passion or prejudice, but with honesty and
understanding. You should exercise with great caution your power to
find a defendant not guilty whose guilt has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
27 See Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and
False Claims of
Jury Nullification, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 285, 310 n.116 (1999)
(providing a list of federal circuits that do not permit an instruction on
nullification and noting that the two states, Indiana and Maryland,
which permit judges to instruct jurors that they have the right to
determine the law as well as the facts, have since limited this
opportunity through case law).
28 California is not the only state with a three-strikes law. See David
Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of "Three Strike"
Laws on State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime
Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 557, 572 (2000) (noting that
twenty-two states and the federal government have a three-strikes law).
However, California, unlike other states, invokes its law frequently.
See id. at 573 ("In the vast majority of the twenty-two states and the
federal government that have adopted three-strikes, the law's effect on
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tell a jury whether or not the case before it is a three-strikes
case.2 9 Instead, the task has fallen to lawyers to provide
hints to the jury that the case before it is a three-strikes case
30 or the task has fallen to jurors to surmise that the case is a
three-strikes case. 31 The task has also fallen to prosecutors
to be circumspect about which cases they choose to bring
as three-strikes cases, particularly in Northern California
where juries are less likely to convict if they sense that a
case is a three-strikes case and the "third strike" is not for a
serious crime. 32 The problem is that juries should not have
to "guess" whether a case is a three-strikes case because if
they guess wrong they are likely to feel bad about their

crime is arguably minimal since it is rarely used. The one exception is
California where 4,468 offenders have been sentenced under the third
strike provision and over 36,043 for a second strike offense.").
29 The three-strikes law in California requires that any person who is
convicted of a serious felony and has two prior felony convictions
defined as "violent" or "serious" is to receive a sentence of twenty-five
years to life imprisonment. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999).
30 Some of the more creative efforts by defense attorneys include the
defense attorney who carried a folder marked "three strikes" across the
top, another who used baseball analogies throughout the trial, and yet
another who asked the jury: "'In 25 years from now will you have an
abiding conviction that justice was served?' Harriet Chiang, Some
Jurors Revolt Over 3 Strikes/Penalty Prospects Sway Their Verdicts,
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1996, at Al.
31 For example, in the case of a man convicted of robbing a security
guard and trying to steal his car, a juror "became agitated and started to
cry when she realized it was a 'three-strikes' case." Tony Perry &
Maura Dolan, Two Counties at Opposite Poles of '3 Strikes' Debate
Crime: San Franciscois Restrictive in Applying Law, San Diego Takes
HardLine, Approaches Reflect Will of Electorate, L.A. TIMES, June 24,
1996, at Al. As one judge remarked, sometimes juries just "smell" that
a case is a three-strikes case. Id. (quoting Judge Alex Saldamando).
32 See id ("San Francisco Dist. Atty. Arlo Smith, aware that liberal
San Francisco juries would not convict, frequently declined to
prosecute nonviolent crimes as 'three-strikes' cases. His more liberal
successor, Terence Hallinan ... has been even more restrictive.").
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verdict afterward.33 Although courts do not usually tell
jurors anything about sentencing because sentencing is
undertaken by the judge (and to some extent by the
prosecutor in a sentencing guidelines case because the
prosecutor can decide how to charge the case), the sentence
can be so draconian in a three-strikes case that it becomes
an instance when the commonsense judgment of a jury is
sorely needed. However, if the court does not tell the jury
that it is hearing a three-strikes case, then the jury cannot
give its commonsense judgment about whether this is an
appropriate case for a mandatory prison term of twenty-five
years to life. As Tiersma points out, with violent crimes,
the jury is likely to convict even if it is a three-strikes
case. 34 However, with minor offenses, 35 such as the theft
of "a slice of pizza," 36 the jury can introduce commonsense
into the process and not have the defendant be imprisoned
for the rest of his life. With three-strikes cases, the court
should not leave the jury to guess, but should inform the
37
jury so that it can provide its "commonsense judgment."
Courts have an opportunity to provide juries with
For example, one juror who had served on a jury that had convicted
a woman for taking a five-dollar cut in a cocaine deal "felt deceived by
the court" after learning that the defendant would go to prison for life
under the three-strikes law. Rene Lynch & Anna Cekola, '3 Strikes=
Law Causes Juror Unease in O.C., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995,
available at 1995 WL 2017381.
34 See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 112.
33

31
36

See id.

See Frank J. Murray, Is a Pizza Worth 25 Years to Life?, WASH.

TIMES, Apr. 29, 1995, at A6 ("Opponents of California's 'three strikes

and you're out' law ... said it was excessive and absurd to invoke it
against Jerry Dwayne Williams for taking a slice of pepperoni pizza
from a group of children."); Eric Slater, Pizza Thief Gets 25 Years to
Life, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B3 ("Jerry Dewayne Williams was
sentenced to prison for 25 years to life Thursday under the state's 'three
strikes' law for stealing a slice of pepperoni pizza.").
37 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (describing the jury
as a safeguard against the exercise of arbitrary power by making
"available the commonsense judgment of the community").
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information that would allow them to fulfill this function
more effectively. The court's silence is a lost opportunity.
Jurors should be told when a case is a three-strikes
case so that they know that if there is a conviction there
will be a mandatory, lengthy prison sentence. Courts
should be honest with juries about this and should not leave
juries with the burden of having to guess and later on
having regrets about their verdict. Jurors have to live with
these regrets for the rest of their lives. Rendering judgment
is difficult enough-for judge or jury. 38 Courts should not
make judging more difficult than it already is for jurors.
C.

Acknowledging the Impossibility of Some
Jury Tasks

Tiersma urges courts to be honest with jurors and to
explain when the task they are being asked to perform is
difficult, if not impossible. He suggests that jurors would
be helped if the court acknowledged the impossibility of
the task and simply asked jurors to do the best they can.
Tiersma identifies several ways in which courts ask jurors
to do the impossible. For example, judges tell jurors to
determine the truth of what happened, even when jurors are
39
not given all of the information they would like to have.
Similarly, when jurors are asked to award damages and to
predict how an injury will affect a person's future job
prospects, earning power, and life span, Tiersma suggests
that courts should tell jurors that no one can predict the
future, but that they should just do this job as best they
can. Additionally, when jurors are told in a criminal case
" Robert Cover described the task of judging as "deal[ing in] pain and
death." Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601,
1609 (1986). Although Cover focused on judges, his description also
applies to juries.
See Tiersma, supranote 1, at 116-17, 130-38.
" See id at 108-09.
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about the presumption of innocence, Tiersma suggests that
judges should provide further explanation because this
concept is difficult for laypersons to understand. After all,
have not the police and prosecutor done their jobs and
arrested and charged the right person? Tiersma proposes
that judges explain to jurors that this is a bedrock principle
and a necessary one because prosecutors, police, and other
law enforcement can and do make mistakes. 4 1 If judges
follow these suggestions and are honest with jurors, then
jurors are more likely to try to do what they have been
instructed to do and will not be as overwhelmed by their
task as they may now feel.
III.

Courts Should Give Jurors the Tools To Be
Engaged Jurors

Tiersma identifies a number of reforms that courts
could undertake that would assist jurors to perform their
difficult roles. His recommendations are helpful insofar as
they encourage jurors to be engaged, but if they went just a
step further, they would enable jurors to have tools that
would lead them to be engaged participants during the trial
and the deliberations.
A.

Giving Jurors Written Copies of
Instructions and Permitting Jurors To
Ask Questions about the Instructions

Tiersma points out that judges instruct jurors by
reading their instructions aloud to jurors from a written text
and that jurors would benefit from having a copy of the
written text.
I quite agree, but would add that jurors
should have individual copies of the written instructions
that they can follow while the judge reads the instructions
41

41

See id. at I22.

See id. at 122-24.
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aloud.43 Jurors should be able to make notes on their
individual written copies of the instructions and should then
be able to take their copies with them when they enter the
jury room to deliberate. Each juror would then have his or
her own annotated copy of the written instructions to
consult during jury deliberations. One judge who gives
jurors their own written copy of the instructions reported
that deliberating juries no longer send notes to her with
legal questions. 44 She described this practice, which she
has adhered to for over a decade, as "wildly successful"
and as "an inexpensive, effective45way to virtually guarantee
juror understanding of the law."
In some courtrooms, jurors listen to the judge's
instructions, but do not receive a written copy of the
instructions.46 It is difficult, if not impossible, to remember
several hours of instructions, given in abstruse legal
language, without being able to see the words or refer back
to them later. These jurors face an uphill battle in their
effort to understand the instructions. Without a written
text, they might ignore the instructions altogether either
because they do not remember them or because they did not
understand them and have no way to clarify what they did
not understand. If, during their deliberations, they send a
note to the judge seeking further clarification, they are
See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the TwentyFirst Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 499-500 (2006)
(describing how individual written copies of the jury instructions aid
jurors' comprehension of the instructions).
44 Jacqueline Connor, Jurors Need To Have Their Own Copies
of
Instructions, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 25, 2004, at 7.
45 Id.
46 For example, in New York, courts do not provide the jury with
even
a single, written copy of the jury instructions. See Terry Carter, The
Verdict on Juries, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2005, at 41, 42 (reporting on New
York's pilot studies, including giving jurors copies of the written
instructions, and noting that these practices have been tried on an
experimental basis but have not yet been adopted as accepted
practices).
43
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likely to find that the judge will simply reread relevant
portions of the instructions to them without actually
47 or the judge could simply
answering their question,
48
ignore their requests.
In other courtrooms, such as those in Illinois, the
entire jury is given one written copy of the instructions to
49
share among all of the jurors during deliberations.
Although the Illinois jurors with their one copy are slightly
better off than the jurors without any written copy at all, the
Illinois jurors are limited because only one juror can see the
written instructions at a time during the deliberations.
Thus, whoever holds the instructions becomes more of an
expert than the other jurors. The Illinois jurors, like the
jurors who do not receive a written copy, were also at a
disadvantage when the instructions were read aloud by the
judge because they did not have a written text that they
could follow as they listened to the instructions. People
absorb information in different ways. 50 Some people learn
See, e.g., Connor, supra note 44, at 7 ("When jurors would send out
questions asking about the meaning of a concept or term, the custom
was always to reread the instruction, as if the jurors would understand a
second recital with the renewed dulcet tones of the judicial officer.");
Mike Kataoka, Eschewing Obfuscation: The Judicial Council Strives
for Plain English with Its New Jury Instructions, CAL. LAW., Dec.
2000, at 52, 53 ("'[Judges] sit up there and read the instructions and
watch people really trying hard to understand. And often the judges
respond to questions simply by reading the same instructions louder."'
(quoting Justice Carol A. Corrigan, Chairwoman of the Judicial
Council Task Force on Jury Instructions and Chairwoman of the
Criminal Subcommittee in California)).
48 See, e.g., SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY
47

WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY

167 (2005) ("Adding insult to injury

from the jurors' perspective, judges sometimes would appear to turn a
cold shoulder when the jury asked them to clarify instructions or define
terms such as 'mitigating."').
49 See ILL. SUP. CT. COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL
CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 7 (2005 ed.).
5o See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Learn How They Learn: Knowing Modes of

Adult Education Helps Lawyers Create Successful Presentations,
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by listening, while others learn by reading. Some prefer to
take notes, while others do not. If instructions are delivered
in two different ways (lecture and written text) rather than
just one (lecture), and if note taking is permitted, 5 1 the court
to
is more likely to reach a greater number of jurors and
52
instructions.
the
remember
and
understand
them
have
Tiersma also suggests that jurors should be
permitted to ask the judge questions about the
instructions. 53 I wholeheartedly agree, and have made this
suggestion before. 54 As Tiersma notes, most teachers take
it for granted that questions are an important part of the
learning process. This is true in the classroom, and is likely
to be true in the courtroom too. Most judges would
probably shy away from this proposal because they worry
that they might say something that would be the basis for
reversal on appeal. 55 One empirical study's findings
A.B.A. J., Aug. 2003, at 26, 26 ("People learn in different ways.... A
good teacher will try to incorporate as many different learning
preferences into his or her instruction as possible.").
51

The trend is toward allowing jurors to take notes, see JURY

TRIAL

141-43 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997), but
not all courts have adopted this practice. See G. Thomas Munsterman
& Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Building on Bedrock: The Continued
Evolution of Jury Reform, JUDGES' J., Fall 2004, at 10, 15 ("Only a
small handful of states continue to restrict juror note taking.").
52
See, e.g., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 51, at 19
("[M]aterial is better remembered when it is presented in several
different forms than in a single form. Having the jurors both listen to
and read the instructions should capitalize on this effect.").
53 See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 146-47.
54 Marder, supra note 43, at 501 ("After the judge reads the
instructions to the jury, but before he or she sends the jury off to
deliberate, the judge should allow jurors to ask questions about the
instructions.").
55 See, e.g., James D. Wascher, The Long March Toward PlainEnglish
Jury Instructions,CBA REC., Feb.-Mar. 2005, at 50, 54 (describing the
response of Cook County Circuit Court Judge Stuart A. Nudelman, a
past president of the Illinois Judges Association, to a jury's question on
the instructions: "[H]e declined to answer the jury's question both
INNOVATIONS
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suggest that jurors' comprehension of the instructions
to ask
would improve if they were given the opportunity
56
instructions.
the
about
have
any questions they
Judge Dann is likely to agree with this
recommendation because he is a believer in judge-jury
"dialogue." 57 Because of Judge Dann's jury reform efforts,
Arizona state court judges now instruct juries that have
reached an impasse that they can turn to the judge for
further assistance. 58 Rather than delivering the typical
"Allen charge," 59 in which jurors are pressured to go back
to the jury room and to try to reach a verdict, Arizona
judges can meet with the jury and see what the basis of the
impasse is and whether further argument by the lawyers or
dialogue with the judge would help the jury to overcome its
impasse. 60
The judge is permitted to play a more
constructive role, as is the jury.
If jurors are able to ask the judge questions about
the instructions, then they will not have to make up answers
during their deliberations. In most courtrooms, jurors are
not permitted to ask the judge any questions about the
because he was not entirely sure how to answer and because any
answer might well have been 'a guarantee of the appellate court saying
that, as the trial judge, I went too far and that it's the jury's job to
interpret instructions.').
56 See Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understandingof
the Law in
Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539, 551 (1992) ("A new finding
of this study is that jurors who requested help from the judge performed
substantially better than those subjects who did not. When the judge
responded by providing supplemental information, either in the form of

written instructions or by explaining the instructions in their own
words, the jurors' understanding of the instructions reached fairly high
levels (up to 67%).").
57 B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona
Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 283 (1996).
58 ARIZ.R. Civ. P. 39(h); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 22.4.

59 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (holding that there
was no error when the jury returned for further instructions and the trial
court judge instructed the jurors to reexamine their views).
60 See Dann & Logan, supranote 57, at 283.
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instructions immediately after they have been instructed. If
jurors have questions, then they can try to answer the
questions during their deliberations. Sometimes they arrive
at correct answers, other times they do not. Alternatively,
once the jury is deliberating it can send a note to the judge,
asking the judge the jury's question about the instructions.
Typically, the judge will respond, not by answering the
jury's question, but simply by gathering everyone in the
courtroom and rereading the relevant portion of the
instructions. The jurors become frustrated when the court's
only response is to reread a portion of the instructions,
which they did not understand the first time. After this
happens a few times, the jury realizes that it is not going to
obtain any answers from the judge so it stops turning to the
judge for assistance. In one case, a college professor who
served as the foreperson of a criminal jury in New York
reported that his jury simply stopped turning to the judge
when they discovered that the judge was unhelpful, as well
as cantankerous. 6 1 One law professor who conducted
interviews with jurors in several capital cases reported that
jurors stopped asking the judge questions about parts of the
instructions that they did not understand when the judge
simply reread portions of the instructions to them.62
63
Instead, they tried to provide their own explanations.

See D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY 81 (2001).
See SUNDBY, supra note 48, at 49-50 (describing jurors who felt
intimidated by the process of having to return to the courtroom to hear
the judge reread portions of the instructions anytime the jury submitted
a question to the judge).
63 Id. at 50 ("'[W]e just tried to resolve any further disputes on our
own."') (quoting a juror).
61

62
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B.

Permitting Jurors to Question Witnesses

Tiersma recommends that jurors be permitted to ask
the judge questions about the instructions, but he does not
suggest that jurors should be able to submit written
questions to the witnesses. This practice is explicitly
permitted in several states, 64 and explicitly prohibited in
other states. 65 In most states and federal circuits, however,
66
the decision is left to the discretion of the trial judge.
Allowing jurors to submit written questions to witnesses is
a reform that would benefit jurors enormously. They
would not have to remain confused or uncertain during the
trial; instead, they could get answers to their questions.
In states where juror questions to witnesses are
permitted, the jurors are typically given an opportunity at
the close of a witness' testimony to submit a written
question to the judge who then consults with the lawyers
and decides whether the question should be asked of the
witness. The questions are submitted anonymously and the
judge, after consultation with the lawyers, decides whether
See Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: "To
Ask or Not To Ask, That Is the Question," 78 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 1099,
1100 (2003) (noting that Arizona, Florida, and Indiana permit jurors to
submit written questions to witnesses, and that Colorado intends to
adopt the practice in civil and criminal cases).
61
See id.(reporting that Mississippi prohibits juror questions to
witnesses in all cases, whereas Texas, Georgia, and Minnesota bar the
practice in criminal cases).
66 See Eugene A. Lucci, The Case for Allowing Jurors To
Submit
Written Questions, 89 JUDICATURE 16 (2005) ("Every federal circuit
64

that has addressed the issue of juror questioning of witnesses agrees
that it is a practice that should be left entirely within the court's
discretion."); Bruce R. Pfaff, John M. Stalmack & Nancy S. Marder,
Jurors in Illinois Should Have the Right To Submit Questions To Be
Answered by Witnesses, CBA REC. (forthcoming May 2009) (providing
a survey of state court and federal circuit cases on juror questions to
witnesses, with most cases leaving the decision to the discretion of the
trial judge) (manuscript at 7-13, on file with authors).
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they are appropriate questions. If they are, then the judge
will ask them. If they are not, then the judge will explain to
the jury that this is not a question that can be asked.
Because the questions are submitted in written form at the
end of a witness' testimony, they do not interrupt the flow
of the trial.
This practice allows jurors to have their questions
answered as they arise, and jurors appreciate this
opportunity. 6 7 Otherwise, they are left confused throughout
the trial and can only speculate as to answers during their
deliberations. Moreover, in the states that permit this
practice, judges, lawyers, and jurors have been satisfied
with it. In states where juror questions have been permitted
as part of a pilot program, the participants usually find that
68
they like the practice even if they resisted it initially.
Jurors' questions tend to be few in number and
See Lucci, supra note 66, at 17 (polling jurors and finding that
"jurors universally approve of and appreciate the ability to clear up
confusion by asking questions, and, combined with the ability to take
notes and having written jury instructions on the law, when jurors are
allowed to ask questions they feel very satisfied that they reached the
correct verdict").
68 See, e.g., Mott, supra note 64, at 1104-05 (reporting on a
pilot study
in New Jersey state courts in which jurors and a majority of lawyers
responded favorably to the practice of permitting jurors to submit
written questions to witnesses, as did judges, including those who
"were initially skeptical, but after experience with questions in their
courtrooms, they were pleased with the results and expressed their
desire to continue after the pilot period ceased"); Patrick S. Pemberton,
Out of the Mouths of Jurors:In Los Angeles They're Letting the Jurors
Quiz Witnesses, CAL. LAW., Nov. 2000, at 18 ("[Tlhe judges who
participated in the pilot program [in L.A.] were generally pleased with
the results. And so were a large majority of the participating jurors,
according to a poll that was done."); Seventh Circuit American Jury
Project Final Report 60-62 (Sept. 2008) (surveying participants in the
Seventh Circuit's pilot program in which judges and jurors in particular
reported that the practice of permitting juror questions to witnesses
contributed to the fairness of the trial process and the jurors'
understanding of the case).
67
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reasonable. 69 Often, jurors seek clarification of a fact 7° or
greater explanation about a practice. 7 1 One pilot program
permitting juror questions to witnesses found that juror
72
questions do not add significantly to the length of a trial.
One theory is that juror questions to witnesses might even
reduce the time required for deliberations.7 3 Another
theory is that such questions might reduce the number of
hung juries, though no study has tested this theory yet.
Permitting jurors to submit written questions to
witnesses, just as permitting jurors to ask the judge
questions about the instructions, are practices designed to
give jurors the information they believe they need to decide
69

See Mott, supra note 64, at 1109 ("A study asking judges in Arizona

to rate the reasonableness of juror questions found that judges' ratings
were extremely high."); id. at 1112 (working from data collected for
other purposes from initiatives in Arizona, D.C., and Pennsylvania,
Mott found that "[o]f the 130 state-level cases, the average number of
questions jurors submitted per case was 16"); Lucci, supra note 66, at
17 ("I am currently in my fifth year of allowing jurors to propose
written questions, and have done so in well over 100 trials. Over that
period . . . the vast majority (over 90 percent) of juror questions are
good questions and many are excellent .... ").
70 See Mott, supra note 64 at 1117 ("Approximately one-fifth of the
juror questions asked witnesses to clarify factual evidence such as
exactly what events witnesses saw or more detailed facts about a person
or place."); Lucci, supra note 66, at 17 (observing that in his own
experience with juror questions in over 100 trials, "most questions seek
clarification of testimony regarding topics that have already been
touched upon by the witness, including testimony not heard or which
was vague or ambiguous").
71 See Mott, supra note 64, at 1115 ("Jurors inquired about
typical
practices within a profession, whether the expert believed an event was
plausible, or what procedures an individual should have taken in a
given situation.").
72 See id. at 1109 (describing a study of the pilot program in New
Jersey that "found that the estimated median time added to trials
allowing questions was only thirty minutes").
73 See Lucci, supra note 66, at 18 ("Questioning is likely to save time
with improved understanding by the jurors, reduced questioning of
other witnesses, and shorter jury deliberations.").
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the case. Jurors typically exercise restraint in asking
questions, 74 but both practices would allow jurors to get
answers to the questions that they have rather than
remaining confused throughout the trial or after the
instructions and then speculating during deliberations.
Both of these reforms give jurors the opportunity to seek
answers to their questions when they arise so that when
75
they enter the jury room, they are prepared to deliberate.
C.

Instructing Jurors on Deliberations

Courts typically do not give jurors any instructions
on deliberations. Tiersma described judges as being "quite
76
coy about how jurors should approach deliberations."
Judges are reticent to provide instructions about
deliberations because it is up to jurors to decide how to
conduct their deliberations. Judges are reluctant to intrude
into the province of the jury. However, some guidance
would be useful, and of course, jurors can still decide how
closely to follow the judge's instructions. Tiersma notes
that even the new California jury instructions do not give
jurors any advice on how to proceed with their
77
deliberations, other than some general admonitions.
Although Tiersma does not recommend that judges should
provide such guidance, I think it would be useful.78
74 See Mott, supra note 64, at 1109, 1112 (noting the reasonableness

and limited number of questions asked by jurors to witnesses); see also
Connor, supra note 44, at 7 (noting that jurors who received individual
written copies of the instructions did not send notes to the judge with
legal questions during their deliberations).
75 See Lucci, supra note 66, at 18 ("When a witness answers an
individual juror's questions, it helps to lay the proper foundation for
effective deliberations by the jury as a group.").
76 Tiersma, supra note 1, at 125.
17 See id
71 See Marder, supra note 43, at 503 (recommending that judges
instruct juries on deliberations).

73

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 169
Instructions on deliberations can give jurors an idea of what
is expected of them and how to proceed. The jurors still
decide how to conduct their deliberations. When all the
jurors have an overview of deliberations, then when they
enter the jury room they can proceed without some jurors
feeling at a loss. Instead, all of the jurors will feel prepared
to participate in the deliberations.
One approach that judges can take to inform jurors
about the deliberation process without interfering in how
jurors actually decide to structure their deliberations is to
give each juror a copy of the American Judicature Society's
(AJS) pamphlet entitled Behind Closed Doors. A Guide for
Jury Deliberations.79 The AJS is a non-profit organization
committed to an independent judiciary. The pamphlet
gives jurors background information useful for
deliberations, such as the role of the foreperson, different
ways to conduct deliberations, the need to be respectful of
each juror's views, and what to do when the jury has a
question or cannot agree on a verdict. 80 Although the
information is general, it is nevertheless helpful. Thus, the
pamphlet can be viewed as a tool that aids jurors in
performing their tasks during deliberations. Rather than
being baffled or confused by what they are supposed to do
in the jury room, jurors receive some general guidance
from the court in the form of a pamphlet. Of course, jurors
can choose to depart from the suggestions, but at least they
enter the jury room with an overview of the process and
some understanding of possible ways to proceed.8 1 It is up
See generally AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: A
GUIDE FOR JURY DELIBERATIONS (1999) (providing general
79

information about deliberations).

" See id at 3-8.
81
Without such guidance on deliberations, some juries struggle with
how to proceed. See, e.g., Erin Emery, The Jury That Couldn't: Scenes
from a Mistrial in Teller County, DENV. POST, July 3, 2002, at IA
(quoting a juror in a first-degree murder trial who said: "'It was really
frustrating because we were not getting any help on how do you go
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to the jurors to decide when they want to follow the
suggestions and when they want to depart from them.
Another approach is that judges can instruct jurors
on the deliberation process. Any instructions, like the AJS
pamphlet, can be general so that jurors have basic
background information. The instructions also can present
jurors with an array of approaches as to how to organize
their deliberations, and they can choose which one makes
sense to them. Judge Kane, a Federal District Court Judge,
decided to draft instructions that would inform jurors about
deliberations after he read Graham Burnett's account of his
jury duty in A Trial By Jury, in which Burnett expressed his
frustration with the court for failing to provide any
guidance as to deliberations. 82 Judge Kane then published
his instructions in The Judges' Journal,83 a journal whose
His
audience consists largely of fellow judges.
instructions, like the AJS pamphlet, are informative without
being intrusive. Other judges can adopt them or use them
as a model for developing their own instructions. Indeed,
he tells jurors: "I am not directing you how to proceed, but
I offer the following suggestions that other juries have
found helpful so that you can proceed in an orderly fashion
....

,84

Another advantage of Judge Kane's instruction is

that he includes guidance on the dynamics of deliberation,
including suggestions that jurors participate fully, listen to
each other carefully, avoid interrupting each other,
deliberate before taking a vote, express respect for each
85
such as
with patience.
and proceed
other,
instructions,
suchstates,
to provideSome
are beginning
Michigan,
about this, how do you approach the situation. You're supposed to
decide the outcome of a man's life-blind-and that's not
acceptable."').
82

BURNETT, supra note 61, at 79-85.

John L. Kane, Giving Trials a Second Look, JUDGES' J., Fall 2004, at
28, 30-31 (providing instruction).
84 Id. at 30.
" Id. at 30-31.
81
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though Michigan's instruction does not provide as much
guidance as Judge Kane's instruction. 86 Judges can work
from either Judge Kane's instruction or Michigan's
instruction so that they do not have to reinvent the wheel.
The key point is that judges can provide jurors with
information on deliberations so that they are fully informed
and understand their tasks. The instruction or pamphlet
serves as a tool that enables jurors to be active participants
in their deliberations. The traditional reason for not giving
such an instruction-wariness about intruding into the
province of the jury-though respectful of the jury's
independence, often leaves jurors mystified or confused.
There is a middle ground, whereby judges can provide
background information and set forth possible ways the
jury might proceed, but the court also can instruct jurors
that they decide how to organize their deliberations.
D.

Instructing Jurors on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Testimony

Another area in which judges are reluctant to
intrude is how jurors should assess the credibility of
eyewitness testimony. Typically, courts do not offer any
instructions on eyewitness reliability or allow expert
witnesses to testify on the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony because assessing the credibility of eyewitness
testimony is supposed to be solely within the province of
the jury. Judges also tend to believe that this assessment is
based on commonsense. Thus, there is no need for expert
testimony. The difficulty is that there have been myriad
empirical studies showing that eyewitness recollections can

See M. Civ. J.I. 60.01 (Jury Deliberations), available at
http://www.courts.michigan.gov/mcji/jury-deliberations/print
Ch60.htm.
86
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be very unreliable. 87 Our commonsense tells us that we can
believe what we see, and therefore, we can believe what
eyewitnesses claim to have seen. However, empirical
studies show that there are many factors that contribute to
the unreliability of eyewitness testimony and unless jurors
are made aware of these factors, they will tend to think that
is. 88
eyewitness testimony is more reliable than it really
The factors that can affect the reliability of eyewitness
testimony include: how far the eyewitness was from the
person being observed; the conditions, such as whether
there was bad weather or poor lighting; how much time
there was for observation; the health of the eyewitness;
whether the eyewitness and the person being observed were
of the same race because cross-racial identifications are
harder to make; and how much stress the eyewitness was
a
under because contrary to common belief, the more stress
89
person is under, the less reliable the identification is.
In California, as Tiersma explains, judges now
instruct jurors on the factors that can affect the reliability of
eyewitness testimony. 9° California judges, by instructing in
this way, provide more information on this subject than
judges in most other jurisdictions. However, as Tiersma
notes, California judges do not go far enough. They
instruct jurors to consider whether the eyewitness and the
person being observed are of different races, but they do
not say why this is important. They do not explain to jurors
that cross-racial identifications are more difficult to make

87

See, e.g., Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Sci. AM., Dec.

1974, at 23 (discussing studies).
88

See, e.g., ELIZABETH

LOFTUS & JAMES DOYLE,

EYEWITNESS

TESTIMONY 26 (1987) ("Another reason that jurors place so much faith
on eyewitness testimony is that they are often unaware of how many
different factors influence its accuracy.").
89 See, e.g., Buckhout, supra note 87, at 23, 24-27 (identifying factors
that make eyewitness identification unreliable).
90 See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 126.
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91
than identifications between people of the same race.
Tiersma rightly criticizes the instruction for this omission
because it leaves jurors to "guess" or "to read the judge's
mind. 92 His point is well taken; the instruction should
provide this additional piece of information.
However, there is even more information, in
addition to the challenges posed by cross-racial
identifications, which would be useful for jurors to have.
For example, researchers in this area have found that
eyewitness testimony is more likely to be believed than any
other form of evidence. 93 Even when other forms of
evidence undermine the eyewitness identification, jurors
will continue to believe the eyewitness testimony.
So,
perhaps something stronger than even an instruction in
which the judge describes the factors that contribute to the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony is needed.
There is much disagreement as to how to counter
the strongly held belief that we can believe what we see,

91 See,

e.g.,

SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE

82 (1988)
(identifying several factors that are not commonly known and that
make eyewitness identification unreliable including the difficulty
people have in identifying people of other races); Buckhout, supra note
87, at 26 (describing a study in which stereotypes limit what viewers
see and recall).
92 Tiersma, supra note 1, at 126.
93 See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
9 (1979)
("Jurors have been known to accept eyewitness testimony pointing to
guilt even when it is far outweighed by evidence of innocence.");
LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 88, at 24 (describing studies of mock
jurors that show that they tend to believe eyewitness testimony
particularly when it was given with confidence); John C. Brigham &
Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors To Estimate the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 27
(1983) (noting that jurors find eyewitness evidence extremely
persuasive).
94 See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 91, at 79-82 (providing
examples of erroneous eyewitness identification that persuaded juries
in spite of strong alibi defenses by the defendants).
AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
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and therefore, we can believe what an eyewitness says he
95
or she has seen. An instruction is a good starting-point.
California is ahead of the curve in this respect, even with
the shortcoming identified by Tiersma on cross-racial
identifications. Other recommendations include allowing
the testimony of experts who can explain more fully the
factors that the judge mentioned in the instruction 96 or
providing jurors with some of the findings gained from the
empirical studies as a way of showing them that eyewitness
testimony should be open to question. Suggestions that are
more controversial include the exclusion of any evidence
that is based only on eyewitness testimony. 97 Some courts,
like those in California, instruct juries on the factors that
can affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Other
courts have allowed the testimony of experts. 98 There is a
need for greater experimentation by courts so that a "best
practice" emerges. The one point that is clear is that
courts' predilection to take no action and to avoid the
problem is not a useful approach. It does not give juries the
See id. at 84 (noting that some courts, if requested by one of the
parties, give a cautionary instruction in which they "inform the jury that
identification evidence can be wrong and encourage them to scrutinize
it carefully").
96
See id. (noting that a "more controversial, more prevalent, and
potentially more effective" approach than a cautionary instruction is to
allow parties to call experts "to testify about perception, memory, and
eyewitness testimony").
97 Compare id. at 83-84 ("One [way
to assist jurors with eyewitness
testimony] is to exclude it altogether in cases where it stands alone,
without corroboration. This alternative is plainly unacceptable. It
would needlessly paralyze too many legitimate criminal
prosecutions."), with Michael J. Gorman, Eyewitnesses Make Serious
Mistakes, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A21 (describing the
misidentification of Bryant Gumbel's son as a suspected purse-snatcher
and recommending that eyewitness "identification alone should never
lead to a criminal conviction").
98 See, e.g., KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN,
supra note 91, at 85 (describing
Judges Bazelon and Weinstein as "particularly strong advocates of
using eyewitness experts").
95
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information they need to perform their task in a responsible
manner. The consequence of relying too heavily on
eyewitness testimony 99can be quite serious; it can lead to an
erroneous conviction.
IV.

Courts Should Seek Jurors Drawn Broadly from
the Community
A.

Rejecting Expert Juries

Tiersma observes that courts require jurors to be
experts in several different areas and he suggests that juries
of experts might be useful where expertise is needed.
Tiersma proposes that an expert jury could be used to
decide technical cases, such as tax fraud cases.100 He
proposes that in "highly technical areas" it would "make
sense on occasion" to have a jury of experts.' 0 ' For
example, in a tax fraud case, he suggests
that a jury of
'1°2
idea.
bad
a
be
not
"might
accountants
Tiersma is not the first to suggest a jury of experts
in technical areas, but this idea has been rejected in the past
and should continue to be rejected. Expert juries have a
number of drawbacks compared to juries of ordinary
citizens drawn broadly from the community.
This
recommendation, rather than broadening the base of
citizens who could serve as jurors, would limit the base. It
would lead to limited viewpoints being made available to
the jury, limited opportunities for ordinary citizens to serve,
and would cast doubt on the integrity of a process by which
ordinary citizens were bypassed in favor of experts.
99 See, e.g., DNA Clears Man in Rape, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

1, 2006, at A21 (describing the case of Larry Fuller, who was convicted
of rape based on the eyewitness identification of the victim; however,
he was eventually exonerated based on DNA evidence).
100 Tiersma, supranote 1, at 139.
101 Id
102

Id.
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One drawback to a jury of experts, who serve in
trial after trial, is that they are unable to bring a fresh look
to a case that a jury drawn from ordinary citizens who serve
in only one trial could bring. Justice White recognized this
limitation when he described the protections that a jury
affords a defendant in a criminal case. He suggested that a
criminal defendant might prefer the commonsense
judgment of a jury of ordinary citizens, even though they
are unschooled in the law,' 0 3 to the expertise of a judge
10 4
because the judge might become hardened over time.
Expert jurors, who would be expected to serve in trial after
trial, run this risk just as readily as do judges who hear
criminal cases time after time.
Another drawback to the expert jury is that it is
necessarily drawn from a limited pool of people who meet
certain professional or technical requirements so that they
qualify as experts. Thus, the expert jury would not be
drawn from a broad swath of the population and would not
have available to it the full range of perspectives, life
experiences, and commonsense judgment that a jury of
ordinary citizens could offer. A jury consisting of experts,
many of whom might have gone to the same schools,
received the same professional training, and share the same
attitudes or views that are prevalent in that profession,
might be bereft of any jurors who can offer an outsider's
perspective or critique. In addition, a jury of experts raises
questions about how representative that jury is of the
population at large and whether the expert jury is being
103

See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("If the

defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he
was to have it.").
104 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("The purpose
of
a jury is .

.

. to make available the commonsense judgment of the

community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-conditioned or

biased response of a judge.").
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used as a screen to justify the exclusion of other members
of society from serving as jurors. Justice White observed
that "[r]estricting jury service to only special groups . . .
cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury
trial. . . . Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a
pool broadly representative of the community... .,105
Another limitation is that it is difficult to decide
which areas are technical and would require expert juries
and which areas are general and could be heard by juries of
ordinary citizens. The technical categories for which
expert juries are needed are likely to grow until they
overtake the general category for which ordinary juries are
needed.
Finally, as Alexis de Tocqueville reminds us, the
jury is above all "a political institution."' 0 6 One way in
which it functions as a political institution is that it serves
as a "free school" and teaches ordinary citizens about the
importance of fulfilling their civic duty and serving as
jurors. 107 Casting a vote and serving on a jury are the two
ways in which citizens participate in their democracy.
Jurors who lack the background to serve as expert jurors
are denied an opportunity to participate in the judicial
system and to acquire that education. Although they might
eventually have the chance to serve on a jury, their chances
are reduced with the creation of expert juries, particularly
when expert juries burgeon as all cases begin to take on a
technical sheen.
Tiersma's fallback position is that there could be
one or two experts on any jury that is asked to decide a
technical issue. 10 8 He notes that lawyers tend to use their
peremptory challenges to remove from the jury anyone who

105

Id. at 530.

106 TOCQUEVILLE,

107

supra note 20, at 250.

Id. at 252.

'0' See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 139.
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has relevant expertise. 109 He realizes that lawyers are likely
to object to any proposal that an expert or two should be
seated on the jury in a technical case. Although there is no
guarantee of having an expert on one's jury, it seems that
peremptory challenges should not be used simply to
remove all prospective jurors who might have some
expertise."l 0 To the extent that a jury drawn broadly from
the populace will have a range of views available to it,
including Jurors with expertise, eliminating peremptory
challenges 1 or at least reducing the number of peremptory
challenges would avoid or limit the skewing effect of
lawyers who exercise their challenges to exclude
prospective jurors with expertise. If lawyers had fewer
peremptory challenges, then they would use their
challenges with greater care and try to remove those
prospective jurors whose impartiality they doubted but who
did not meet the standard for a for cause challenge.
Although Tiersma does not go this far in his
recommendations, this seems to be a better approach than
expert juries, which pose a threat to juries of ordinary
citizens and do not have the advantages of juries drawn
broadly from the community.

109 See id.

According to one prospective juror's observation, "we potential
jurors discovered that anyone who knew anything about costs or the
economist, an
medical profession had been screened out-an
accountant, and two nurses." Robert J. Barro, Pleadingthe Casefor a
Paid-JurySystem, Bus. WK., July 22, 2002, at 20.
111 My view has long been that peremptory challenges should be
eliminated rather than simply reduced in number. See Nancy S.
Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the
Jury, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1041 (1995). For a recommendation made by
Professor David Baldus that peremptory challenges should be
eliminated or limited to three per lawyer, see Debra Cassens Weiss,
Law Prof Who Studied Peremptories Suggests Three-Strike Limit,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/law_
prof who_studied _peremptories suggests three-strike limit.
110
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Moreover, before taking the dramatic leap to expert
juries, ordinary citizens should be given the basic tools
necessary to perform their tasks, particularly when
expertise is required. For example, when juries have to
decide damage awards, they should be permitted to use
calculators and Excel spreadsheets, which are basic tools
that any expert would employ. 11 2 These tools are common
in the workplace, and should be common in the jury room.
These tools are not particularly expensive and would aid
jurors in making the calculations that they need to make.
Not too long ago, jurors were asked to make calculations
about damages but were not even permitted to have paper
and pencil in the jury room. Most courtrooms now allow
such basic tools as paper and pencil."l 3 Courts need to take
the next step and provide calculators and Excel
spreadsheets to jurors. Before Tiersma criticizes ordinary
jurors for their lack of expertise, he should insist that courts
provide them with the basic tools that would enable them to
perform the tasks they have been asked to perform.
B.

Reaching Out To Prospective Jurors

Tiersma does not mention the myriad ways in which
courts have reached out to prospective jurors and have tried
to summon them from a broader swath of the population
than ever before. Courts are moving in the right direction,
though more remains to be done. For example, courts used
to summon jurors from voter registration lists only, 1 4 but
For a detailed discussion of the high-tech and low-tech tools,
including spread-sheets and calculators, that jurors should be given to
help them perform their tasks, see Nancy S. Marder, Juries and
Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First Century, 66
BROOK. L. REv. 1257, 1286 (2001).
113 See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 51, at 141 (describing
juror note-taking as "a widespread technique").
114 See, e.g., David Kairys, Joseph B. Kadane & John P.
Lehoczky,
112

Jury Representativeness:A Mandatefor Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL.
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now many courts use multiple lists, such as tax rolls,
drivers' licenses, unemployment lists, or utilities, in
addition to voter registration lists." 5 The idea is to reach as
many people as possible and not to rely on just one source.
Many more people are qualified to serve as jurors than
people who register to vote. In addition, courts have done a
better job of updating the addresses that they use when
mailing questionnaires and summonses. This is important
given how often people move.
Several trial courts have been innovative in trying to
increase minority representation among those who are
summoned to serve; however, appellate courts have not
viewed these efforts with favor. When a district court in
Michigan "subtracted" potential jurors from the master
wheel because they were not African Americans in order to
create a more diverse venire, 116 the Sixth Circuit struck
down the practice, 117 holding that it violated a federal
statute that prohibited selection based on race 118 and that it
also violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 1 9 When a district
L. REV. 776, 825-26 (1977) ("The most widely used primary list is the
voter registration list. . ."); id at 778 (noting that in 1977, "only two
federal district courts and several state courts utilize[d] multiple lists")
(footnotes omitted).
15 See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 51, at 36 ("As of August
1996, 12 states use only voter registration lists, six states use only lists
of licensed drivers, two states use state-unique lists, and 25 use a
combined voters and drivers list. Five states add some additional lists
to the voters and drivers lists.").
116 See Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror
Selection: Cross-Section by Design, 79 JUDICATURE 273 (1996)
(describing the use of stratified juror selection by the Eastern District of
Michigan).
17 United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6'1Cir.
1998).
118 See Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 ("[N]o citizen
shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district
courts of the United States ... on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status.").
119 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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court judge in Massachusetts tried to create a more diverse
venire by ordering new jury summonses to be mailed to
residents who lived in the same zip code as jury
summonses returned to the court as "undeliverable," the
First Circuit granted the government's petition for a writ of
mandamus and directed the district court judge not to
implement that part of her order calling for new jury
summonses. 12
The First Circuit concluded that an
individual judge could not enlarge the jury array; rather, it
had to be done on a district-wide level. 121 Appellate courts
must become more supportive of innovative efforts by
district court judges; otherwise, venires are unlikely to
reflect the larger communities from which they are drawn.
Meanwhile, academics have studied why people do
not always respond to their jury questionnaire or summons.
One study discovered that while some never received their
questionnaire or summons, and others are deterred by
practicalities, such as the absence of childcare, the
unavailability of parking, or the meager compensation, the
most important factor was whether people felt that they had
22
some control over when they performed their jury duty.'
As long as they felt that they had some control, especially
in terms of timing, the potential jurors were more likely to
respond to their questionnaire and their summons and feel
enthusiastic about jury duty. 123 If courts focused on
offering prospective jurors some control over when they
performed their jury duty, such as an automatic extension
when they are first called, then less time would be spent

120
121

United States v. Green, 426 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
See Judge Nancy Gertner, 12 Angry Men (and Women) in Federal

Court, 82 CHI. KENT L. REv. 613, 623 (2007) (providing background to
Green).
122 See Susan Carol Losh et al., "Reluctant Jurors": What Summons
Responses Reveal about Jury Duty Attitudes, 83 JUDICATURE 304, 310

(2000).
123

See id.
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imposing fines 124 or25 having marshals search for additional
prospective jurors. 1
Courts' efforts to send jury questionnaires and
summonses to as broad a swath of the population as
possible have proceeded slowly, but at least they are
moving in the right direction. The challenge of summoning
a diverse venire depends upon the efforts of many
participants, including innovative efforts by trial courts,
support for these efforts by appellate courts, and greater
understanding by researchers of why prospective jurors do
not always respond to their summonses. The goal is to
reach as diverse a group of citizens as possible for the
venire, and then not to lose them during the exercise of
peremptory challenges. Ideally, the petit jury that is
actually seated is drawn broadly from the community, can
offer a range of views and experiences, and can render a
verdict that will be accepted by the community, even if the
community disagrees with the verdict.
V.

Conclusion

Most of Tiersma's recommendations encourage
courts to be honest with jurors and to give them the tools
they need to perform their jobs ably. His recommendations
could go further, as I have suggested above, but they are
See, e.g., Colin F. Campbell & Bob James, Innovations in Jury
Managementfrom a Trial Court's Perspective, JUDGES' J., Fall 2004,
at 22, 25 (describing Arizona's enforcement efforts for those
summoned for jury duty, including orders to show cause and up to
$500 penalties for those held in contempt); Greg Moran, When Jury
Duty Calls. Counties Wrestle with High Evasion Rates, CAL. LAW.,
May 2001, at 22 (describing that in California failure to appear for jury
duty is an act of contempt punishable by a fine up to $1000 and five
days in jail).
125 Moran, supra note 124, at 22 (explaining that in Stanislaus
County,
California, a "failure to appear" postcard follows an ignored jury
summons, and if that fails to elicit a response within ten days, then a
uniformed marshal with an order to show cause can appear at the door).
124
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consistent with the basic principles by which courts should
approach jury reform. The only recommendation for which
this is not the case is the creation of expert juries. This
recommendation runs counter to the principle that juries
should be drawn broadly from the community. This
principle is important for several reasons. First, by drawing
on ordinary citizens from all walks of life, a jury will
potentially have available to it a wide range of viewpoints,
perspectives, and life experiences. Second, a deliberation
among jurors from diverse backgrounds will allow for
questions, challenges, and the avoidance of what Irving
Janis called "groupthink," in which jurors simply go along
with the prevailing point of view. 12 Third, such juries of
ordinary citizens, working together and participating
actively in a thorough deliberation, can reach a just verdict
and one that the community is willing to accept.
Surprisingly, such a jury is also more likely to reach an
accurate verdict.
James Surowiecki described this
phenomenon in The Wisdom of Crowds.12 7 He suggested
that when a group engages in a deliberative process in
which the participants have different viewpoints and skills
and feel free to offer them, they will reach a more accurate
result than a homogeneous group, even one with
expertise, 128 or than one or two people, "no matter how
smart they are." 129 Thus, when jurors are treated with
honesty by courts and given the information and tools to be
active participants, they are more likely to render accurate
verdicts. If Surowiecki is right, then we need to worry less
about creating expert juries and more about creating
conditions that will allow juries of ordinary citizens to
achieve the wisdom of crowds.

126
127

IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 262, 270-71 (2d ed. 1982).
JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2005).

128

Id. at 30-31.

129

Id. at 3 1.
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ESSAY

REVERSE ENGINEERING OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS1

Bethany K Dumas*
Reverse engineering of jury instructions requires (1)
creating a decision structure or decision tree for a case,
based on a theory of the case, (2) identifying crucial points
in the decision structure or decision tree, and (3)
incorporating crucial points into the jury instructions. This
paper suggests that reverse engineering of jury instructions
can be used to instruct jurors about legal concepts and
technical terms before they hear jury instructions or closing
arguments.
The goal is to improve the clarity of
instructions to achieve litigation goals.
It is a truism in the legal community that successful
advocacy in the courtroom requires a lawyer to proceed
based on an appropriate theory of the case.2 Through a
theory of the case, the lawyer organizes and correlates facts3
to support the most effective legal argument for the client.
Further, evidence presented to jurors in a jury trial must
fully support that theory of the case or explain why a
competing theory is inadequate to explain the facts of the
case. Thus "[t]he modem litigator's arsenal should include
...techniques ... for selecting appropriate case theories,
for testing those theories, and then for making the theories
This is a draft of Chapter 4 of a book manuscript in progress, Writing
and Using Effective Jury Instructions. Earlier chapters are: 1. Jury
Instructions: History and Rationale, 2. Lay Perceptions of Jury Service,
and 3. Recent Criticism and Reform Efforts.
* Professor of English, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN. B.A.
Lamar University; M.A. & Ph.D., University of Arkansas; J.D.
University of Tennessee.
2

See JAMES W. McELHANEY, EFFECTIVE LITIGATION:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 123 (1974).
3 See Id; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1517 (8th ed. 2004).
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understood at both an intellectual level and a psychological
level through4 the use of illustrative exhibits or computer
technology."
In jury trials, the litigator's arsenal must also
include techniques for insuring that jurors are adequately
instructed with respect to their decision-making
responsibilities. In most jurisdictions, it is still assumed
that adequate instruction includes instruction in law, though
two states, Kentucky and perhaps5 Georgia, seem to be
moving away from that assumption.
Let me pause to explain what is being called the
"Kentucky Approach" to jury instructions, as it has
implications for the material below. Attorney Charles M.
Cork, III, of Macon, Georgia, contrasts it with current
practice thus:
Much of current practice conceives jury
instruction as a miniature, accelerated education
process in which the judge lectures on one or more
fields of law and the jurors are expected to
assimilate the lecture into a coherent and correct
understanding of the law. This will be called the
"Lecture Approach." The goal of this process is
that the jurors will understand all of the contours
of legal doctrine reflecting on the legal dispute
before them. The lawyers for each party will
supply to the judge a series of proposed jury
instructions comprised of excerpts from reported
decisions or statutory text, selected in a partisan
manner, emphasizing language that is most
favorable to the client's case, and often repeating
Anthony J. Bocchino & Samuel H. Solomon, What Juries Want to
Hear: Methods for Developing Persuasive Case Theory, 67 TENN. L.
REV. 543, 543 (2000).
' Charles M. Cork, III, A Better Orientationfor Jury Instructions, 54
MERCER L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2002).
4
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such language in different ways. The current rules
for presenting instructions and obtaining review of
the judge's decisions give no incentive to lawyers
to submit balanced and simple, but complete, jury
instructions.
After
receiving
opposing,
unbalanced sets of proposed instructions from the
lawyers, the judge will then attempt to assemble
the excerpts into a cohesive, neutral body of text
that will educate the jury about all relevant aspects
of the law applicable to any issue raised by the
evidence and the contentions of the parties.
Unfortunately, the instructions proposed by
counsel will hamper, not assist, the judge's efforts
to instruct the jury.
Unless the judge can
accomplish a creative synthesis of the proposed
instructions, or ignores them, the jury will hear a
number of excerpts that apparently conflict with
each other. Further, the excerpts often contain
misleading legal usage of common terms, legal
jargon, and other confusing and misleading
instructions. The result is that the jury instructions
will fail to enable jurors to understand the
contours of the applicable law simply because
those contours cannot be learned by ordinary
citizens through cramming; the law can only be
learned by legal study that systematizes and
harmonizes the body of relevant legal texts into a
coherent whole. What is sensible to judges and
lawyers, who have had years to learn the contours
of the law, will remain opaque to jurors without
6
similar training and experience.

The process whereby judges attempt to assemble
lawyers' suggestions into a cohesive document sometimes
6 Id. at

2 (internal citation omitted).
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includes a charge or charging conference, a meeting during
which the parties' attorneys present their suggestions for
jury instructions.7 The goal of the charge or charging
conference is for decisions to be made so that shortly after
the meeting the parties' attorneys receive copies of the jury
instructions that will be use. The judge makes all final
decisions. Now let us contrast current practice with what is
being done in Kentucky and which Georgia appears to be
moving towards; Cork continues thus:
Instead of treating jury instruction as a
compulsory mini-law school, it is far superior to
orient jury instruction practice so that it helps the
jury do its job, which is to resolve questions of
fact.

The method

.

.

.

already practiced in

Kentucky and toward which the Georgia Supreme
Court may be moving, is to limit instructions to
the core factual issues that control the ultimate
verdict. This method will be called the "Kentucky
Approach." The judge gives instructions in order
to call for the jury to do something, rather than to
contribute to the jurors' knowledge of somewhat
random information about the law. Instructions
are framed around the parties' respective burdens
of proof and their contentions.
Typically, a
complete instruction on liability in a simple tort
case would take the form of, "D had a duty to do
x, y, and z; if you believe from the evidence that D
failed to comply with any of these duties and that
the failure to comply was a substantial factor in
causing P's injuries, you should find for P;
otherwise, you should find for D." Instructions in
cases with legal issues of greater complexity will
still be framed in terms of the factual issues that
the jury must resolve in order to determine
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 249 (8'

ed. 2004).
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whether a party with the burden of proof has
sustained that burden. . . . The point of these
instructions is to call upon the jury to perform its
fact-finding function, rather than the essentially
legal 8 function of harmonizing disparate legal
texts.
More generally, perhaps, such an issue as burden of
proof is crucial in all cases, and such issues as contributory
responsibility are important in some cases. In any event,
jurors must be persuaded by factual evidence, and that is
most effectively accomplished in terms of a theory of the
case-defined very comprehensively in Black's Law
Dictionary:
A comprehensive and orderly mental arrangement
of principles and facts, conceived and constructed
for the purpose of securing a judgment or decree
of a court in favor of a litigant; the particular line
of reasoning of either party to a suit, the purpose
being to bring together certain facts of the case in
a logical sequence and to correlate them in a way
that produces in the decision-maker's mind a
definite 9result or conclusion favored by the
advocate.
The remainder of this article will identify briefly
some contemporary commentary on the ways in which case
theories are developed and implemented in decision
structures or decision trees (hereafter "decision
structures"), then address the issue of how litigators can
insure that jury instructions are adequate to allow jurors to
consider a given case theory fairly.

8

Id. at 2-3 (internal citations omitted).

9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (8th ed. 2004).
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The technique discussed in this paper is known as
reverse engineering of jury instructions. The term was
initially used by engineers to mean the disassembling of a
product or device in order to understand the underlying
concepts and perhaps produce something similar.10 As
used with respect to jury instructions, the term means
deconstructing the desired verdict with respect to what
decisions the jury will have to make in order to reach that
desired verdict. In order to carry our reverse engineering of
jury instructions, a litigator must complete three steps
beyond establishing a theory of the case. The litigator must
(1) create a decision structure for the case, (2) identify
crucial points in that decision structure, and then (3)
incorporate the crucial points of that decision structure into
the jury instructions.11 The technique at its best makes use
of insights from discourse theory as well as knowledge of
the ways in which syntactic and semantic
structure operate
12
to assist or impede communication.
Recent case theory research has focused on case
theory as being grounded in story or narrative. 13 This
approach has moved away from case theory as legal
doctrine and towards case theory as persuasive storytelling.
Overall, however, it has been suggested that "[c]ase theory
operates at three levels: legal, factual, and persuasive[:]"
[1.] Legal theory defines the case in terms that
describe why, as a matter of law, your client
should prevail. . . . Because legal theory is
0

See generally

ELDAD EILAM, REVERSING: SECRETS OF REVERSE

ENGINEERING (Wiley 2005).

" See Bocchino, Anthony J, and Samuel H. Solomon. What Juries
Want to Hear: Methods for Developing Persuasive Case Theory, 67

Tenn. L. Rev. 543 (2000).
12 See id
13 See generally Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9

CLINICAL L.

REV. 293, 295 (2002) (discussing techniques for treating the case
theory development as building a story line.
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primarily for judicial consumption, it is possible to
have two or more-perhaps even wholly
inconsistent-legal theories of the case at the
same time ....

All that must occur at trial is that

the lawyers prove facts sufficient to sustain a
favorable verdict on appeal."
[2.] Factual theory defines what the facts of the
case really are. .

.

.

[I]n developing effective

factual theory, it is vital to remember that not only
are the facts themselves important, but so is the
perception of facts that will drive factual theory.
Often the reality of the facts and the common
perception of them will be at odds, and it is for the
lawyer to reconcile reality and the perception of
reality for effective factual persuasion. ...
[3.] Persuasive theory

. . .

explains why it is that

the jury should feel right about its decision.
Persuasive theory is grounded in common human
experience and is usually presented in common
sense terms that come from some authoritative
source [for instance, the Bible or great literature]..
. . Persuasive theory will usually strike at the core

psychological values that most jurors share and
that motivate much of their decision-making. As
such, an effective persuasive theory will resonate
with themes of fairness, redressing a wrong, doing
the right thing, and, in circumstances suggesting
14
egregious behavior, the need for punishment.
It is important to treat a factual theory as a working
hypothesis, one that must be modified or discarded if
necessary supporting facts do not emerge during discovery.
Ideally, "the legal, factual, and persuasive theories of the
14

Bocchino & Solomon, supra note 5, at 544-46.

96

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 192
case will be unitary." 15 Perhaps some specific case
In United States v. Hill,
examples will be helpful.
accused of conspiring to
were
County
defendants in Union
import cocaine based upon four and one-half hours of
audio-recorded conversation among defendants and
undercover agents. 16 Most of the facts were not at issue,
and the law was not in dispute. There was clearly a plan to
import cocaine into the county via air, which is a criminal
act. What was at issue was whose plan it was and whether
is, at issue was the proper
a conspiracy had occurred. That
7
interpretation of agreed facts.
The prosecution's theory was that the defendants
had conspired to import cocaine in violation of criminal
law.' 8 The defense's theory was that defendants, one of
whom was a county sheriff running for re-election (the
other was a mayor of a town within the same county), were
cooperating with initiating undercover agents in order to
confiscate the airplane when it landed with the cocaine.
Tennessee law permits local jurisdictions to keep such
equipment if it is confiscated during a drug seizure. The
defendants claimed that they needed the money that they
19
would raise by selling the airplane for county expenses.
Conversational analysis of the tape-recorded conversation
revealed a striking similarity of conversational patterns
between defendants and agents with respect to topic
initiation and topic elaboration. 20 Based on my analysis, I
concluded that the linguistic evidence supported the
defendants' theory at least as well as a criminal conspiracy
theory.

15Id. at 548.
16 United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1984).
17 Expert Report of Bethany K. Dumas, United States v. Hill, No. 835587/83-5588 (E.D. Tenn. argued May 20, 1985).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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This case was a re-trial of a case in which an
original conviction had been overturned by the Sixth
Circuit on the ground that the defendants' constitutional
rights had been violated when the original judge refused to
allow defense attorneys to question prospective jurors
about some of their beliefs. 21 A plea bargain was reached
in the second trial, but only after the jury was unable to
agree on a verdict. 22 Jurors did not appear to be confused
about the law and few facts were in dispute; however,
jurors were unable to agree on an interpretation of the
undisputed facts.23
In a number of capital cases, jurors have requested
clarifying instructions on the meaning of the term
reasonable doubt, used in the pattern instructions on
murder in most jurisdictions. 24 As recently as 2000, in
Weeks v. Angelone,25 the Supreme Court held:
[I]t is adequate for a trial judge to answer a jury's
question about the meaning of instructions by
reiterating the language of the original
instructions. The specific issue in Weeks was
whether a trial judge is obligated by the
Constitution to do more than refer the jury to a
specific portion of jury instructions when the jury
has a question about the meaning of an instruction.
Typically, trial judges respond to such questions
by simply re-reading the relevant portion of the
instructions. During the penalty phase of Weeks,
the jury questioned the trial judge concerning
21
22
23

24

Hill, 738 F.2d at 153.
Expert Opinion of Bethany K. Dumas, supranote 17.
id.

Bethany K. Dumas, Reasonable Doubt about Reasonable Doubt:

Assessing Jury Instruction Adequacy in a CapitalCase, in LANGUAGE
INTHE LEGAL PROCEss 246-49 (Janet Cotterill ed., Palgrave Macmillan
Press 2002).
25 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
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sentencing alternatives. The judge conferred with
Weeks's counsel, but concluded that he could not
answer their question more clearly, so he merely
referred the jury to the appropriate section of the
original jury instructions. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and that
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The
final opinion thus declares it to be the law of the
are presumed to understand
land that "jurors
26
instructions."
For our purposes, the opinion from Weeks is
important because it makes clear that juries are sometimes
uncertain about the law. Additionally, it underscores that
jury understanding matters; it is sometimes a matter of life
and death.
Now that we have established the role and
importance of jury interpretation and jury comprehension,
let us explore the additional steps we are looking at today.
We will begin with a very brief look at how one transforms
a theory of the case into a decision structure.
The concept of reverse engineering of litigation
procedures was, to the best of my knowledge, first
introduced by Anthony Bocchino, James Dobson, and
Samuel Solomon in 2001.
They introduced "reverse
engineering the verdict" as:
[A] method for taking what has been learned in
discovery and molding and shaping that
information into a trial theory or strategy that will
ultimately persuade the jury of the correctness of
the position of our clients. .

.

. Some graphic

designers work well with large display boards,
Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury
Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 714
(2000) (internal citations omitted).
26
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while others are better suited to using computergenerated slide shows.... In this way the social
scientist can determine the effect certain
arguments have on the flow of juror opinion....
Usually, regarding the use of graphic displays, less
is better, and the graphic display professionals are
more likely to come to a similar conclusion as
they are part and parcel of the entire trial theory
development, not just their own special piece of
that preparation. . . . It is for the trial team to
determine not only the form, but also the content
of the graphic displays to be used
to best explain
27
and demonstrate the trial theory.
The strategy of "reverse engineering the verdict"
involves developing a detailed case theory and calling the
28
attention of jurors to discrete issues in the case theory.
Bocchino et al. acknowledge that "[i]n many cases, there is
little dispute as to what happened and who did what to
whom, but a great deal of dispute as to why the parties did
what they did .... At issue then, will be the motive of the
people who caused the thing to occur., 29 The authors then
suggest that:
[a] decision tree, which shows the options for
decisions and the choices made by the party in
charge, leading to the ultimate conclusion in the
case [can] be very helpful in advancing either the
plaintiffs or defendant's case. If the jury can be
made to understand the options available at each
juncture in critical decision making, the choices
27

Anthony J. Bocchino et al., What Juries ? Want to Hear H: Reverse

Engineering the Verdict, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 177, 177, 179, 182, 186,
189 (2001).
28 Id.
29

See id at 187.
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made, and the reasons why the choices were made,
jurors will be a long way towards understanding
whether the defendant's motives were legitimate or
not.30
In their 2001 article, Bocchino, Dobson, and
Solomon describe a detailed plan for using social scientists,
graphic designers, and lawyers to improve litigation
strategies. 3 1 The social scientists include those who
conduct various kinds of surveys, jury consultants, focus
groups, jury simulations, and witness evaluations. Missing
from the list are linguists who might pay attention to ways
in which the words of jury instructions might be introduced
during trial process in order to habituate jurors to thinking
in terms of key concepts that are crucial to legal theory as
well as factual analysis.
For example, suppose that in a products liability
case it is required that a product is shown to be "defective
and unreasonably dangerous." Pattern jury instructions do
not generally give narrative examples of what constitutes a
"defective and unreasonably dangerous" product (though
some judges do). However, a line of questioning of
witnesses could be developed and utilized that would
provide examples during trial so that when jury instructions
and closing arguments are given, jurors would already be
familiar with the terminology.
In other words, I am proposing that reverse
engineering of jury instructions be conducted as an exercise
in the explicit teaching vocabulary and definitions during
trial process. Reverse engineering of jury instructions
would need to be done within the context of legal, factual,
and persuasive theory, of course. There is no reason to
believe that this strategy would not work and every reason
to believe that it would. It has been demonstrated in the
30 Id.
31

See id. at 178-80.
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context of custodial interrogation that individuals being
interrogated can be "taught" to use specialized terms (often
with legal meanings that they do not understand). If one
has an explicit agenda and a clear sense of what one is
trying to teach, it should be relatively easy to teach terms
and definitions in the context of trial questioning.
Earlier, I mentioned the charge conference, where
the attorneys present their suggestions for jury instructions
and judges attempt to assemble those suggestions into a
cohesive document. At its best, a charge conference
concludes with judges presenting printed copies of the jury
instructions that will be used. Lawyers seeking reverse
engineering of jury instruction will have clear ideas about
what to present well before the charge conference is
actually held. How much of the legal definition that is
included will vary, depending upon the extent to which a
jurisdiction favors the lecture approach of jury instructions
or the Kentucky approach.
This article has proposed that techniques of reverse
engineering can be used to advantage in composing jury
instructions; partly by identifying how best to instruct
jurors about legal concepts and technical terms well before
they hear jury instructions or closing arguments. Future
publications will illustrate how appropriate questioning
during voir dire can serve to educate potential jurors about
terms and definitions. They will also explain how such
litigation techniques can make it easier for jurisdictions to
adopt the Kentucky approach or something similar,
dropping most legal definitions from jury instructions and
leaving it to the trial lawyers to educate jurors about
relevant concepts during trial. The overall goal of the
approach is to improve the clarity of instructions to achieve
litigation goals.
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ESSAY

IS IT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT JUROR BEHAVIOR?
John W. Clark III*
I.

Introduction

Each year in the United States there are over
150,000 jury trials. Theoretically, the jury serves as the
conscience of the community.
The jury's decision
manifests what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
With this substantial responsibility, jurors are assigned the
responsibility of evaluating arguments made by attorneys,
determine the truthfulness of witness's testimony, decipher
physical evidence, and comprehend jury instructions given
by the judge. Therefore, the American adversarial system
allows attorneys a great deal of latitude in determining a
juror's fitness to serve.
Attorneys often consider many variables important
when considering whether to select or excuse a prospective
juror. For example, some legal scholars would argue that
bumper stickers
(attitude),
lawn care
practices
(conscientiousness) and clothing attire (socioeconomic
status) are significant factors when selecting or excusing a
juror. Others may suggest a person's type of employment
(occupation) or view towards war (ideology) are acceptable
indicators. Since attorneys utilize predictability measures,
caution should be heeded.
Research investigating
individual differences involving personality, ideologies,
attitudes, and demographics as predictors of jury decision
making have been widely studied.
However, research
*

Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Troy University.
John W. Clark et al., Big Five PersonalityTraits, Jury Selection and

Case Outcomes in Real Criminal and Civil Cases, 34 CRIM. JUST. &

BEHAV. 641, 642 (2007).
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these variables has produced incongruent
examining
2
findings.
Legal scholars must understand that the selection of
jurors is but one facet of trial advocacy. Often, attorneys
place a great deal of importance in their selection of jurors.
However, the individuals selected, as jurors ultimately
comprise a group of twelve develop their own sense of
justice. The manifestation of a jury's sense of justice is
exhibited via a collective personality, ideology, or attitude.
However, in some cases, the jury fails to unite and work
toward their stated goal i.e. search for the truth. The latter
has led one scholar to suggest: "why do jurors who hear the
same evidence frequently disagree on the proper verdict?
When and how do preexisting prejudices and attitudes
influence jurors' decisions? How do jurors comprehend
and apply instructions ' on
the presumption of innocence and
3
proof?
of
the standard
With the above sentiments, the purpose of this
article is to examine social psychological variables that
influence jurors beyond the jury selection phase.
Importantly, it should be noted that attorneys have very
little, if any, control of the extra-legal factors once a trial
commences.
II.

Extra-Legal Factors

The majority of persons summoned for jury duty
have no prior exposure to American jurisprudence. Thus,
their interaction with judges, attorneys, and bailiffs is not
contrived. While the goal of a jury is to determine fact
from fiction and innocence from guilt, jurors are at best
unpredictable. Given this fact, there are no perfect jurors.
All cases, trials, and juries are unique. The selection of
2 Id. at 641.
3 INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING

3 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
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jurors is often characterized by controlled chaos.
Specifically, the control mechanism lies in the fact that
attorneys are attempting to select or deselect jurors by some
reason or fancy. Chaos is demonstrated by the
unpredictability of twelve ordinary citizens. While the
public often accuses attorneys of "stacking the jury,"4 this is
somewhat of a myth often perpetuated in the media.
Once the process of jury selection is complete and
the trial begins, a new dynamic begins. This dynamic is
manifested by the inability to control jurors in and out of
court. As for out of court, when jurors leave the confines
of the court they are free to watch the evening news, read
the morning newspaper, surf the internet, or even speak to
another juror by telephone or email. While a judge may
instruct jurors otherwise, the enforcement is next to
impossible unless you sequester all jurors, and even then,
abuse is a very real possibility. In court, there are extralegal factors that may influence an individual as well as the
collective jury. Extra-legal factors can be thought of as
factors beyond the evidence that influence a juror's
decision. What are some extra-legal factors that influence a
juror or jury and ultimately undermine the system?
Physical attractiveness, social categorization, judicial bias,
personality, attitudes, ideologies, and stress appear to be
among the strongest factors. It is important to note that
these factors operate from the moment the defendant enters
the courtroom. Thus, before opening statements, jurors are
sizing up the parties involved.

J. KRESSEL & DORIT F. KRESSEL, STACK AND SWAY: THE NEW
SCIENCE OF JURY CONSULTING 215-16 (2002).
4 NEIL
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A.

Physical Attractiveness

Social psychological research indicates that jurors
5
are affected by a defendant's physical attractiveness.
According to Franzoi, the way a defendant is physically
perceived has a direct bearing on one's degree of
responsibility. 6 Moreover, according to Abwender &
Hough, "fairly consistent literature suggest that physically
unattractive defendants are generally at a disadvantage,
with respect to both the likelihood of being found guilty
and the severity of the recommended sentence." 7 At the
same time, research suggests that people tend to assume
that physically attractive people possess an array of socially
desired personality traits. For example, attractive people
are more intelligent, confident, strong, happy, assertive,
honest, and
outgoing than those who are less physically
8
attractive.
Ideally, in a criminal trial, the defendant's physical
attractiveness should not matter. However, Abel &
Watters, suggest attractiveness is a factor that influences
the verdict in both simulated and real world trials. 9 Given
the above suggestion, DeSantis & Kayson suggest attorneys
are well aware of the importance of the bias toward
Donald M. Burke et al., Effects of Victim's and Defendants Physical
Attractiveness on the Perception of Responsibility in an Ambiguous
Domestic Violence Case, 5 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE; 199, 200 (1990).
5

6 See generally STEPHEN L. FRANZOI, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
4th ed.

1996).
David A. Abwender & Kenyatta Hough, Interactive Effects of
Characteristicsand Mock Juror in U.S. Participants'Judgment and
Sentencing Recommendations, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 603, 604 (2001).
8 Bruce Keisling & Malcolm Gynther, Male Perceptions of Female
Attractiveness: The Effects of Targets' Personal Attributes and
Subjects' Degree of Masculinity, 49 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL., 190, 19095 (1993).
9 Millicent H. Abel & Heather Watters, Attributions of Guilt and
Punishment as Functions of PhysicalAttractiveness and Smiling, 145 J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 687, 688 (2005).
7
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attractiveness and often steer their clients to do everything
feasible to improve their appearance in the courtroom. 10
An excellent example of this involves the retrial of Andrea
Yates. While the jury found her not guilty by reason of
insanity for the drowning of her five children in 2001, the
strength of evidence was undeniably strong. According to
Parker and Kasindorf, Yates was an attractive defendant
who seemed pleasant and personable, a person with whom
the jurors could readily identify. 1 Another example is the
jury in the first murder trial of Eric and Lyle Menendez.
There, jurors were deadlocked, thus guilt could not be
established. Interestingly, according to Parks & Sanna,
some of the jurors when interviewed later revealed they
could not believe the brothers killed their parents because
the boys looked like nice young men.12
B.

Social Categorization

According to Breckler et al., people separate society
into two groups: they view others as belonging either to
their own group (the in-group) or to another group (the outgroup). 13 Most often, these distinctions are based on
religion, race, gender, age, ethnic background, occupation,
and income. 14
An important component of the ingroup/out-group perspective is the belief that a person
considered to be in the in-group is perceived to display or
10 Andrea

DeSantis & Wesley A. Kayson, Defendants' Characteristics

of Attractiveness, Race, and Sex Sentencing Decisions, PSYCHOL. REP.
679, 679 (1997).

11Laura Parker & Martin Kasindorf, Yates Retrial May Signal Opinion
Shift, USA TODAY, July 27, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/

nation/2006-07-27-yates-verdictx.htm.
12

CRAIG PARKS & LAWRENCE SANNA, GROUP PERFORMANCE AND

INTERACTION, 157 (1999).
13 STEVEN J. BRECKLER, JAMES M. OLSON & ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ALIVE (2006).
14

Id. at 75.
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possess positive characteristics, whereas a person
considered to be in the out-group is thought to possess
undesirable or negative characteristics. 15 According to
Franzio, with respect to social categorization, research
suggests that physical features are the most common way to
classify people, particularly in the early stages of
impression formation. 16 Interestingly, applying social
categorization to jurors is effortless. To demonstrate, from
the moment a defendant crosses the threshold of the
courtroom doors, all eyes are fixated upon him or her. It is
important to recognize that jurors identify the defendant as
in-group or out-group and evaluate his or her physical
attractiveness. In the end, a defendant who is perceived to
possess positive characteristics, in-group standing, and
physical attractiveness stands a greater chance of
acquittal. 17 For example, from the onset of the O.J.
Simpson murder trial there was a tremendous amount of
media coverage. Simpson was a wealthy and physically
attractive former football star at the college and
professional level.
Because Simpson was a national
celebrity, most Americans had preconceived notions of his
character. Interestingly, Toobin discovered that halfway
through the trial, sixty percent of Caucasians believed
Simpson was guilty, whereas, only twelve percent of
African-Americans believed in Simpson's guilt. 18 These
figures sustain the theory that an in-group/out-group
dichotomy exists.

Alan J. Lambert, Stereotypes and Social Judgment. The
Consequences of Group Variability,J. PERSONALITY & SOC.-PSYCHOL.
388, 388 (1995).
16 FRANZOI, supra note 8.
17 MARK CONSTANZO, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED To LAW, 138 (2004).
18 Jeffrey Toobin, Putting it
in Black and White, THE NEW YORKER,
July 17, 1995.
15
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C.

Judicial Bias

Judges maintain a significant amount of discretion
in trial outcomes. While jurors render verdicts and judges
serve as the impartial referee, judicial figures exercise
serious influence in directing the verdict. Aesthetically, in
courtrooms throughout the country, judges wear black
robes and sit on escalated benches. Further, the courtroom
itself forces an intimidating division between the judge and
the citizens. Most often, the courtroom is aesthetically
pleasing. To demonstrate in courtrooms throughout the
country we find high ceilings, wood panels, marble
columns, and visible symbols like the scales of justice; all
of which reinforce the judicial branch's image as an
institution worthy of respect. Despite members of the
judiciary maintaining an air of authority and tradition, it
may be impossible for judges to remain truly neutral.
Judges, like the rest of us are human beings who make
mistakes. Despite remaining neutral, judges hold attitudes,
values, biases, and political interests that may affect their
rulings. When judges attack a witness's credibility or
improperly admit evidence, they negatively impact a
defendant's verdict.
Throughout a trial, while judges ask juries to weigh
the evidence and witnesses' testimony, the judge's biases
enter the courtroom, whether intentional or not.1 9 Judges
are to suspend judgment until all the evidence, witnesses
and closing arguments have been concluded. However,
judges often draw their own conclusions based on
preferences for the prosecution and, as a result, judges may
display nonverbal cues which may influence jurors.
Research indicates that a judge's appearance and behavior
during a trial or while delivering jury instructions can

19 Id.
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influence the jury.20 Moreover, the Alabama Supreme
Court in Allen v. State, suggested that courts have long
recognized that nonverbal judicial behaviors (i.e. facial
verdicts. 21
expressions and tone of voice) can influence jury
Accordingly, when judges expect a guilty verdict, their
non-verbal behavior is often perceived as cold, less
competent, less wise and more anxious when delivering
instructions to the jury. 22 In contrast, judges expecting a
not guilty verdict are perceived as warmer, less hostile, and
more open-minded.23
D.

Personality

The personality of jurors has received minimal
attention from academic researchers throughout the years. 24
A person's personality follows him or her throughout life,
and is not to be left at the door when serving on a jury.
At present, only a handful of studies have examined
the relationship between juror personality and jury decision
making. The following studies will show just what was
found with the limited research on juror personalities.
One study administered a personality test to 86
individuals from eight deliberating juries to measure the big
five model of personality in Texas criminal and civil cases.
It was-discovered that jurors who reported high levels of
conscientiousness were more likely to be influenced by

Marisa E. Collett & Margaret B. Kovera, The Effects of British and
American Trial. Procedures on the Quality of Juror Decision Making,
27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 403, 405-06, 418 (2003).
" 276 So.2d 583, 586 (Ala. 1973).
22 Peter D. Blanck, Calibratingthe Scales of Justice: Studying
Judges'
Behavior in Bench Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1119, 1139 (1993).
23 Id. at 1137.
24
Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of
Empirical Research on DeliberatingGroups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 622, 674-75 (2001).
20
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other jurors. 25 By contrast, jurors reporting high levels of
openness were less likely to report being influenced.26
Further, extraverted jurors were seen as being more
One
influential than jurors who were introverted.27
criticism of this study was the failure to administer a
personality test to all people summoned for jury duty to
compare the personality tests of those jurors who were
selected and those who were excused.
Another study discovered that a person's "character
structure" (i.e., socialization, empathy, and autonomy) is
28
related to the voting behavior and effectiveness of jurors.
According to this study, character structure relates because
socialized individuals are often thought to be more inclined
to follow societal rules and values. 29 With respect to
empathy, these individuals are more inclined to entertain
other people's viewpoint and consider either the
defendant's or plaintiffs intentions when coming to their
Autonomous individuals are
ultimate verdict.
characterized as being independent and decisive; and, this
study found that individuals who are highly autonomous
were able to withstand group influence. A 1996 study
examining the personality of jurors serving on felony cases
found that guilty verdicts rendered by males are related to
authoritarianism and socialization. 3 1 Two years later,
25

David K. Marcus et al., Studying Perceptions of JurorInfluence in

Vivo: A Social Relations Analysis, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 173, 173

(2000).
26

Id.

27

Id. at 184. Extraversion was the only big five-model trait associated

with perceptions of being influential. Id.
28 Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, CharacterStructure and Jury
Behavior: Conceptual and Applied Implications. 38 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 662, 662 (1980).
29 Id. at 666.
30 id.

Gary Moran & John C. Comfort. Neither "Tentative" Nor
"Fragmentary": Verdict Preference of Impaneled Felony Jurors as a

31
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another research study asked a mock jury to rate the
dominance of jurors in the group during deliberations based
32 The
upon on a videotaped recreation of a criminal trial.
videotaped deliberations indicate that jurors who scored
higher in the extraversion measure were more likely to be
other jurors and more likely to be
perceived as dominant by
33
selected as a foreperson.
To date, there is only one comprehensive study
which examines the relationship between the big five
model of personality and actual summoned jurors. This
research conducted by Clark et al. is the first study which
examines the personality of summoned jurors and the
relationship to jury selection, excusal, and case outcomes
from deliberating juries in real criminal and civil cases. 34 In
total, there were 764 jurors who completed the personality
and demographic measures. The researchers administered
these measures before the jury selection process. A
measure was also given after a verdict had been reached.
Here, an attempt was made to ascertain jurors' case
experiences. Court clerks were very useful in supplying
information about the juries composition; verdict; and
excused by the
whether the jurors were struck for cause,
35
prosecution.
the
by
excused
or
defense,
Results indicate personality and selection to a jury
36
not associated with a juror's personality traits.
were
trial
Function of Attitude Toward Capital Punishment, 71 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 146, 146 (1986).
32 K.J. Rotlenberg, M.G. Hewlett, & C.M. Siegwart. PrincipledMoral
Reasoning and Self Monitoring as Predictors of Jury Functioning,20
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 173 (1998).
33 Id.
34 John W. Clark, Marcus Boccaccini, Beth

Caillouet, & William F.
Jury Selection, and
Traits,
Personality
Model
Chaplin, Five Factor
JUST. & BEHAV.
CRIM.
34
Cases,
Civil
and
in
Criminal
Case Outcomes
641, 641 (2007).
" Id. at 647.
36 Id. at 650-51.
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However, there was an association between a juror's race
and sex. Specifically, African-Americans were most likely
to be excused from jury duty, and women were more likely
to be selected to serve as a juror than a male. Another
finding suggests the prosecutor was more likely to excuse
younger and employed jurors than the defense. 37 Overall,
there were 17 juries that deliberated to a verdict.
Researchers found that juror extraversion was associated
with case outcomes and processes.3 8
Specifically,
extraversion was associated with being selected as a jury
foreperson. 39 Also noteworthy is the fact that foreperson
extraversion was associated with lengthy jury deliberation
times 40and the perceived foreperson influence in criminal
cases.
E.

Attitudes

Inside and outside the courtroom, all participants
have independent judgments about some aspect of society.
Jurors may have strong views about politicians, abortion,
law enforcement, or capital punishment. It is an a priori
assumption that jurors bring their attitudes and life
experiences to the jury box. Obviously, in a courtroom
where the jury decides guilty versus not guilty and freedom
versus incarceration, attitudes of a jury are paramount.
Even though voir dire may enable an attorney to identify
potential jurors who are biased or subjective, impartial
jurors still may end up serving in a trial. In the field of
social psychology, it is without a doubt that attitudes
influence social thought.4 1 Accordingly, attitudes often
surface in the form of schema. According to Wyer & Srull,
17

Id. at651.

38 id.

'9 Id. at 655.
40 Id. at 651, 654-55.
41 Id. at 119.
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schema are cognitive frameworks that help us to organize
and analyze information about specific situations, concepts,
or events. 42 In a criminal or civil trial, schema may play a
crucial role as jurors go through a cognitive process in
evaluating the guilt or innocence of an individual.
Research conducted by Pennington and Hastie describes a
story model for juror decision-making. 43 The authors
hypothesize that jurors develop a narrative story of the trial
and ultimately organize the trial information into an
understandable context. This context enables them to
render a decision. 44 Furthermore, the story model suggests
that some jurors rely on their world knowledge and life
experiences in deciding the guilt of an individual.4 5 Most
importantly, jurors go through this cognitive story
construction from the opening statement to the actual
deliberations. To illustrate the above schema or story
model, imagine a jury of twelve individuals in which there
are seven males and five females. Moreover, there are four
jurors with advanced degrees, six with a high school
education, and two with a GED. Now imagine four jurors
who are Caucasian, five African-Americans, and three
Hispanics. Importantly, all of these jurors bring their own
biases and prejudices into the courtroom. Furthermore,
each one develops his or her own personal schema in
evaluating the evidence, the defendant, and events in
question.

4' HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION,

47 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. &
Thomas K. Srull eds., 1994).
43
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Jury
Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR
DECISION MAKING

(Reid Hastie ed. 1994).

44 Id.

45 Id.
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F.

Ideology

The ideological construct that has received the most
attention in jury research is authoritarianism. According to
Narby, Cutler, and Moran, the authoritarian is likely to hold
or subscribe to conventional values, submit to strong
leadership, act aggressively toward out-group members,
and "believe in the rightness
of power and control, whether
46
societal.
or
personal
In essence, a reasonable person could conclude that
authoritarianism is the value that a wrong should be
punished through retribution. 7 As a result, jurors who are
authoritarian are more likely to recommend lengthy
sentences, to vote guilty, and to punish the defendant when
he or she is of a lower social status than the juror or
attitudinally dissimilar. 48 Research on authoritarian jurors
has also shown that a juror's ethnicity, sex, and type of
crime committed serve as moderators49 of the relation
between authoritarianism and outcomes.
A second ideology is the belief in a just world.
According to Boyll, this person views life as just and fair
and ultimately individuals get what they deserve. To
illustrate, research conducted by Gerbasi, Zuckerman, and
Reiss discovered that mock jurors who demonstrated a

46

Douglas Narby, Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A Meta-Analysis of the

Association Between Authoritarianism and Jurors' Perceptions of
Defendant Culpability, 78 J. OF APPLIED 34, 34 (1993).
47 Id.at 35.
48
Virginia R. Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy and the
AuthoritarianPersonality:An Application of PsychologicalMeasuring
Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 734, 744
(1968).
49 Linda A. Foley & Minor H. Chamberlin, The Effect of Race and
Personality on Mock Jurors' Decisions, 112 J. OF PSYCH. 47, 47
(1982).
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strong just world belief are more likely to blame the victim
for the crime being committed. 50
G.

Stress

The reality is that most legal scholars forget jurors
are placed under a tremendous strain that ultimately
The legal community must be
manifests as stress.
cognizant that jurors may be experiencing extreme levels of
Research
stress before, during, and after the trial.
conducted by the National Center for State Courts suggests
that:
[j]urors confront numerous sources of stress at
every stage of jury duty, even in routine trials.
Beginning with the summons to jury service, they
experience disruption of their daily routines,
lengthy waits with little information and often in
unpleasant surroundings, anxiety from the scrutiny
of lawyers and the judge during voir dire, tension
from sifting through conflicting versions of facts
and unfamiliar legal concepts, conflicts during
the verdict
deliberations, and isolation following
51
service.
jury
from
and their release
In addition, research conducted by Hafemeister and
Ventis indicated that jurors maybe more likely to
experience stress in trials that depict unusually violent
crimes. 52 Importantly, these trials are characterized by
visually graphic and horrific evidence that is often
Kathleen C. Gerbasi, Miron Zuckerman, & Harry T. Reiss, Justice
Needs a New Blindfold: A Review of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCH.
BULL. 323, 330 (1977).
50

5' NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THROUGH THE EYES OF THE

JUROR: A MANUAL FOR ADDRESSING JUROR STRESS 1 (1998).
52

Thomas L. Hafemeter & W. Larry Ventis, JurorStress: Sources and

Implications, 30 TRIAL 68 (1994).
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accompanied by a recording of the crime scene.53 It should
be noted that jurors in these trials have subsequently gone
on to reveal stress related symptoms for months
afterward.54 Some of these jurors have actually sought out
professional assistance i.e. counseling which could
continue for years. To demonstrate, one juror who served
on a capital murder case suggested that she almost divorced
over it. 55 This juror experienced depression, a feeling of a
lack of control, and nightmares. 56 She ultimately stopped
talking. In a second example, a juror who served on a case
that was punishable by a life sentence stated:
After the trial, the first day I went back to work,
somebody came up and said, 'Hi you doing?' I
just cut loose crying and I cried for an hour solid,
and my boss was in the office that day, just on a
routine visit, and that poor man didn't know what
to do! [He] kept saying, 'she's got to get some
help!'
He thought I was having a nervous
breakdown, but I mean, it was just, it had to come
out of somewhere, I guess.
. . . I thought about it
57
know.
you
all the time,
A second source of stress is deliberations. According
to research conducted by National Center for State Courts,
the foremost stressor as reported by jurors in death penalty
cases is deciding whether or not to impose the death
penalty. 58 Another stressor as reported by these jurors is
determining whether the accused is guilty of a capital
53 Id.
54 Id.
55
Michael

E. Antonio, I Didn't Know It'd be so Hard: Jurors
Emotional Reactions to Serving on A Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE
282,286 (2006).
56 id.

57 id.

" Id. at 71.
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offense. 59 With respect to non-capital offenses, the number
one source of stress is deciding on a verdict. 60 Given this,
Bornstein et al. conducted a study that examined juror
stress in 28 trials. 6 1 A total of one hundred and fifty-nine
jurors participated in the study, which examined stress
immediately after the trial and one month afterward.62 The
results indicate that the greatest amounts of stress resulted
from the decision-making tasks itself.
Another source of stress is the voir dire process.
Most importantly, the National Center for State Courts
discovered that over three-quarters of jurors experienced
stress during jury selection. This makes perfect sense if we
recognize that the majority of jurors are unsure of the
process and most often, they are thrown into an awkward
situation. 63 Further, voir dire is often characterized by
intrusion. Attorneys (whom are perfect strangers) ask very
personal and private questions about the lives of jurors and
this "shocks" and violates all rights of privacy. 64 It should
also be noted that stress may arise from responding to
surveys that may be administered by the court. 65 To
demonstrate, jurors are asked to provide demographic
information. 66 This often includes age, gender, race,
67
education status, marital status, and possibly occupation.
A second type of survey and most often traumatic is the
one that is case specific. 68 Examples here include
attitudinal measures such as opinions toward sexual
59 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note

61.
Id,
61 B. Bornstein et al., JurorReactions to Jury Duty: Perceptions
of the
60

System and PotentialStressors, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 321 (2005).
62 Id. at 326-27.
63 Id. at 16.
64 Id. at 17.
65 Id. at 20
66 Id.
67

Id.

61

Id. at 20-21.
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offenders, abortion, capital punishment, politics, and
religion. 69 Additional questions include victimization, any
prior exposure of the case, prior arrest record, and any
familiarity with the criminal justice system (i.e. a family
friend that has or had been incarcerated or
member or
70
arrested.)

Another source of stress is the disruption of the
daily lives of jurors. 7 1 According to research examining72
juror stress, disruption of daily lives is a serious issue.
Serving as a juror means essentially surrendering one's
daily schedule in exchange for public service.
Interestingly, an argument could be made that the majority
of people would consider jury duty as bothersome and at
best, undesirable. It should be noted that attorneys should
consider the specific circumstances of a prospective juror.
Prospective jurors could be experiencing childcare issues,
marital and financial problems, as well as health conditions.
The last source of stress is the instruction to jurors that
forbids them from speaking about the trial.73
Accompanying this is the restriction from reading the
newspaper or viewing the news on local or cable television.
According to the National Center for State Courts, 60 jurors
were asked, "What were the negatives of serving as a
juror? '

74

One juror responded, "It was very difficult

because you could not talk or share the internal debate in
my mind. ' '75 There were doubts that could not be shared.
69

Id. at21.

70 Id.
71
72

Id at 25.
Brian Bornstein, Monica Miller, Robert Nemeth & Gregory Page,

Juror Reactions to Jury Duty: Perceptions of the System and Potential
Stressors, 23 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 321, 321, 346 (2005).

"

NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EVALUATION OF THE JURY
DEBRIEFING PROGRAM: KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, at Appendix

B-2 (2003).
74 Id.

75 Id.
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A second juror suggested: "Having to keep everything
inside of you. If I had to go much longer, thought [I]
would go nuts. [I] [w]alked out of [the] courtroom after
seeing [a] picture of [the] victim and saw a girl on the bus
that looked like [the] victim. '76 Most intriguingly, research
reveals that reaching out and seeking someone else is
paramount for an individual's well being. 77 This is why
jurors are psychologically harmed by forced silence and
isolation for the duration of a trial.
III.

Conclusion

Trial by jury is a cornerstone of American
jurisprudence. The 2 1st century juror is asked to bear a
heavy burden. We expect jurors to be impartial and
conscientious. In courtrooms across this Country, we strive
and desire for just verdicts and equity for all parties. Most
importantly, these admirable goals may be undermined by
extra-legal factors that cannot be dismissed. This article
examined physical attractiveness, social categorization,
judicial bias, personality, attitudes, ideologies, and stress.
All of these factors collectively, or in part, may undermine
the pursuit of justice. Ultimately, how do we predict the
unpredictable?

76 Id.
77
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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR WHITE: My name is Penny White and I am
the Director for the Center for Advocacy and Dispute
Resolution and the faculty advisor for the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy along with Dr. Otis Stephens.
I want to begin by telling a story. It's an automobile
accident case. A simple car wreck. The lawyers are good.
They're well experienced. They know how important it is
to communicate with juries. The law is clear. The judge is
learned. The judge is not only learned, but patient. Does
this sound like a dream world so far?
The judge has carefully instructed the jury on the
law. The jury has been in deliberations for about three
hours when there is knock, knock, knock on the door. A
question. These are the jury's questions: What are the
three lawsuits? What damages have been done? Who is
suing whom, for what? These really were questions written
by Tennessee jurors in a lawsuit within the last several
years.
It is my honor to welcome you to the first SummersWyatt symposium and to begin by expressing our gratitude
to the members of the Summers-Wyatt law firm for the
opportunity to come together. We are lawyers and judges.
We are linguists and psychologists. We are students and
citizens. We have come to confront the question: Are we
asking jurors to do the impossible?
Because of the abiding faith in the American Justice
System and a tireless devotion to the protection of
individual rights that the members of the Summers-Wyatt
law firm has, they have generously enabled the College of
Law and the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution
to partner with the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
and host this symposium. Join me in thanking them. Not
only will this symposium have an effect hopefully on those
of you in the audience today, but it will also have a lasting
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effect because these proceedings, as well as the papers of
the experts who speak with us today, will be published in a
special edition of the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy.
Now, I would like to introduce to you the person who
makes all of these efforts at the law school possible by his
continuing support and his endless energy, Dean Blaze.
DEAN BLAZE: Well, welcome to the law school. On
behalf of everybody here, we are really excited to have you.
Now, we're talking about juries, but it's kind of intimidating
when you look out at the audience and the jury that you're
talking to is made up entirely of judges or primarily of
judges. I'm used to talking to law students, I'm used to
talking to lawyers. Your Honors, welcome and we're glad
you're here and participating. This is an exceptional
program that Penny and the Journal have put together. I
want to add my thanks to the Summers-Wyatt law firm for
everything you've done to make this possible, for your
ongoing support for the law school. And to the students, I
want to add my thanks for everything you've done, the staff
of the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy.
You know, we're excited to have this because this is
a perfect place for this kind of program. This law school
is-I'm going to sound like a Dean-but I firmly believe
that it's the best place in the country for training people to
be lawyers. Whether they want to be transactional lawyers,
whether they want to be a general practitioner, whether
they want to go to a law firm, whether a large firm, or
whether they want to be advocates in the courtroom, this is
the best place for it.
This is an incredibly important topic. It is a topic
that is near and dear to my heart. In fact, Professor Dumas
and I had a research project going for a while on the
"heinous, atrocious, and cruel" instructions being used in
Tennessee.
We were going to explore the
comprehensibility of that. We had a survey set up. Then,
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thank God, the Sixth Circuit said: "You don't need to do
that; 'heinous, atrocious, and cruel' makes no sense. We're
not going to use it in Tennessee anymore." While I missed
doing the research with you, Bethany, I'm glad that
happened.
We're always talking about the importance of
lawyers. Lawyers are essential, but the jury system is
absolutely crucial to our system of justice. To use a very
simple example, we hold up "To Kill a Mockingbird,"
Harper Lee's book, and Atticus Finch as the best of our
Atticus was incredibly capable and
legal system.
He stepped forward and did what
justice.
committed to
needed to be done in the small town to represent Tom
Robinson. That's fabulous and we should embrace that
image, but remember that Tom Robinson, despite having
Atticus Finch, still ran. He still ran and was killed while
escaping. Why did he run? Because the system failed him
because the jury system failed him.
Now, we're here today not to talk about bias
embedded in potential juries. We're not talking about "To
Kill a Mockingbird," Tom Robinson running, or
Scottsboro. We are talking about proper functioning of
juries and properly instructed, properly informed, properly
engaged juries can do a lot to overcome bias and can
actually make a difference in the proper functioning of our
system. In conclusion, I hope you enjoy our program, and I
hope you learn and that your thoughts are provoked today.
Thank you.
INTRODUCTION TO SYMPOSIUM
PROFESSOR WHITE: Our symposium is divided into two
distinct parts: acquisition and application. I tell you this
because it's going to be a little different than your run-ofThis morning we are in the
the-mill symposium.
We will acquire knowledge.
acquisition phase.
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Knowledge about language and how we can better
communicate with juries for the purpose of helping them
perform what the United States Supreme Court has called
the most awesome responsibility. Beginning with our
keynote speaker and a panel of distinguished individuals,
we will acquire this knowledge from a diverse group of
experts, diverse in their expertise, in their approaches, and
in their viewpoints.
After our morning of acquiring knowledge, we will
move on this afternoon to application. This afternoon,
based on a case modeled after a Tennessee decision, we
will ask lawyers and judges, aided by law students, to
contemplate jury instruction issues while a mock jury of
undergraduate students deliberates the same case in another
room. At the end of the day, we will join in again to
exchange what we have learned in the hopes that in some
small way, we will make the task of jurors less impossible
in the future.
At this point, I want to turn the program over to the
Editor-in-Chief of the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
and we'll get started. Ashley Musselman, who has worked
on this program with me since about September. Thank
you, Ashley.
MS. ASHLEY MUSSELMAN: Good morning. My name
is Ashley Musselman. I'm the Editor-in-Chief of the
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy. I want to start off by
saying, on behalf of the Tennessee Journal of Law and
Policy that you all for coming. I want to also recognize
some of the members of the board of the Journal. When I
say your name, please stand and be recognized. Ashonti
Davis, managing editor. Chris Hayden, and Ashley White,
research editors. Jade Dodds and Sara White, articles'
editors. Jonathan Buckner, publication editor. Jesyca
Westbrook, candidacy-process editor. Thank you all for
your hard work and dedication to the Journal. I would also
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like to thank the Journal members that were part of the
symposium committee. I would like to recognize a few of
them as well. When I say your name, please stand and be
recognized, Sally Goade, Sean McDermott, Monica Rice,
Jesyca Westbrook, Ashley White and Crystal Young.
At this time, I'd like to introduce the keynote
speaker at our event today, Peter Tiersma. Dr. Tiersma is a
Professor of Law at Loyola University in Los Angeles,
California. He is a nationally renowned speaker and expert
in writing comprehensible jury instructions. He has written
extensively on language and the law and on jury
instructions.
His
recent
publications
include
"Communicating with Juries," "How to Draft a More
Understandable Jury Instruction," "Some Myths about
Legal Language," and "Speaking of Crime: The Language
of Criminal Justice." So, without further ado, please join
me in welcoming Dr. Tiersma.
[Professor Tiersma's keynote speech was a
summary of his article, Asking Jurors To Do the
Impossible, located on pages 105 to 147 of this journal.
Following his presentation, he was asked the following
questions.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MS. MEREDITH RAMBO: You had mentioned what you
called the gag rule.
Basically about how it's been
impossible to keep jurors from talking to each other during
the entire process versus in deliberation, but then later you
had mentioned something about being lie detectors and
twelve heads being better than one. Don't you run into the
fact that if jurors are conversing during the entire process,
that one person's bias may influence how those other jurors
hear the evidence and process it themselves? Might the
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problem arise that this may lead one person to make the
judgment?
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: Well, that, I suppose, is the
concern.
That's probably the reason you have those
restrictions. The ABA came up with a rule recently, which
allows jurors, as a group to discuss things during breaks,
but everyone has to be there.
That's one fairly conservative way of implementing
that idea. Yes, there is a problem if one juror is a
loudmouthed juror who dominates a discussion. I think
that's a concern. But you know, it's also a concern when
they're all together in the jury room at the end.
I know that's an answer that judges and lawyers
often have with respect to jury instructions being rather
difficult to understand. They argue that some of the jurors
are going to be relatively well educated. They can explain
it to the others. Ultimately, they'll all understand what the
instructions mean. Some research has suggested that in fact
that isn't necessarily the truth. That what happens is that
it's not the person who understands the instructions best
who explains it to the others. It's the loudmouth. That
person might understand them correctly or that person
might not understand them correctly. He or she tends very
forcefully to state his or her opinions. He or she might be
wrong; he or she might be right. So, you've got that sort of
person on just about any jury.
MR. ALEX RIEGER: Along with the gag order questions,
say there was a jury that didn't involve that loudmouth
person but still didn't have the gag rule. They deliberated
and discussed amongst themselves before all the evidence
is presented, wouldn't possibly letting them discuss early
and letting them all be together, wouldn't we still be afraid
that there would be some sort of band wagon approach,
where twelve people essentially group think their way to an
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early answer and stubbornly and steadfastly stand by that
answer until all evidence is presented and basically just
ignore the other evidence in favor of the decision they've
already made?
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: The question is this: Is it
possible for jurors to keep an open mind? If we tell them,
"You can discuss it, but keep an open mind. You're going
to hear other evidence. You might be surprised by what
you hear."
We've got a psychologist here to tell us more about
how people reach decisions. Typically, you tend to reach a
tentative conclusion. That's going to happen regardless of
whether they discuss it or not. They're going to reach
tentative conclusions and they're going to modify that
conclusion as additional evidence comes in.
I think that jurors are fair-minded enough that if you
tell them, "Reserve judgment until the end. You can talk
about it, listen to the witnesses, you can reach a tentative
conclusion. You've got to listen to the other jurors and
reserve your final judgment until the end." I think they
should be capable of doing that. We actually have a certain
amount of evidence on this from Arizona. Jury experts
have been looking at actual deliberations. Shari Diamond
has written about this very issue. She concluded that there
are some dangers to this, but that overall the process seems
to be working pretty well.
JUDGE ROBERT CHILDERS: Have there been any
studies on group dynamics, particularly on group dynamics
in the jury in a court setting that are allowed to talk to
jurors. What about a group of jurors getting together and
having lunch every day and that sort of thing and the group
just sort of leads the jury in the direction that they want to
go during the deliberations? Are you familiar with any
studies on group dynamics?
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PROFESSOR TIERSMA: Well, no, that's not an area that
I'm really an expert on to be honest. I mean I'm a law
professor and I used to be a linguist, so I'm really
concentrating on language.
PROFESSOR WHITE: I want to ask the last one. As an
evidence professor, I'm struck that you suggest that one
solution to unringing the bell is to specify the evidence
you're asking them to forget, which is what why we often
teach law students that they may just not want to object
because they will re-emphasize.
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: That's a strategic question for
the lawyers.
PROFESSOR WHITE: If the judge restates it, "Don't take
into consideration that the defendant assaulted his past
the
jurors'
three
girlfriends,"
that
improves
comprehensibility?
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: Well, does it improve juror
comprehensibility? I think it commonly does. It also
reinforces that message. So, this is very much a strategic
decision. If you really want to have an effective limiting
instruction, I think the judge would have to say, "Evidence
has been introduced that the defendant attacked his
previous girlfriends. You can consider that evidence on the
question of whether the defendant testified truthfully when
he denied doing so, but you should not consider it on the
question of guilt."
Now, once you say it that way, you begin to realize
how problematic limiting instructions are. But at least that
would focus the jury on the issue. If it's a punitive damages
case, you might say, "You've heard testimony of some
incidents that happened outside of Tennessee. You can

130

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 226
consider that on the question of this but not that." Rather
than simply talk about other state evidence generally, you
identify exactly what you're talking about. That's my idea.
Yes, they're extremely problematic. There's no doubt.
INTRODUCTION
MS. ASHLEY MUSSELMAN: At this time, I would like
to introduce our panel. Our panel is comprised of members
of various disciplines, including law, psychology, criminal
justice, and linguistics. The panel is here today to provide
a response to this issue addressed from their perspective of
their various disciplines. So please help me in welcoming
our panelists.
Janet Ainsworth, a professor of law at Seattle
University School of Law. John Clark, III, an associate in
criminal justice at Troy University. Bethany Dumas,
Professor of English here at the University of Tennessee at
Knoxville, and David Ross, Professor of Psychology at the
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. We'll start with
Professor Ainsworth.
COMMENTS OF JANET AINSWORTH
PROFESSOR AINSWORTH: It's a real honor to be here
today and to be able to comment and make a few
observations on Professor Tiersma's interestingly titled
"Asking Juries to Do the Impossible" presentation. I'm
struck that you said this as though it's a bad thing. When I
think of the impossible things I am reminded of the line
from Alice in Wonderland. When Alice said, "Well, I can't
do that. It's impossible." The Red Queen replied, "Well, I
often believe six impossible things before breakfast."
So I guess the question that I want to ask today is:
Are these things really impossible? Lawyers and judges
can do things to make those impossible tasks that we give
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to jurors perhaps a little bit more possible. I work with
issues of language in law, but today I'm really wearing a
somewhat different hat. I was a trial attorney before
coming into the academy. I practiced criminal defense for
about eight and a half years, and tried somewhere in the
neighborhood of 100 to 150 cases-and they were virtually
all jury trials. My thinking about this issue is much less as
an academic and probably much more as a lawyer.
When Professor Tiersma talked about impossible
thinking, he talked about a great many different things that
we ask jurors to do. These tasks really fall into several
different kinds of categories. What might be instructive for
us is to think about the ways in which we can help jurors
with some of these categories, whereas others we may not
be able to do as much about. For example, Professor
Tiersma reminds us that jurors are often asked to make
decisions about issues instructed in technical language or
archaic language, or with confusing, convoluted, poorly
structured, and lengthy sentences. Those are all examples
of one set of problems-namely, that jury instructions are
often fairly opaque. They are not user-friendly.
A second problem is that jurors are often asked to
make determinations about matters that we think of as more
properly legal matters in which they have relatively little
guidance about how to think about the legal issues. Third,
we often ask jurors to make decisions in which they ought
to make decisions sequentially in some order, but we fail to
tell them that. In other words, we don't road map for them
how the various issues they are deciding may fit together.
Finally, we ask jurors to both assess the past and predict the
future, or sometimes even to construct a hypothetical
present and future as though something different had
happened in the past. All of these tasks are in some sense
impossible. I'm going to speak to each one of them briefly.
I hope to make some suggestions about ways that lawyers
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and judges can deal with some of these impossible tasks,
building on the things that Professor Tiersma has said.
I'm not going to speak very much about the problem
that is probably the easiest for us to do something about,
which is drafting jury instructions that make sense in plain
English. Getting rid of some of the archaic language.
Breaking sentences down into simpler sentences, not
clause,
upon
clause,
upon
clause,
embedding
upon
nominalization,
upon
nominalization
nominalization-all these can make train wrecks of jury
instructions. Rather we should make them instructions that
people can actually understand.
Simple as this sounds, there are a number of
challenges to this. For one thing, all of us today are here
because we were trained in the use of language in
specialized ways, as judges, as lawyers, as legal
professionals, and as social scientists. It's sometimes easy
for us to forget how difficult it is for ordinary jurors, who
don't have as much experience with parsing that kind of
specialized literary language to understand what it is that
we're saying. I suspect this is only going to get worse. I
keep being reminded that my students now are millennials.
They're not used to reading long things. They're not even
used to reading e-mails anymore-that's for old people.
They're not even using IM's anymore. I've been told those
are for semi-old people. Now they're twittering. I've been
told, although I don't twitter myself, that twitter limits what
you can say to 140 characters. I believe that includes
spaces. So any statement which is longer than 140
characters may be daunting to the jurors of the future. This
is something we need to think about.
My advice to lawyers in preparing to craft
instructions is to talk to the jurors in your cases when
you're finished. I've often found that jury instructions that
seemed clear and intelligible to me turned out to present
land mines for jurors. They didn't to me because I had read
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them so many times before and heard judges utter them so
many times before that they seemed completely obvious to
me. Only when I spoke to jurors after the trial did I
understand how confusing they were, or did I understand
that the jurors actually misapprehended the instructions. I
learned a lot about jury instructions, and frankly, I learned a
lot about lawyering generally every time I spoke to jurors
after trial. My suggestion to those of you who are in the
practicing bar is, if a judge allows you to speak with jurors
after they conclude their jury service on your case, take full
advantage of that.
You'll always learn something
interesting and important from them.
I pointed out that jurors are often asked to deal with
what we might consider legal questions. Professor Tiersma
gave you a couple of examples. One example that I felt the
most vexing when I was in practice came out of a habitual
criminal statute in Washington State. This statute was an
early "three strikes and you're out" statute, which meant
that if you had three convictions of certain types of
felonies, you got a sentence of life in prison. The Supreme
Court in our jurisdiction decided that, in order to get a
conviction under the statute, all the elements needed to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the
convictions all be constitutionally valid. Therefore, the
question of the legality of any prior conviction had to be
answered by the jury. The jurors were instructed that it was
their job to determine whether prior convictions, often by
guilty pleas, were constitutionally valid beyond a
reasonable doubt.
So the jurors had to figure out whether a particular
guilty plea was constitutionally valid. This is something
that has sorely tried many judicial minds. The idea that
jurors could do it was somewhat counter-intuitive, to say
the least. Worse yet, they had to make their determination
beyond a reasonable doubt. What it means to a jury to
decide that something was constitutionally valid beyond a
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We
reasonable doubt was even more problematic.
managed to fix that, of course, by scrapping the entire
statute and coming up with a new "three strikes and you're
out" law, which doesn't have that problem. The new statute
has a variety of other problems but that's beyond the scope
of this talk.
I think if there's a wonderful take away from the
examples that Professor Tiersma was giving to us, it's that
jurors are really not told very much about how to be jurors.
They are not given an instruction manual. They're not
given a good road map about how they should proceed.
That's easy for us to forget because those of us who are
lawyers and who are judges have seen so many jury trials
that it seems blatantly obvious how jurors ought to begin
their deliberations, how they ought to determine what the
issues are and how to decide them. In reality, that isn't
necessarily the case, and becomes particularly clear when
you talk to jurors after trial.
A greater use of meta-instructions-instructions
about instructions, instructions about how to proceed-are
certainly useful. Indeed, in Washington they've began to
use some of those meta- instructions, telling jurors how to
think about the decision making process. However, they
didn't replace the old instructions and so we now have
probably the worst of all possible worlds. For example, in
our criminal instructions in Washington, we gave an
instruction that begins, "A person commits the crime of X
when.. ." blah, blah, blah, followed by a description of the
elements of the crime. We refer to that as the "a person
commits" instruction. Jurors were sometimes confused
because they didn't understand how the elements related to
each other and whether each of the elements were essential
to conviction.
So the jury instruction committee got together and
said, "Let's come up with a new instruction-kind of a
We will call that the "to convict"
meta-instruction.
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instruction, reading, "To convict a person of the crime of X,
you must first find X. You must then find Y. You must
then find Z. If you have found all these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it's your duty to return a verdict of guilty.
If, however, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of
these elements, it will be your duty to return a verdict of
not guilty." But, they weren't sure whether they should get
rid of the "a person commits" instruction, so now jurors get
both. This ends up being very confusing. A number of
jurors have said, "Well, we couldn't figure out which of
those instructions was the real one. So we (a) flipped a
coin, (b) tried to apply both, (c) discarded both of them."
Those are all options that jurors have picked. You can see
that continuing to use both instructions turns out to be not
very helpful.
Cases involving lesser-included offenses provide a
classic example of an issue needing some kind of metainstruction that tells jurors how to make decisions about
lesser-included offenses. The suggestion is often made that
special verdict forms-verdict forms that actually walk the
jurors sequentially through the fact determinations they
have to make-can be helpful to jurors. Why then do
lawyers and judges find special verdict forms so difficult?
Why are they so resistant to using them? I think one reason
is a fear of inconsistent verdicts. If we actually could open
up the black box of a jury verdict and get something other
than "thumbs up, thumbs down," we're worried that we
might in fact find that the jurors had made inconsistent
factual findings. This would be a problem, making us face
up to facts we might prefer not to know.
One interesting potential solution to that problem
could come from technology, oddly enough. If you've
bought anything online in recent years, you probably know
that at some point they're going to show you a little box
following the sales terms that says, "I accept." You put a
little green dot in that box to get to the next screen. There's
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no place on that screen where you can do anything other
than to either click "I accept" or get out of the program and
not buy the thing. If you take a technological approach to
using a special verdict, you could set the form so that once
the jurors made a particular determination; they would
never then see the rest of the instructions that no longer
were relevant. For example, in a lesser-included offense
situation, you could actually have the jurors get a little box
to check if they found the defendant guilty of the greater
offense. If they check that box, they never see the followup screens asking them to consider lesser offenses. If they
find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense, then up
pops the next screen instructing them on the lesser offenses.
This electronic jury verdict form would get rid of the
distracting things jurors don't need to consider but instead
give them forms describing the issues that they really need
to decide in the case.
With respect to the impossibility of predicting the
future and dealing with hypothetical futures like, for
example, what would have happened if the disease had
been appropriately diagnosed, let me say this. It is true that
jurors are certainly not able to do that, but nobody else is
either. I think that actually telling the jurors that explicitly
is not a bad idea. Jurors get nervous about not being able to
perform their job correctly. If you can tell them that some
things are inherently not knowable by anyone, not just by
them because they're not legally trained, but by any of us,
legally trained or otherwise, they feel much more
comfortable about making the kind of determinations that
we ask them to do.
If juries are in fact asked to do the impossible, as
Professor Tiersma suggests very colorfully that they are, it
only seems fair to encourage lawyers and judges to do the
merely challenging-that is, to assist them in performing
their roles. If we do this through better instructions, we
may help make the impossible for jurors into the merely
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challenging, whether it is in fact before or after breakfast.
Thank you.
COMMENTS OF JOHN W. CLARK III
PROFESSOR CLARK: It's good to be here. I just kind of
tell it like it is. That's always been my approach. I'm real
straightforward and I conduct a lot of jury research. I am
very passionate about this idea of twelve persons coming
together and trying to deliberate and ultimately reach a
verdict. Back in 2000, I was really thinking a lot about the
criminal justice system, law enforcement, courts and
corrections, and equity, due process. I remember in
graduate school thinking about where I want to go with
this. I love the legal system. I love engaging in dialogue
with attorneys and judges. I mean I've really been
fortunate. I owe my career to judges who gave me the
opportunity to conduct jury research.
I've surveyed, examined, and discussed a lot of
different studies, attitudes, ideologies, personalities,
technology, mental retardation with jurors. I've actually
examined, met with, and discussed over 4,000 since 2000.
And predominantly this is all in Alabama and some in
Texas. I've always been, as I say today, a straight shooter
with this. I very much appreciate the professor's opening if
you will. I've learned a lot. I've thought a lot about jury
instructions. One of the words that I've heard today is
control.
Well, I drove here because I wanted to be in control
rather than fly. Because I'm not in control. So I can
control so much. I mean I am very eclectic. You can tell
already. I've heard this idea of functioning. Functioning.
Well, I'm probably dysfunctional, as well as most of
society. Our society, you could argue, is dysfunctional and
then we try to make them functional in a jury system that
is, some would argue, dysfunctional. We have a lot of

138

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 234
dysfunction going on. It seems that we're trying to make it
functional. If this doesn't make sense, then it might later.
If you drink a beer, it might then. I do my best work, you
know, late at night. I've written my best articles late at
night.
But with that said, tomorrow it may even make
better sense. With that being said, this idea of truth and this
idea of equity, and sometimes I get really caught up on it, is
that really what it's about? I mean is that what we want? I
think more times than not, we all get caught up in our
prescribed rules and our processes in the roles that we
follow. Sometimes we tend to forget control, function,
truth, and equity. What are we really trying to do? I'm
really in it for the pure essence of finding out something
and going in to examine something.
I've had the real unique opportunity to speak to a lot
Whether it's law school
of different persons before.
students, or undergraduate students, graduate students,
attorneys, and judges. They'll all tell you, in the past, that I
just come at it the way I come at it in my approach. I really
do think that we need to recognize again, when it comes to
jurors, that they do have their own lives. I've conducted a
lot of research in this stuff. And I've met with a lot of
jurors as I've indicated.
Jurors have their own lives. We summon them and
we're lucky to get probably half of all that go out. There's
already this idea of cross representation and how many
jurors are we truly bringing in. Nonetheless, we take them
from their lives where it's chaotic-there's work, kids,
responsibilities, trying to keep a job, the economy that we
live in. Nonetheless, they have a life. We ask them to
come down to this foreign atmosphere, and foreign room.
We place them in some really unusual situations.
Nonetheless, we put them in this environment and
we expect so much from them. They're just out of their
element. We have to understand that. They have their own
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lives. We've got to understand and recognize we're taking
them from their world and putting them somewhere that
may be very different. I think sometimes we lose focus of
that.
We also, secondly, must recognize that when it
comes to jurors, they have their own personalities. So, I
think this is really cool because we're thinking about jury
instructions. We're really focused on meticulously and the
semantics and the lexicon and putting these words in place
and trying to make sure that the instructions and it's just
right. We all need to do the best that we can.
With that being said, we can be perfect on
instructions. Then think back to yourself when you were in
school. How many people follow the instructions? You
take a test and it gives you instructions. How many people
don't follow instructions? So there's something to be said
for that. Think about the personalities. Think about
Think about ideology.
How is this and
attitudes.
instructions related? Well, the case could be made that no
matter how good a job we do it might not matter.
No matter how good we come across with
instructions, and we want to maintain control as we've
already indicated. We want jurors to function, as they need
to function. But can we ever get away from recognizing
what jurors bring in when we come inside the threshold of
the courtroom door. Never forget or just accept the
personality, attitudes, and ideology that's brought inside
these courtrooms.
Ultimately, you could have the greatest instructions
but we all must recognize that there's some things that we
can't control. Because I'm extraverted and I score high on
neuroticism. I score high on openness. I score high on
conscientiousness. I score very low on agreeableness,
which means I don't really get along with a lot of people.
That's called the five factor model personality.
When you think about, again, recognizing control and
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function and everything that works fine. The point is
there's a human dynamic to this. There's a human element,
and that's what I want everyone to recognize. Of course,
judges, attorneys, and the law students especially. There's
the individuality. There's this discussion of understanding
that you select.
We're thinking about trial advocacy, thinking about
twelve jurors and some alternates. Ultimately, there's this
idea of it's better to have twelve than to have one.
Understand that when jurors are deliberating, and this is
important, the twelve become one. This is fascinating. As
a trial attorney, you select individuals and excuse.
Ultimately, twelve do make one. The key to this, to how
much and how important the one becomes is with the
passage of time. If it's a real slam shut case and the
strength of evidence is very strong, the twelve may not
necessarily come to be one. With the passage of more
time, the twelve mold together. That's when you get into a
collective personality. I think that's really important and
that's not really mentioned a lot in the literature. You may
go out and you look for individuals that you think are best
suited for the case at hand, but ultimately, the twelve, with
enough time, could easily become one.
With respect to note taking, I think maybe it's not
necessarily a bad thing. I know there's the pros and the
cons for that. But, maybe if we're in the courtroom and it's
isolated and they're writing something, maybe something's
That does show a degree of
pertinent enough.
conscientiousness, and maybe it could be germane later in
the deliberations.
With respect to discussing this with other jurors:
we must keep in mind, no matter what we do, jurors are
going to discuss the case with other persons. That's the
reality of this. We have to accept that. Whether they
discuss it amongst themselves, but more importantly,
without them being sequestered, going to their homes and
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at night. It's so abnormal not to talk at times and discuss.
Whether it's a family member, whether it's a friend, they
will get it off their chest. It's a stressful situation. They are
taken from their lives and responsibilities into a trial. Even
more importantly, they are exposed to very visual, very
graphic, very heinous evidence. They want to talk about it.
They may also want to take notes.
Another thing we must recognize in this process is
the debriefing.
We should debrief and allow the
recognition that jurors go through a lot in some instances.
Having some sort of psychological debriefing program is
important. Throughout this country, you really do not find
that. There are a few other counties throughout the
country, such as King County, which debrief.
I have plenty of examples to demonstrate
psychological issues that jurors have encountered after the
fact-Aduring the trial and even afterwards. Ultimately,
jurors like technology as well. So as the instructions and
thinking about, are we asking jurors to do the impossible. I
know how savvy individuals are.
I know that the
technology is important in the twenty-first century. Jurors
are expecting certain things.
COMMENTS OF BETHANY DUMAS
PROFESSOR DUMAS: Let me introduce myself briefly
for those of you whom I do not know yet. I am delighted to
be here. I am always pleased and honored to be involved
with this College of Law in any way at all. I have been
since my first days here, although they were not always
extremely easy and pleasant days. Just a very brief
comment or two about where I come from with respect to
all of this: I began life as an English major-well, not
quite, but near the third grade I think. I was going to be a
literature professor definitely I decided. I've been thinking
about my life as I've been listening to others this morning
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and thinking about how is it that I got led to be here this
morning talking about what I'm going to be talking about
this morning. Looking back, I've always been, in a sense,
data driven. I'll give you one example of what I mean by
that. I got part of the way through a Ph.D. in Literature and
then I had to take some philology courses-Old English,
history of the English language, Beowulf in the original
language. You know, you read six lines of it once. I fell in
love with that. I thought this is wonderful. This is what
life is really about is each time you would pull those from
the page from the year 450.
At a certain point, I also was tired of not ever, ever,
ever having any money at all. I decided I would teach for a
year or two in this and then finish my doctorate. So I
taught literature courses for two years at a state college. I
hated it. Then I got an opportunity to teach at another
university for a year and I took it. Then I took a job over
the telephone at Southern University in Baton Rouge in
1964. I went down to Baton Rouge to teach at the largest
essentially all black state supported university in the
country. It was one of the more educational things I've
done in life I took the job because of the fact that I thought
I would learn something. In 1964, there were no books and
really no articles on what at that time we were calling
Black English or African American English. Most of my
students were from small southern towns in Southern
Louisiana.
Many of them, quite frankly, had never
interacted much with a white person other than a store clerk
or a postal clerk. So, we had some communication
problems. I was very fortunate in that the department head
at Southern, shortly after I got there, became Melvin Butler,
who was African American and who was a linguist.
So when I got stuck, I would go to Melvin and say,
"Tell me what's going on. Tell me what to do. Tell me
what I need to know that I don't know already." I had
already taken some linguistic courses in language variation
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and dialect studies, but that year, I decided that I wanted to
understand why the kind of variations that exist in the
American English exist, and why was it that we couldn't
talk to each other more easily. I actually changed into a
linguistics concentration that year. It was that particular
trip. That's what I mean by being data driven. This I was
interested in. It was exciting. I wanted to understand it.
So I did finish in linguistics and did research in language
variations beginning with Ozark English and moving to
Tennessee to continue my studies of Appalachian English.
I had been here four or five years. I was wondering,
do I want to run around with a tape recorder doing this kind
of study all my career or will I want to do something
different at a certain point? Understand that I had never
been remotely interested in the law, except to stay as far
away from it as possible as a graduate student.
More or less by accident, I read that 1980, '81
article by Ferro and Ferro, the short version of the
Columbia Law Review article on why jurors don't
understand jury instructions. They had actually conducted
a careful research in the Washington D.C. area, about that
particular point. I read that. The short article fascinated
me, and I went and read the long law review article. I
guess it was the first law review article I ever read. I
decided that judges, Your Honors, and lawyers needed to
know something about language that linguists know. I
decided that I wanted to help teach judges and lawyers.
However, I couldn't think of any reason why any of them
would listen to me.
So I decided that I needed to understand legal
process. I thought I could do it in one year. I quietly got
myself admitted to the College of Law, and for four years
between 1981 and '85, I taught full-time except for the final
year, and I also came over here to begin my real education.
That's how I got where I am. Jury instructions have been a
passion of mine for a long time, and some of the work that
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I've done has actually resulted in some detailed
examinations of the kinds of things that Peter has told us
about and written about extensively.
One of the fortunate things that happened to me
fairly early in the beginning of this research is that Judge
Inman corresponded with me, and over a period of years he
shared with me some of his solutions to some of the
policies we're discussing. One is paraphrasing entire
instructions. Another involves pre-narrative examples,
which are not extremely popular with judges. I understand
why. But, he shared a number of those kinds of things with
me.
For instance, just to show you one short example,
talking to a jury about the concept of present cash value.
Most jurors are not accountants, and so that is kind-of a
strange phrase. If we examine the pattern of instruction in
Tennessee, I won't read that. We could go get the
paraphrasing. It makes the language a little bit simpler.
We could even add a brief example. Hopefully, the simple
example will be of some benefit.
If you know that a person will need $1,000.00 five
years from now, you would normally not give him the
$1,000.00 now. Well, in today's market, actually, you
probably would. Maybe you would give him $2,000.00.
But if you were required to give him money now, you
would give him only the amount of money which, when
invested, back when we could invest, would equal
$1,000.00 in five years. How much that money should be
now is for you to decide. That would be kind of a narrative
paraphrasing example that I learned the existence of from
Judge Inman.
Another example, and I'm going to show you one
more, would be something like proximate cause, which
might include both positive and negative examples. There
again, of course, from Judge Inman. Some of these legal
concepts or principles can be difficult for laypersons to
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understand. I hope this example will illustrate for you a
practical example of proximate cause. It is negligent for a
driver to drive a car that has bad or slick tires. If that
automobile with bad tires slammed into the rear of a car
because the driver could not stop due to a combination of
slick tires and wet pavement, then the negligence of the
driver in driving with bad tires would be a proximate cause
of the accident.
Of course, the other problem here is that
"proximate" sounds to a layperson like "approximate," a
very different meaning. But, it is possible for the person to
be negligent without that negligence being a proximate
cause of the accident. If the driver of that car with bad tires
is stopped for a red light and is struck in the rear by another
car, obviously the bad tires had nothing to do with the
accident. In other words, the driver's negligence in driving
a car with bad tires was not a proximate cause of that
accident. This is a straightforward example it seems to me.
I'd love to go through the history of having juries in
the U.S., but I will not. I will move to trials just a little bit.
Let me say, before I move into this, that my head is filled
this morning with data, and it's a little bit different from
what it had been filled with while I had been standing here
in the past years. I have been focused a lot upon how
undergraduate students at Duke University understand the
nature of legal process and the nature of jury service. I've
also been having two to three novels and views of films on
"To Kill a Mockingbird," "Runaway Jury," and "The
Runaway Jury" that are still in the book and other such
things.
Also, I want to mention that last fall I had the
interesting experience of challenging, pre-requiring
students to write a novel involving a lawyer. I'm teaching a
little undergraduate course-it's a special topic course. I
looked at all the special topic courses, and I didn't like any
of them, so, of course, I invented my own: Lawyers in
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Literature. We started out with the thriller, "The Runaway
Jury." We went into excerpts from novels, that kind of
thing. Then the day after the drop deadline came, I went in
and told the students what we were actually going to be
doing in class. The preceding summer, as I had been
planning the course, it occurred to me finally that 254 is a
writing intensive course, and that I was probably expected
to have all my students to write a research paper. I did not
want to read some library research papers on any topic
whatsoever. So I thought, okay, what do we write instead?
I decided that we would corroboratively write a novel.
This applied to all my students the day after the drop
deadline. They looked at me like, woman from Mars, what
are you talking about?
They didn't think we could do it or would do it.
What I had done prior to that day is to have them do some
writing exercises, both in and out of class, such that I knew
they could write sentences and weave together coherent
narratives. Those are the two things I thought they needed
to do. My motive for having them write the novel is that I
wanted to, in effect, put them in the driver's seat with
respect to fiction. I wanted them to think hard about what
does a fiction writer have to do? How do you think about
plot, how do you develop characters, how do you identify a
conflict, how do you write? How do you do all this stuff
when you're the author? So that for the rest of their lives
they might occasionally, in reading a novel, think about,
well, I wonder if he thought about going here instead, or he
thought about going there instead? That kind of thing.
Now, it was a large class for this kind of activity.
There were thirty-one students in the class. And we didn't
get to do what Ken Kesey did with his graduate students in
Oregon back in the '80s. I learned, actually after my course
started, that Ken Kesey had done this experiment once with
graduate students. Well, they came to his house twice a
week and all sat around a table and wrote a pretty bad

147

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 243
novel. You can buy it if you want to. It's out in print, and
you can buy it.
We couldn't do that, I mean thirty-one students
twice a week for an hour and fifteen minutes. We
developed a plot outline. We identified our characters, our
conflict, and our resolutions; then divided ourselves into
groups to write the individual chapters. We finished a 100page draft. It's a bad draft. But, my requirement was not
that they write a good novel. It was that they write a
novel-a draft of a novel.
Furthermore, four of them decided they would like
to continue working on it. So they've been working all
semester this spring with me. The idea was that they would
take the 100-page draft, flush it out, and improve it. That
lasted for about four weeks. They came in the fifth week
and said, "We have an announcement to make." What's the
announcement? "We have thrown away the 100 pages and
we are starting over."
They're doing a pretty good job.
So, what's the point I'm trying to make? I wanted to
examine the extent to which untrained, laypersons,
undergraduate students, and these are not pre-law students,
would depict legal process and depict jury service.
Because I think one of the problems with jury instructions
is that jurors are regarded as sort-of minor players even
when they're doing a very major sort of function-that
they, themselves, don't have a clear picture of what a jury
service is.
I'd like to conclude by just suggesting that the
improvement of languages, the addition of paraphrasing
and narrative is extremely important. But I think that
there's a kind-of discrepancy between lip service paid to
jurors just prior to the fact and the way the jurors, in fact,
are often actually treated. I have suggested that they have
to be empowered into kind-of a lay expert they're being
asked to be. That is, the lay expert on facts. I think that the

148

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 244

way they're treated in court would probably have to be
changed just a little bit. I've even suggested at one point
seriously that if in 1979 or sometime during the 1980s, or
even in the 1990s judges could have taken early research on
syntax and semantics of jury instructions totally seriously,
they might well have made or authorized changes in
sentence structure and vocabulary choice that many of us
have been advocating. But if they had done only that, I
think that would have been actually totally inadequate. It's
far more important for us to do-and I've been suggesting
this morning, to stand back and look at the whole picture of
what we're asking jurors to do when they walk into that
courtroom, what we're removing them from, what their
perceptions are as they, in fact, attempt to follow the kinds
of instructions that we are both charging them with and also
always trying to improve. I welcome your comments and
suggestions later. Thank you very much.
COMMENTS OF DAVID ROSS
PROFESSOR ROSS: My name is David Ross, and I've got
kind-of a different perspective on the topic. Don't leave.
I'm a Professor of Psychology at the University of
Tennessee Chattanooga.
For many years, I've been
studying juries and eyewitness memory and doing a lot of
work. When I was in graduate school, I thought I would
get all this great science, and the legal system would just
open its arms, understand it, and want to hear about it.
Little did I know how incredibly naive I am. Part of that
education came when I met the Honorable Neal Thomas in
Chattanooga. We've been working together for many years
on issues like trying to increase juror comprehension and
things like that. It's been an incredible journey.
I wanted to share with you three points that I think
might be different here as well, that we haven't talked about
here. One of the first things I want to do is ask you a
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question. What's the literacy rate in Tennessee? Does
anybody know? Currently, the illiteracy rate, I should say,
reading level below sixth grade in Tennessee, is forty-three
percent. You know what it is nationally? Twenty-seven
percent. So the very first question that we have to ask is to
what extent are we going to match the language level of our
jury instructions to the people who come in to hear them?
First of all, as we have established today, court is a
very foreign place. It is intimidating. People don't know
about it. In fact, how many people in this room know that
we actually have a jury orientation videotape available to
every court in Tennessee? Well, the person who made that
videotape is sitting right here: Judge Thomas. His whole
idea has been to help educate jurors from the moment they
walk in the door to help them feel more comfortable.
We've done a careful research on the impact of the jury
orientation tape that makes jurors feel more comfortable,
and it increases their comprehension of the process, which
is a critically important thing. If we look at the literacy
problem, it becomes even incredibly more important.
In fact, those of you, for example, the judges-and
I'll pose this question to you as well-in your jurisdiction,
do you know what percentage of jurors show up who have
been summoned for jury duty? In Hamilton County, where
we're from, it's thirty-two percent. Thirty-two percent. The
number one reason that jurors don't show up for jury duty,
from the research, is that--does anybody want to take a
guess at it? Yes?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The mail.
PROFESSOR ROSS: The mail? This is actually a good
guess. A lot of them don't get it. But people who have
actually gotten the summons, why they don't show up?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They can't read it?
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They're not getting paid
enough.
PROFESSOR ROSS: Well-pay is a problem, plus fear of
being made a fool of. Fear of not being competent. Fear of
humiliation. That ties right into the question of how are we
going to make this entire process easier? Maybe we need
to expand the jury orientation videotape to make them
understand that they're going to hear things like jury
instructions that are going to be complex.
We do--one of the things I've done over the years
too is that I do a lot of trial consulting with attorneys. We'll
look at a jury instruction, and I'll read it and I give it to
them. Will you please tell me what this means? They don't
know. They say, "Well, I'm not really quite sure." I say,
"Well, I don't know. If you don't know, how is the jury
So the issue of literacy and
going to know?"
comprehension starts from understanding who your jury
panel is, how these people are going to be competent to
understand. If you have a literacy rate of forty-three
percent, if thirty-two percent of your community shows up
for jury duty, we're looking at a substrata of our population
that we've got to pay attention to before we even start
looking at the question of jury instructions.
It's not just a jury instruction issue. It's a much
broader issue than that. Making them feel comfortable.
Making them understand the process. So that was the first
point I wanted to talk about. We really didn't hit literacy.
It's a really, really, really important problem, and it varies
even within our state when sometimes we go to real rural
communities and deal with jurors there. Literacy rates even
within counties vary enormously.
I always tell the attorneys when we're practicing for
a trial or we're working on something, that if your
presentation doesn't pass the granny test, it's not a good
By that, meaning-and not anything about
one.
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grandmothers-but I use that example, Granny didn't go to
law school. It's got to be in a language that everybody can
understand. So the jury instructions have to follow or pass
the granny test. That's my first point.
My second point hasn't been, I don't think,
addressed yet today. I think this is even more problematic.
What happens when the content of the jury instructions is
wrong? Let me give you these concrete examples of our
own work. The single largest, the single biggest reason for
wrongful conviction in the criminal justice system. Does
anybody know what it is?
Eyewitness testimony,
eyewitness identification.
Of the first forty DNA
exoneration studies, ninety-or examples-ninety percent
of those were due to errors in line-up identification
accuracy. Five of those people were on death row waiting
to be executed. One was two hours from execution and got
a stay.
Well, if you look at the jury instructions that are
given in most states regarding how to evaluate the accuracy
of eyewitness identification, the content is wrong. The
content is wrong. We have approximately today about
3,000 studies of eyewitness identification. The typical jury
instruction to the jury is to rely on witness competence.
Competence bears little to no accurate relationship to
witness accuracy. The same thing with detail. It bears
little to no relationship to witness accuracy. So, jurors are
actually given an instruction that is just the opposite of
what the science tells them.
So, you wonder how many of those cases-and if
you look at the DNA exoneration studies that are
continuing to go on, those preventatives are still hovering
around seventy-five, eighty percent errors in line-up
identification accuracy. How much of that error in the
system is because jurors are given instructions to use to
evaluate an eyewitness that are factually wrong? That
points them in the wrong direction? Because something

152

5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 248
like witness competence is an extraordinarily easy thing to
manipulate. What we know from many, many studies from
the '80s is that from the time the person experiences the
event to when they actually testify, witness confidence or
competence goes like this (indicating downward). By the
time they get on the stand and they go, "Yeah, that's the
guy," that competence measure means nothing. But the
Court instructs the jury, that's what you use among other
things. So that was my second point.
I will give you another example of a very important
issue where the content of the jury instruction was wrong.
Years ago, we were interested in the issue of child
witnesses. Children were really starting to testify in court,
and legal changes were making it easier for children to
testify at very young ages. One of the issues that the courts
were concerned about was how do we protect a very young
child, a four or five-year-old child, from the trauma of
testifying? Because when the child comes in and sits in the
witness box, whom would that child typically look at?
Who's in front of the child? Who? The defendant.
Exactly.
The theory is that having the defendant there may
produce such trauma to the child that it may impact his or
her testimony or make the child unavailable to the court
because the child can't speak. It's too fearful. So, courts
started putting protective shields between children and
defendants or using video monitoring systems, where they
would leave the defendant and the jury in the courtroom,
and they would have the child directly across in the judge's
chambers.
Well, this raised the issue of what? What does this
deny the defendant? Exactly. The Sixth Amendment right
to confront his accuser. The Supreme Court of the United
States heard a number of cases on this issue in a very short
period of time. They came down with the conclusion,
based on a jury instruction, that it was not unconstitutional
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as long as the judge gave the instruction to the jury just
prior to the child testifying that the jury is to ignore-as
you talked about ignore the pink elephant in the roomignore the screen that's being placed between the child and
the defendant. You are not to infer anything about the guilt
or innocence of the defendant as the function of the
presence of that screen.
Their court opinion was without any data, that the
instruction was sufficient to undo any presumed prejudice
that would be introduced by that screen. Well, what does
that do? First of all, it assumes that the screen would
actually prejudice the outcome of the trial, number one.
Number two, it assumes that the jury instruction would
eliminate the prejudice. Well, at that time, there was no
data on the topic, and we had a NSF Grant to look at that.
To make a long story short, we spent an enormous amount
of money and time to look at whether this is the case, that
the presence of a screen actually increases conviction rates,
which was the concern of the court. The reasons for the
instruction.
We did a study. We did a very large-scale,
elaborate study. Not only did we find that it had not had an
impact, it had the opposite impact. That if you protect a
child and you put a protective screen between the child and
the defendant, conviction rates don't go up. They go down;
and they go down significantly. Just the opposite of what
the court concluded and argued. Moreover, what does that
do to the utility of the instruction? The instruction says
what? The instruction says, "Look. Don't let the screen
imply that the defendant is guilty." But if you look at the
data, it doesn't do that. It actually decreases conviction
rates. Just the opposite of what the court concluded. So the
content of the instruction was wrong. So if you were going
to rewrite the instruction, what would it say? It would say
the opposite, you know. Don't let the presence of the
screen make you think the defendant is not guilty.
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But actually, what it was doing, what it was really
doing is they had it backwards. The presence of the screen
was not impacting perceptions of the defendant. The
presence of the screen was impacting the perceptions of the
child. Because if you put a screen between a child and the
defendant, the assumption about the child was what? Was
what? Fragile, unreliable, had to protect it, and couldn't
rely on the testimony of the child. If you were going to
write an instruction that was actually accurate based on
data, the instruction would have been something about
don't allow the presence of the screen to influence your
judgment about the credibility of the child's testimony.
Those are the kinds of issues that I thought so
critically important. If we could correct all of the linguistic
structures, to make it easier for people to understand the
jury instructions and things like that. But the question is,
what happens when the content of the instruction is wrong?
What can we do as scientists to help supply the courts
information to correct the instruction? That's when I
started to work with Judge Thomas in asking, "Well, why
can't we just change it?" Very naively. Little did I know
how little, how difficult it is for the legal system to change
and to make these changes because of concerns about
reversibility and things like that. And I was incredibly
naive, thinking as long as we had this data, everything
would be fine. But it's really been an incredible experience
to see the interaction between science and the legal system,
and wondering, how do we get those two to mesh and
actually get the wheels of the legal system to turn a little bit
faster than they're turning, to make changes in accordance
to what we're finding in scientific studies of jurors and
issues facing the court system?
Thank you for allowing me the honor to be among
you.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MS. ASHLEY WHITE: At this time, we're going to open
the floor up for questions for the panel.
MR. SID GILREATH: Your illustration about the
deduction of present value in a tort. We have that
instruction for deducing present value for pain and
suffering. We have an instruction before that says, "There
is no fixed rule in which to determine pain and suffering."
So we have an inconsistent situation there, and I wish that
the people who write the rules and procedures, the Supreme
Court, were here today.
Anyway, that shows the
inconsistency that we have in our instructions as you talked
about in California.
PROFESSOR DUMAS: Thank you for that comment. I
don't know exactly how that committee works. But do such
committees ever have an editor who is just an editor, who
looks for things like that, rather than importing substantive
information into them? It might be an idea.
JUDGE CREED MCGINLEY: The chairman of the
committee is here. This gentleman.
PROFESSOR DUMAS: Then I'll sit down and listen. Can
you comment?
JUDGE ROBERT CHILDERS: You want me to comment?
Sure. On the Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, we completely
re-wrote several instructions after McIntyre v. Balentine
came out in 1992. As part of that, we broke up into
subdivisions or working groups and assigned each working
group a section of the instructions. We also created what
we call the Clarity Subcommittee.
The Clarity
Subcommittee looked at every instruction to try to clarify,
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without changing the substance, and to try to gender
neutralize the instructions as much as possible. So we did
that.
Unfortunately, without the benefit of the linguist,
which I wish in hindsight we had one, however, we are
now looking at the possibility of engaging the service of a
linguist because when I came on the bench in 1984, some
of the instructions were one-paragraph long sentences. I
couldn't understand them. So, my goal since I've been a
member of this committee and I've been chair, and I've
been the chair since 1991. And so we continue to try to do
what you folks are talking about today. And that is to make
the instructions as understandable as we can. We put our
third edition-we're now up to the eighth edition this year
because we're putting it in a softbound volume each year
like the criminal committee is doing.
We tried to reach an eighth grade education level.
The computer tells us we reached a tenth grade level. You
know, we took out words like "exercise" and put in "use."
We eliminated "proximate." As I used to tell the jury when
I got to proximate cause, I would literally spell the word
out.
I'm saying, "Proximate, P-r-o-x-i-m-a-t-e, not
approximate, like we're used to using in our everyday
language."
We've taken out other words to try to again use the
plain English language and not this stilted language that the
law has always used. So I hope that briefly explains the
process we use. I also have lay judges trying to make jury
instructions understandable for lay people.
PROFESSOR DUMAS: Thank you. Can I just say one
thing? The thing I'm most grateful for is that the word
"captious" disappeared from the reasonable doubt
instruction. I once asked a room full of linguists to define
the word captious for me. One person in the room offered
a definition.
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Were they right?
PROFESSOR DUMAS: I don't know.
MS. ASHLEY WHITE: Yes?
MR. BRADLEY SMITH: My name is Bradley Smith. This
question is actually for Professor Ross. In regard to your
statement about there being instructions that were factually
inaccurate, where we're actually asking the jury to do
something instructionally wrong, how much do you think
that ties into what Professor Tiersma stated about rape
identification? Not only telling them that it made a
difference, you're supposed to consider it, but actually
telling them why you're supposed to consider it? Do you
feel like by not only changing those instructions to be
accurate, but by telling the jurors why they were inaccurate,
do you think that would affect the outcome?
PROFESSOR ROSS: I think actually I would rewrite the
entire instruction regarding eyewitness identification
because when they talk about things like rape, that's
actually a category of variable that it's difficult for
psychologists to talk about. Because there's rape, stress, all
kinds of things that the eyewitness experiences. The field
of eyewitness identification has much clearer definitions
and instructions for jurors on how the police collected the
identification evidence. In fact, there are the Department of
Justice Guidelines instructing exactly what you should have
done.
The instructions should be not about the eyewitness.
The instruction should be about the procedures that were
used to collect the identification evidence, and whether
they followed the guidelines that had been published by the
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Department of Justice and have been sent to every law
enforcement agency in the United States.
So, cross-race ID is a tough one because even if it's
a cross race ID case, no one can tell you. No one. There's
no psychologist in the country who can tell you whether or
not a particular eyewitness is susceptible to making an error
because of cross-race ID. We can only talk in generality.
That's a misleading instruction. But what we can do is say,
"Look. There's agreed upon in the science among judges,
attorneys, the DOJ Guidelines about how the evidence
should have been collected. That's what the instructions
should be about. Not about what are called estimated
variables, things like cross-race identification. They're
looking at the wrong variables. So, I would rewrite the
whole instruction on something we really have much better
science on.
JUDGE BOB JONES: Judge Bob Jones, also a Professor of
Law. When you studied the screen between the minor and
the defendant, did you also study the impact upon the jurors
on the purity of instructions? The purity of instruction by
the judge about not letting the prejudice intercede about the
guilt of the defendant?
PROFESSOR ROSS: Yes. Yes, we did. And we looked at
a lot of the questions about that in terms of their reaction to
it, the reactions to the judge giving the instruction, and
things like that. But the thing that we found most
disturbing about the reaction to the instruction is we asked
them to recall it. Guess what percentage recalled it. Five
percent recalled the instruction, which I couldn't believe.
Five percent recalled the instruction.
That's another issue I think, in terms of jury
instructions and memory, is where do they fall. That
instruction fell in the middle of the trial. You know, for
example, an instruction like what we were talking about in
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regard to the eyewitness. Well, if you read it at the end,
after the testimony has already been given, how can a juror
go back, take that instruction and apply it to assessing the
credibility of a witness that they may have heard a week
ago? So, why not give the instruction just prior to the
presentation of the witness. We were very disappointed by
how many of the jurors couldn't even remember the
instruction.
MS. MEREDITH PASAY: I have a question about the
same study along those same lines. Because I was thinking
I don't know a lot about the details of the study. If the
instruction was, if you see the child on the screen, don't let
it affect your judgment about the guilt of the defendant, and
then it comes out that they find not guilty, and the
conviction rate goes up. So it seems like the instruction
makes it worse.
PROFESSOR ROSS: Well, we had a control group that
was compared to a control group that didn't get any
instructions. What we found with the instruction-so we
have one condition where they see the entire trial-and
what we did is we took actual cases that went before the
Supreme Court by hiring attorneys to write a model case.
We manipulated the presence or absence of the instruction.
It had no impact at all on conviction rate gain; the reason
being is I think only five percent remembered it. But then
again, the question is, well, if you do more and try to give it
more and more, the problem is it's still the wrong
instructions.
The instruction should be don't let it
undermine your perceptions of the credibility of the child.
It's really not about the defendant. So, to answer, it was a
fascinating study. I can give it to you if you would like to
read it.
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MR. JOHN ROGERS: My name is John Rogers. I have a
question for the entire panel. I would hope that each of you
is more than aware of the fact that the institution that we're
talking about here, the American jury trial is not on the
verge of extinction, but certainly it's extremely ill. The
reduction in the number of trials that take place all across
this land, state or federal, has been fueled with a fire and
the fire generated by those institutions in our society like
the business roundtables, the insurance lobbyists to destroy,
to take away that fundamental right of all citizens. I want
to know, have any of you ever worked directly for the
Chamber of Commerce, been employed, had studies
funded, that you have been involved with, provided the
capital to administer those studies, and if it bothers you? If
it hasn't happened yet, would you do so, work for the very
forces in our society that are trying to deny every citizen
the right to a fair and impartial jury trial?
PROFESSOR AINSWORTH: I'd like to briefly comment.
You are actually talking about the elephant in the room that
nobody is talking about, which is that jury trials are a
vanishing species in our system. Mark Galanter wrote a
very influential article in 2004 called The Vanishing Trial:
An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts. All of the studies that have come out
since Professor Galanter's study have confirmed his
empirical findings that civil and criminal trials are going
away.
It's a very complex matter to figure out why this is
happening. For example, in the criminal area, which I'm
more familiar with, it is largely a function in federal court
of sentencing, with mandatory minimum sentences that
make it almost impossible to get your day in court without
risking five, ten, and even higher mandatory minimum
sentences unless you plea bargain. So it's a foolish
defendant who tries.
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On the state court level, it's also a function of
factors like the dramatically increasing case loads among
public defenders. I've been looking at situations where,
although the ABA suggests that 150 to 180 cases per
attorney per year is about the right caseload, there are
jurisdictions now in which public defenders are assigned
700, 800, 900 cases per attorney per year. We're talking
about felonies in many cases. Well, if you've got 900 cases
per year, I'm going to guarantee you're not going to try very
many of them.
On the civil side, there are a combination of factors
to point to. Things like damage caps in tort reform have
made it much more difficult to have get the kind of damage
awards that would make a jury trial economically plausible.
And so cases are simply settling on that basis rather than
going to trial. But in many respects, it may be that if we
came back here in twenty years to talk about jury
instructions, the question will be, why? If so few cases are
actually being tried to juries, is a jury instruction
conference somewhat of a sideshow compared to the real
issues that face us in terms of our civil and criminal justice
system? I agree you've raised a really important issue. I
hope and would like to believe that we can preserve the
jury trial. Because I think it's crucial. Somebody talked
about legitimacy.
Today I think it's crucial to the
functioning of a legitimate justice system that there be
community input into its most important decisions.
PROFESSOR CLARK: Following up, very good question.
Personally, I've never done any work for private types of
organizations. I know there is a lot of money to be made.
You know, you get into especially pharmaceutical
companies and research studies that are done. Making
references, legitimizing justice system, recognizing even in
jury consultants there is a $450 million a year industry on
that. My research has always just been very pure, going
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into it for recognizing and understanding something. Not
necessarily going into it and whatever the outcome may be,
but trying to understand that whether it's a positive or a
negative, this is a finding. And it's a finding. Not going
into it hoping to find something or steering it in a certain
manner.
I very much appreciate that question because of the
necessity to have an ordinary group of twelve persons-lay
persons-come in and render these verdicts. I don't want to
go to an expert of jurors. You've heard other countries
making use of jurors who are considered just experts. I'm
very much opposed to that. So I hope I have answered
your question.
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: Can I say just one thing about
that too? Although it is definitely true, trials and juries,
jury trials especially, have gone down quite a bit over the
last decade or two. Maybe to put it in perspective, on the
positive side, there are other countries that are starting to
adopt the jury system. For example, Japan and Korea have
started to use something like a jury system or what they
sometimes call lay assessors. So, even as-it's rather odd,
isn't it-that while jury trials are decreasing in the United
States, we've in a sense exported the idea to some other
countries, which are now starting to adopt it. So, there is a
positive note, I suppose, to that issue.
MR. ROGERS: One of the reasons I asked that question is
particularly with your presentation, I would think thatwell, while it was not intended for that purpose, I want you
to know I'm not complaining or insinuating in any way that
you would be for the annihilation of the jury system. But
when you point to this long litany of areas within the jury
instructions, which create this sort of imbecilic circus that
must go on in the jury deliberation room because they're
required to apply these impossible, nonsensical rules, I
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think it does a disservice to the lawyers whose job it is to
explain many of the jury instructions. You know, we have
them before the jury is charged. We put them on board or
voir dire, and we explain to the jury what we believe. You
can't tell them what the law is, but we tell them what we
think about how to apply those laws to the facts of this
case.
All I want to say to all of you is that you need to
keep in mind that this analysis you're doing may only be
half the story. You have to take into account what the bar
is doing in the courtroom to bring to light this sometimes
archaic language. To deal with that archaic language in a
way that makes sense, makes common sense, and why the
American jury system still is the greatest form of resolving
disputes in the history of mankind.
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: I think I probably should
respond to that because I don't take your comments
personally.
But you know, it's interesting that in
California, I've been involved for the last twelve years on
the effort in California to make jury instructions more
comprehensible. How did that start? It started out with the
riots basically in Los Angeles. It was an indirect result of
that and the O.J. Simpson case.
What we call the Rodney King case, which is the
case of Rodney King being badly beaten by these police
officers. The police officers were put to trial, and they
were acquitted. Then O.J. Simpson was acquitted. In
California, a lot of people began to think the jury system is
broken.
Right?
And so there was a blue ribbon
commission that was appointed by the State Supreme
Court, which basically made a lot of recommendations as to
how the jury system could be improved. They made many
recommendations, but one of them was that jury
instructions ought to be made more user-friendly.
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Our Chief Justice Ronald George took that, and
this whole process began that I became involved
how
that's
in-very involved in, I hate to think of how many hours I
spent on this whole process over the last twelve years. But
it's quite a few. But at any rate, I've been involved in that
as a result of this whole soul-searching that we went
through about the jury system and whether it is broken.
So, when we're talking about making jury
instructions more comprehensible, we're certainly not
talking about getting rid of the jury. What we're talking
about is making the process for jurors, involving them
more, making them more educated about what they're
doing, and making them more comfortable with the
process. It seems to me that that, in the long run, is going
to strengthen the jury system rather than undermine it. If
jurors know what they're doing, and they're not being
confronted with weird instructions and legalese that make
them feel like they're strangers to the system and we don't
really want them there because we don't make the effort to
address them personally, we don't address them as "you."
We always talk about "the jurors" and that sort of thing.
That really puts them off, and that's what we want to avoid.
Ultimately, this is about making jurors know what
they're doing, carry out their job better, and feel better
about the process after they've been through it because they
understood what was happening and they feel confident
about the verdict that they've reached. This is all about
strengthening the jury system. It's not about undermining it
in any sense.
PROFESSOR DUMAS: And just for the record, John, no, I
have never been engaged by one of these companies and
nor do I plan to be.
PROFESSOR ROSS: Ditto for me. To reiterate the same
spirit, I think all of us would share that same ideology that
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this work is designed to help preserve and to improve, not
to tear down and eliminate. So, the spirit is the opposite of
that.
MS. DOROTHY STULBERG: I'm Dorothy Stulberg. I
don't think it makes any difference what is happening if
nobody's having jury trials. So, I think his comment is
extremely important. None of us, as practicing lawyers,
want to go to jury trial. The insurance companies want us
to go to jury trials because the remedy is so low. There are
so many factors that come in before juries. I am scared to
death of what the Chamber of Commerce is doing. They
are specifically opposed. The business world is specifically
opposed to juries. They don't want the public to have some
concept of what justice is. So I-it scares me because I
agree-I think somebody said the value of twelve people
sitting there commenting on what's right for our world. It
bothers me, as a practicing attorney, that it looks like the
legal system is so strong because of the publicity of the
power structure. I think it's relevant to make it easier, but
make it easier, and nobody is going to use juries. Anyway,
that's my comment.
MS. ASHLEY WHITE: We have time for one more
question.
UNIDENTIFIED LAW STUDENT: You said earlier that
there is life outside of serving on a jury. That made me
think about a jury trial that I got to witness this summer.
After the jury selection process, the jurors that were
excused seemed excited, even seemed like they had dodged
a bullet because they didn't have to serve. That made me
think about whether you had come across any research or
thought of the possibility that either (a) jurors don't want to
serve on juries, and/or (b) they don't really care about the
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administration of justice and how does that affect the
system?
PROFESSOR CLARK: That's a great question. That's
amazing that you brought that up. I've got a study that's
being written up right now that deals with juries over the
period since 2000 and my involvement in conducting jury
research. I'm amazed that on that Monday morning when
the summoned jurors show up, and they go through the
orientation, I've absolutely been amazed at the number of
jurors that, for whatever it's worth, they'll get up and then
they'll run to get in line and say, "This is why I need to go.
This is why I've got to be excused." It's upsetting, and I
cannot believe it.
You can just guarantee that half of the people-if
there are 160, 80-something-are going to get up. What's
interesting is, again, touching on this issue of the
importance of dating back to 1215 of the Magna Carta of
the conscience of the community. Twelve persons coming
together and rendering a verdict, being that conscience of
the community and trying to have the pulse of right and
wrong as fellow citizens.
The number is startling of them trying to get out of
jury service, again, for whether it's medical reasons or
unjust or unsound issues. There is a lot of evidence that
does indicate that jurors-what are they going to get out of
this experience? What are they going to get out? In
Alabama, for example, if you're paying jurors $10.00 a day,
I mean you know, and they're saying, "What am I going to
get out of this?"
So many persons see this as a job to the extent, as a
liability, as frustration and aggravation. That's why we're
trying to improve the jury system, and along with this,
making it user-friendly. Let's make the jury system userfriendly and keep trying. It's almost like you have to go
back to Civics again. Listen, this is a privilege that you can
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serve on a jury, and you must understand that. I think we
need to do a better job of conveying that message. But it's
amazing how jurors and persons come together. I learned
this a long time ago from a judge that the juries and persons
being summoned for duty, they're wheels, if you will, to the
extent that when you're a defendant and you're on the
fourth floor, and on the first floor there's 160 people down
there, wow. That really, that gets it going, don't it?
So, the importance of having those jurors. But I am
amazed, and studies indicate again the frustration,
aggravation, low pay, what am I going to get out of this. I
don't have time for this. Accompanied with what I said
about their own lives and what they're going through, the
dysfunction, if you will, and issues. It makes it very tough.
Okay, it's tough, but that's the reality. And that's what I
wanted to indicate to everyone: the reality of what we're
dealing with. The reality of the world that we live in, in
2009 is not easy. But we must understand who we're
dealing with and how we can improve it. And I think that's
what we're doing today.
INTRODUCTION
MS. JESYCA WESTBROOK: Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen. My name is Jesyca Westbrook, and I'm the
Candidacy Process Editor for the Tennessee Journal of Law
and Policy. I'm also the logistics chair for this symposium.
Before I introduce Judge Dann, I would first like to thank
him again for graciously being here. We could not ask for
a better outcome after Mr. Munsterman could not join us.
Today we also could not ask for a more experienced
or distinguished afternoon keynote speaker. Judge Dann is
a retired Phoenix, Arizona Superior Court Judge with over
twenty years of experience on the bench, five of them spent
as Chief Judge. After retiring in 2000, instead of playing
golf as many others do, he then completed two visiting
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fellowships at the National Center for State Courts and the
National Institute of Justice.
His dedication to jury research, jury trial
innovations, and reform has helped to shape the future of
jury trials in the U.S. And he's a nationwide leader in the
effort to transform the way courts view jurors. He has been
called a pioneer trailblazer in the field and, as a result, has
received the William Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence and the ABA Inaugural Jury Impact Award.
So, on behalf of the Center for Advocacy and Dispute
Resolution, The Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, and
the Summers-Wyatt Symposium, please join me in
welcoming Judge B. Michael Dann.
COMMENTS OF MICHAEL DANN
JUDGE DANN: Thank you. And did you say retired or
tired? Today it's both. Good afternoon. I'm really happy
to be here. Sad that Tom Munsterman couldn't make it.
Many of you know Tom. Tom is a good friend of thirty
years and a walking encyclopedia on matters having to do
with the American jury.
Maybe you don't know about Tom. He has no legal
background, training, education, experience.
He, by
background and education, is a mechanical engineer,
electrical, one of those. He was called to Federal Court for
a jury trial in a drug transaction sale case or something and
was so taken, moved, and unmoved by the experience that
he wrote the judge after the trial and said, "Have you ever
considered doing things a little differently with regard to
the jury's needs?" The judge welcomed the letter and
invited Tom to come in to chat. They had a nice visit, and
Tom shared his wisdom with the judge. The judge
suggested that Tom, since he had so much to offer, consider
going into the business of juries and jury trials.
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Tom took him seriously and founded his own firm,
which was eventually a jury research and re-engineering, if
you will, re-engineering the jury trial. His small firm was
absorbed by the National Center for State Courts, where he
has remained for twenty-some years. He's a wonderful
guy, who has visited probably every state and a lot of
foreign countries. I know he spent a lot of time in Russia
recently, as they have made halting attempts to adopt some
form of jury that fits the Russian culture and politics. And
Japan, and Korea, and so forth. Maybe you've had the
pleasure of hearing him before. He's a very urbane fellow.
Speaking for myself, I'm undergoing urban renewal.
Maybe some of you miss Tom already.
The pleasure, finally, after years of hearing about
Peter Tiersma and reading his work, and knowing of its
impact nationally on the movement to produce
understandable jury instructions and to improve jury
comprehension. It's the first time I've had the chance to
press his flesh, as LBJ used to say, to hear him live and
making a presentation. Peter, thank you for all your work.
I don't think it's any coincidence that his work
.followed soon after release of the monumental ABA study
on jury comprehension in complex civil cases in 1988 or
thereabout. It showed that juries indeed do manifest a lot
of confusion in cases involving complex civil cases,
involving complex issues, technical and so forth. Over
fifty percent of the source of jury confusion in these cases
is attributable and traceable to the judge's jury instructions.
Over half of their errors and sources of confusion are the
judge's own jury instructions. Something judges and/or
lawyers, you may consider have full control over and have
had forever.
Take our own Arizona jury instructions. Please
take them. When I went there fresh out of school in the
mid to late '60s, and this was before any reform or rewrites
and the committee. I don't know about the rest of you, but I
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think bench bar committees who are tasked to rewrite
instructions to make them understandable, composed solely
of lawyers and judges, are wholly incapable of reaching
that goal, wholly incapable of doing that.
If unaided by experts in the field, non-lawyer
experts in the field of linguistics, psychology, etc., and by
former jurors and without road testing them, subject to
being evaluated by appropriate experts and feedback to the
committee as to how the road testing went. I think we
lawyers and judges need to recognize that, you know, law
schools sharpen the mind all right. But in my experience,
they sharpened my mind by narrowing it. There was
precious little when I went to school pre-war-I forget
what war it was, but pre-war; there have been so manyprecious little on appreciating what other disciplines have
to tell us, to inform us, law students, lawyers, judges, etc.
There have been published articles by folks who
study the judicial process and the legislative process,
showing that judges and legislators pay little heed to the
work of social scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and so
forth, and so on in writing laws and procedures and then
designing court processes. Pay little heed. That's a very
recent article.
Well, let me share with you my favorite Arizona
jury instruction. Our task was to take the Law French,
Latin, and legalese-and translate it. Our goal was not to
reach plain English, but to go from all of that to plain Latin.
So this is what we came up with early on [indicating
projected document]. For those of you are sight impaired, I
apologize. "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are
instructed that the crime of theft requires not only proof of
actus reus, but also mens rea, or in more understandable
terms, animus furandi."
"In considering the evidence, you may determine
the facts under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Remember, however, that ignorantia non-excusat, or as the
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courts popularly put it, that's necessitas non habit legen.
The defendant's defense is assumpsit. One or the other of
these theories may not apply to the case sub judice. In that
event, you should apply the rule of inclusio unius est
exclusio, alterius, so as to choose between ex parte and ex
hypolthese." I like it.
Well, you get the idea. Are we asking too much?
Of course. But we're not asking too much of ourselves.
Jurors. Something we have to weigh. Peter's suggestion
today and in this slide, and in one of his slides, an
interesting suggestion. He asks, well, why don't we turn to
the jury after we've read the instructions to them, and
hopefully, they've read along from their copy that they have
in front of them, each of the jurors. Someone said, "Well,
our court can't afford a copy for each juror, so we'll give
them one." Oh, really, who gets the one copy? Who gets
to read from it while the judge is reading it? Studies show
that comprehension goes up when they can read and hear at
the same time.
A copy for everyone in this day and age of rapid,
inexpensive duplications and so forth. A copy for every
juror. Turn to the jury box and say, "Okay. Having just
read the instructions to you, and you have your own copies
in front of you, I'll take questions during your deliberations
if you have any. You can write questions, in writing, then
I'll meet with the attorneys, and we'll get back to you. Ask
them right then and there in addition to an invitation, do
any of you, at this early juncture, do any of you have any
questions about what you just heard and read? I'll be happy
to take them."
In Arizona when I voiced that suggestion to the
judges, they said, "Oh, my God, no. I can't do that. (1) I
would embarrass the jurors and put them under pressure,
making them feel like they have to come up with questions,
or-that's speculative-or (2) they might actually have a
question, and that might embarrass me. Or I'd get in
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trouble with the Appellate Court for answering, for not
answering, or the way I answered, or what I said or didn't
say." Fear of reversal. So that suggestion has gone
nowhere in Arizona so far. But we will come back another
day and make another run at it.
I've done it, and I've never been embarrassed. Of
course, nothing would embarrass me. I think, in the five to
ten times I've tried it, maybe one question has come up.
They just don't feel comfortable. But they sure feel
comfortable later during deliberations in asking questions.
Some of those questions about the instructions are among
the most difficult.
I'm supposed to talk about the modem jury. In the
vernacular, in the words of the billboard sign, we've come a
long way, baby, since the mid '60s. We have been
somewhat successful, I think, all of us working together, of
dragging the traditional form of jury trial and jury service,
kicking and screaming first into the twentieth century.
We're still working to drag them into the twenty-first
century.
I think a lot of this work started in the mid '60s with
the publication of Kalvin and Zeisel's landmark study, The
American Jury. The first major effort to study real world
juries and jurors-reality, facts, fact-based, empirical. It
opened the door to a whole generation of researchers and
social scientists. Some judges and lawyers joined the
movement, all card-carrying members of the movement.
The result was a lot of research, surveys, studies, writing
articles, and so forth, and so on. There's a flood of
information out there for us lawyers and judges to take
advantage of, policy makers, legislators, etc. A whole
subset of scientists and social scientists developed called
jury experts.
In the meantime, during this period, beginning '50s,
'60s, trials began, although maybe falling off in number
attributable to a number of causes-I think no single
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cause, but for the reasons, some of which you've heard
The number of trials has
mentioned here today.
diminished. I think another reason not mentioned yet is a
lack of trust in juries and lay people deciding these
disputes. On the other hand, Trials grew more complex
on the theory that any case worth litigating, civil or
criminal, is worth at least one expert. And one expert is
worth the other side producing a rebuttal expert. Well,
since I'm calling one, let's make it three. Okay, three
versus two or three. Suddenly American juries have been
confronted in just what used to be a run-of-the-mill case or
street crime with a handful of experts, many of whom don't
agree on important points of evidence.
This makes it so that it's now more difficult to sort
out who has the better evidence. The battle of experts and
so forth; complex scientific evidence and terminology. So
it's our job to help them the best we can. Public
dissatisfaction with the American jury has started to
increase or grow, given the result of certain high-profile
civil and criminal trials in the '90s and 2000.
Then we had the ABA stuff that I mentioned. Since
then, and because of all this coming about, over twenty-five
states, including, I'm happy to say, Tennessee, have
conducted their own, as have two or three federal circuits,
the Ninth and the Seventh. Also, the D.C. Circuit,
Washington D.C.
Have conducted their own,
thoroughgoing soup-to-nuts study of their jury system, and
decided for themselves what they would like to change.
And they've set about to do so.
Tennessee adopted, as I read, the Cullins summary
of the 2003 amendments, Civil and Criminal Rules,
adopted thirteen important innovations for changes.
Tennessee Jury Practice. And because of this work, the
model of the active juror emerged. I don't know who
originated it, but an active juror replacing the older
tradition model. A tradition of 200, 300 years. The passive
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juror model. Now, we've heard those terms applied to
judges. An active judge versus a passive judge. A
magistrate trial versus a passive umpire. Just sits back and
waits to be called upon.
But it applies to jurors too. What do they mean by
active juror model? I'd like to think that it means to give
the jurors the tools they need, some of the tools being
participatory in nature. You create an action activity,
giving active jurors the tools they need to help them better
decide today's cases, civil and criminal, and to reach better
verdicts or to have a greater comfort level with their own
verdict. And hopefully a greater public acceptance and
understanding of the verdict. All consistent with due
process. In other words, without depriving anyone of a fair
trial. And I think that none of the Tennessee changesthirteen changes or innovations-rule changes, if properly
managed and controlled by the court is going to deprive
anyone of a fair trial.
Our goal should be a fair trial. Insuring a fair trial,
not necessarily a perfect trial, without undue fear of
reversal. I think we're calling upon appellate judges to cut
us more slack, possibly the trial judges and lawyers. More
slack to be innovative, to experiment a little bit with those
instructions, to adapt them to the case at hand, to help make
them more understandable. Judges, in my experience-too
many judges, not all by any means-have a heightened fear
of reversal. And I think exaggerated. I mean, what's the
worst that can happen? If a case gets sent back and tried by
someone else, of course it's embarrassing. You can be
censured. You can be removed, flogged and so forth,
impeached, but that's the worst thing that can happen to
you.
All this culminated in the 2005 ABA, the lawyers'
own professional association, telling us, "Yeah, these
things are good for America, for the American jury, and for
the future to help assure the future of a vibrant, functioning,
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well-functioning jury." The ABA standards, or principles

as they are called, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials.
This little booklet. I heartily recommend that you get one.
Each principle or standard black letter is followed by a
good commentary citing the reasons for the thing and the
legal support.
For example, Principle 13, Paragraph F, black letter,
jurors in civil cases may be instructed-may, not mustmay be instructed that they will be permitted to discuss the
evidence among themselves in the jury room during
recesses from trial when all are present, as long as they
reserve judgment about the outcome of the case until
deliberations commence. That's the language. And the
commentary goes on for a page or so to explain why, and
how, and what, and so forth.
I've done it in civil, criminal cases, including
murder cases. A fellow on death row being retried for five
murders. The jury reached an impasse. I'm sorry-I'm
off-base. In Arizona, this procedure is mandatory. We
must instruct civil juries accordingly in Arizona, in Indiana,
and some other states, that they may discuss the case
among themselves, etc., subject to these structured jury
instructions-structured jury discussions they call them. I
was thinking of another procedural change and innovation.
We may get to that later; it is one that I've tried and with
success in murder cases.
So, the ABA Jury Standard, this is the most recent
word or collection of words on the subject. Of course,
we've had two, or three, or four National Jury Summits
since all this started. All right, where are we? I think the
changes, and updates, innovations, reforms, call them what
you will, fall into three or four-at least three general
categories. The first category being that it all has to do
with justice. Doing justice with this and justice with that.
Juries serve the cause justice. In the name of doing
justice to jury service, I think we've increased the
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representativeness and diversity of our jury, of the juries
we're seeing, as a result of such reforms as coming up with
new source lists. Not limiting ourselves to the voters or
driver's license or both, but moving beyond those one or
two lists to other kinds of source lists, broadening the pool
of eligible people to call. Modem, updating our source list.
One day, one trial. Especially in urban areas; I
know this may not be practical in rural, small, lightly
populated counties or circuits. But one day, one trial in
urban areas greatly increases the number of people called
and makes for more rapid turnover, shorter terms of jury
service. One day. If you're not selected that one day,
you're done. Or one trial. If you're selected for a trial, you
serve that trial, whether it's three days, or three weeks, or
three months. So then you're done. Whatever the numbers.
However long the numbers. Three years. Two years. Four
years. That depends on the population, and so on and so
forth.
Creature comforts such as, well, increases in pay,
realistic payment for mileage, making arrangements for
parking. I know we've got a long way to go on parking and
pay in many states. You heard about what, in Alabamasome states are lower than $10.00 a day. What is it here?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Eleven.
JUDGE DANN: Yeah. It's not supposed to be a profitmaking endeavor. I don't think we have to worry about
$40.00 a day or even minimum wage per day or per hour
even being harmful to the process. Efforts to provide paidfor child care at the courthouse. I think, again, urban courts
ought to consider that. So mothers of young children,
caretakers of young children can have a greater chance to
And efforts to deal with juror stress.
participate.
Recognition that there is considerable stress in serving on
the jury. Not just a criminal-a horrific criminal case-but
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a long civil case. Sometimes just the sheer length of a trial
is oppressive and stressful. It's all new and different.
A juror told me, who sat on a Tucson murder
case-we had five former jurors on our reform jury
innovations committee, and that's probably the wisest
decision we made in terms of membership. Yeah, we had a
token law school professor too. Five former jurors were
worth their weight in gold. They held our feet to the fire
and said, "You can't justify, judges and attorneys, you can't
justify giving centuries old practice. Maybe it's time to
take a look at it. I mean we don't buy your justification that
you've always done it that way. That's no justification.
That's a cop-out."
But this Tucson juror told me-he was on the
committee in Arizona-he said, "You know, we're not
stupid. These jurors who come to the courthouse to serve,
who are fortunate enough to be selected. We're not stupid,
but we're ignorant. This is a strange, new world to most of
us who are called. Most of us for the first time. And it's
intimidating and stressful, and a lot of it we don't
understand. So in that sense we're ignorant, but we're not
stupid. The trouble with you judges and lawyers is that you
treat us both-both at once-as both stupid and ignorant."
As brilliant too, he might have added. Because we expect
them to make all these grand decisions.
There are some other things that are being done
regarding term of service, conditions of service, to be more
palatable.
But justice for service.
Justice for
comprehension or cognition. Cognitive justice, I like to
call it.
Procedural justice.
Various procedural aids
intended to increase comprehension and give today's jurors
a better shot at a chance to understand today's cases. The
law and the evidence. You know, you start with plain
English, a rewrite of jury instructions.
Pre-instructing the jury before they start hearing the
evidence, or even opening statements with as much
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substantive law, in addition to the usual housekeeping
stuff-that's important-but give them as much substantive
law as you can about the case. The burdens of proof, the
necessary definition of legal terms, the elements of the
crime or what a plaintiff must prove in a medical
malpractice case. Don't wait until the very end of a case to
tell them.
It would be like asking me to watch, understand,
and enjoy a game of cricket without telling me what in the
devil is going on. What are they doing and why, and so
forth. Give them a road map in advance to follow, and
they're more likely to reach the destination that we want.
Pre-instructions. Copies of the instructions for every juror.
Allowing jurors to put questions in writing through the
judge, with the attorneys and then the judge, the question
should go forward. If it stands any objection, the attorneys
can object out of their presence. Maybe you're doing that
already here.
Structured jury discussions. Maybe a pilot project
might be in order in civil cases to see how that works. Use
of-in complex or lengthy trials-multi-purpose jury
notebooks. Not for every case, but if it's important, it's
hard work, and a lot of work for the judge's staff to
determine to get it right. Not allowing each side to prepare
and bring in their own notebooks. That kind of notebook
would be more advocacy. And the judge loses control over
The judge should, in pre-trial
the notebooks then.
You prepare this and
meetings, make assignments.
exchange it before we come back next time and reach an
agreement on a glossary of terms, legal and technical terms
in the case. You prepare your witness list, get it to him by
e-mail, and so forth. Come back with the first witness list
explaining, listing, the names of witnesses and their
affiliation at the time of the events. Not necessarily now
but so the jurors can deliberate. Juror notebooks.
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Allowing entry of summaries, reading, and giving
the final instructions before closing arguments, rather than
waiting until after. There's always the housekeeping stuff
to take care of after the closing arguments conclude. So,
both before and after they hear from the judge. The judge
should be the one making the instructions clear. That's the
judge's principle responsibility. We shouldn't be relying on
lawyers through advocacy, arguments and comments to the
jury at trial to explain the instructions. That's the judge's
job. Every time that happens, too often when the lawyers
get into explaining and reading ("Ladies and gentlemen,
you're about to hear this final instruction read," and this is
what they get wrong. They're advocating, and they're
arguing their case. And you don't want that kind of
emphasis or slant put on it. The judge has responsibility for
instructing the jury after hearing from the lawyers.
Debriefing, I agree with whoever said it. I've found
that debriefing jurors as a group, having them in the judge's
chambers or going into the jury room, onto their turf and
having a casual visit, without robe and taking the jacket off
and so forth, talking with the jurors about their experience.
And listen, I've learned so much. Maybe most of what I
needed to know about jury changes, innovations from
former jurors. It's like the book: "I learned what I needed
about life in kindergarten." I learned it from former jurors.
These people have almost always done their very
best to get it right. You may not always agree with the
result, but they work very hard. They take it very seriously,
to a man and to a woman, to get it right, to do justice, given
the tools they have and the evidence and so forth and so on.
Very conscientious. They take a lot of pride in their work.
And one of the questions is, "Judge, do you agree with our
verdict?" Usually I skirt around that. There's no point in
my telling them that. Your job isn't over yet. But talking
to them in general terms about their experience, not asking
them why they found a certain way or how they might have
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reached a verdict, but how did the trial procedure strike
you. And they'll give you some wonderful feedback.
Debriefing. Now attorneys, a lot of the judges will
debrief but not permit the attorneys to talk to them. A lot
of judges, especially in the federal side, in my experience,
don't allow lawyers to talk with the jurors post-verdict.
They just have a blanket rule. I think that's a mistake. It's
possible for the judge to invite the jurors, those who wish
of their own free will and volition to stay behind to chat
with the attorneys, telling them; it's very valuable as a
litigator, as a trial attorney, to get some feedback from
jurors. These attorneys are not going to grill you on why or
how. A lot of attorneys regret that they don't have that
opportunity. I think we ought to consider giving it to them
in a structured, careful way. And maybe have a bailiff, or a
court staff person present to interrupt if there's any
overreaching, or abuse, or browbeating by attorneys. But
attorneys, you know, they're not going to want to offend the
jurors.
Okay. That's cognitive justice. Substantive. I think
the next way you can reform will be taking a look at the
substantive power and reach, jurisdiction, of the American
jury. It started a few years ago with a group of decisions:
Apprendi v. New Jersey, Ring v. Arizona, and recent-let's
see, the most recent decision I think is Ice v. Oregonstruck a cautionary note, telling us that juries are the ones
who must decide certain categories of disputed facts
necessary for the judge's decision. For the judge to do so
becomes sentencing, death penalty qualifications, that kind
of consideration. Jurors must decide those issues and may
come to a verdict or make findings, and then the judge,
based upon those findings, does the judge thing-imposes
sentence, or makes a death/life decision.
But mind you, several states have gone to jury
sentencing in death penalty cases, something I find
troubling. The legislatures said, "Well, the Supreme
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Court's ruled juries must decide these death penalty cases."
That's not what the Supreme Court held in Rain. The
Supreme Court said, "They must make certain findings of
dispute. Resolve certain issues of disputed fact."
But the death penalty is supposed to be reserved for
the worst of the worst; it's not intended for every homicide.
And almost every murder has its grizzly, if not horrific,
heinous, aspect. But the death penalty is supposed to be
reserved for the most egregious, the worst of the worst.
The worst of the bad. How on Earth can a one-shot jury
determine which is the worst of the worst? They have no
basis for comparison, where the judge over time sees and
hears a lot of these cases and can better determine, or a
panel of two or three judges working together, on a series
of two or three minds. I think Colorado has gone to this.
I'm not certain if it's Colorado. But two or three judges sit
and make that ultimate decision, life or death. Because
they're better able to see a variety of cases and better able
to identify which is the worst of the worst. The jury, to
them the case they hear is the worst of the worst because it
probably is. I'll get off my soapbox.
But the jury's jurisdiction and power is expanding.
And you may hear more about what some people refer to as
the nullification debate. One argument is that the Sixth
Amendment, the right to an impartial jury, along with the
history of the English-American-the American jury
creates some space, allows, and mandates some space for
the jury at a particular point in the criminal case. We must
allow room, as judges and lawyers, trial and appellate, must
reserve some room for the jury to exercise some discretion.
It's called mercy sometimes.
It's called community
conscience sometimes.
When, for them to convict, for example, when all of
the elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you typically tell them, "You must convict. You shall
convict." Two-thirds of the state and federal courts handle
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it that way. As if we're attempting and we fear the
nullification so much that to eliminate jury nullification,
not just to find it, but to eliminate it altogether by telling
the juror, the jury, they can't. They don't have that right.
No, you cannot. You must find, according to these
instructions, you must convict. Telling the jury to convict
under any circumstances; is that consistent with the Sixth
Amendment? The right of the jury to exercise some wiggle
room perhaps to acquit when to convict, would do violence
to a strongly held conscientious belief of theirs and the
belief of the community. But to convict would be a terrible
injustice.
Spousal-assisted suicide. You name the case. I
don't care. Some drug cases. You know, mandatory threestrikes laws. Is the jury simply a computer, or is it intended
to reflect the sentiment, which if it ignores, it causes great
injustice and calls the law itself into question? The
credibility of the law may be at stake in such cases. I think
that debate remains to be resolved. But it might be the next
debate.
It comes down in my book to being honest and
respectful, honest with the jury and respectful of the jury.
If you feel that way-what's the word--empathy. In other
words, try to put our-step out of our judge and attorney
advocate roles-and put ourselves in the place of the juror
hearing these debated cases, and ask ourselves, well, what
tools would we like? How would we like to have a case
presented? What tools would we like to have? What
would I like to have if I were sitting there charged with the
responsibility of deciding this person's fate? That will
answer a lot of questions for us. Not all, but, I mean, there
are limitations.
Where are we going from here? What does the
future hold? There will be suggestions for more-to speed
up the trial process, make it less expensive for presentation
of videotaped testimony rather than live. Virtual trials have
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been suggested and speculated about by some. That is
where the jurors don't-the actors, including the jurorsdon't even come together in the same place. They are
aware of who they are. We're all watching the same
presentation on the computers and weigh in with questions
and deliberations, a chat room for deliberations. I'm very
leery about that. At some point, even I become a
traditionalist and want to preserve the face-to-face
deliberations, the exchange, viewing witnesses, etc. So, I'm
not a big fan of the suggestion of virtual trials.
A word needs to be said I think about evaluating
these procedures or doing a pilot study if you're leery.
Have it evaluated by experts to get the feedback, rather
than relying on suppositions and assumptions, and age-old
understandings. In Arizona, the Arizona Supreme Court
opened up a whole bunch of trials, criminal and civil, to
study by some of the experts you've heard named: Hans,
Diamond, Munsterman, and others. Fifty civil trials, jury
trials in Tucson were-and deliberations with the parties'
consent-lawyers', jurors', and so forth and so onconsent.
The Supreme Court's consent, conditional.
Videotaped and produced six or eight articles, some of
which are listed in your materials, evaluating juror
discussions, jury deliberations, etc., and answering many of
our questions. Resolving some of our fears, and not
resolving others, leaving them open. Empathy, trust, fear
of reversal. Was it Erica Jong who wrote Fear of Flying?
Did she pass away? Well, if she's still with us, I wish she
would do a book for us that is Fear of Reversal.
Okay. Questions about anything I've said or haven't
said; Arizona's experience, or experience in other states?
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MR. JEFFREY BELEW: I'm Jeffrey Belew. I've got a
question not necessarily for you, but maybe for some of the
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judges this time. We've implemented some of those things
that he suggested with jurors. I was curious what Judge
Thomas or some of the other judges would chime in on jury
questions during the trial. What have you found to be,
percentage-wise, good questions, questions that would
just-obviously a lot of times they know it's insurance,
which we don't let come in, in Tennessee. But what has
been your experience with some of the questions that have
been asked of the jurors during the trials?
JUDGE MCGINLEY: I'm Creed McGinley, and I'm a
judge in a rural district. I try a whole lot of jury cases.
And I was actually part of the pilot project that we've
referred to. They pulled me screaming and kicking into
this thing on some of the issues. I'm doing everything right
now that is suggested here as far as jury notebooks,
complete instructions. I charge them as much as I can on
the front end. I'm allowing juror questions. It has not been
any problem whatsoever. You relatively, you hardly ever
have questions. And when you do, sometimes it actually
suggests to the attorneys some deficiencies in their
presentation. And if a jury trial was a search for the truth,
then I think that's appropriate. But these things, everyone
having a copy of the instructions. A lot of these things that
I said couldn't be done, I'm doing every one of them now
because I can tell the difference in these cases.
MR. BELEW: Is that before the trial or after the trial?
JUDGE MCGINLEY: The what?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You said there were
deficiencies identified by the questions jurors asked. Are
they asking those questions after the presentation or before?
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JUDGE MCGINLEY: Yes, that's when you charge them
that after witnesses testify, but before they are excused.
They're permitted to ask questions and so forth and so on.
And sometimes it will bring up something that likely
should be developed. And the attorneys, I think probably
both sides appreciate it because it helps them.
JUDGE DANN: If I can join in on that. One way to look at
it is that there's no such thing as a bad juror question, as
even the bad or off-the-wall question-what we think was
off-the-wall-is important to that juror. Otherwise, the
juror would not have taken the time and trouble in reaching
out for help with something.
JUDGE MCGINLEY: You do have to screen because ....
JUDGE DANN: Oh, sure.
JUDGE MCGINLEY: They will ask questions that are not
appropriate as far as the Rules of Evidence.
JUDGE DANN: My favorite question in a criminal case
asked the testifying defendant, "Well, if you didn't do this
crime, do you know who did?" You've heard of that. But
these strange or bad questions we do have sometimes alert
the judge and the lawyers that something may need to be
better done about that misunderstanding to clear up
something, add, clarify, and so forth.
It does take
additional time in the trial, and you have to vent it with the
attorneys, give them a chance to object outside. But in my
book, we can take the time-the trade-off is worth it. Juror
satisfaction, juror comprehension is worth it-and the care
we like to think we take with these matters, these serious
matters. It's worth the trade-off, the extra time and effort.
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DEAN BLAZE: Judge, following up on this. What about
re-argument in response to some of the questions? If I
remember correctly, there were a number of times in
Arizona when this was done, I don't know if you did it or
Judge Martone.
JUDGE DANN: Yeah, both of us did it. Judge Marton and
I did it in different homicide cases. This procedure was
also approved by the ABA. It's called in some courts reopening for additional argument, instruction, or even
evidence sometimes. That is, the juror reaches-you get
the familiar note-I think we've reached an impasse. Now,
where they noticed this word impasse is beyond me. But
they know what word to use, the magic word impasse. So
instead of calling them into the jury room and saying, "Are
you really?" and then leading, the next conversation is,
"Are you hopelessly deadlocked? You are, aren't you?"
And lead them through-we do this dance, tradition dance,
and a mistrial.
Well, the only thing worse than trying some of these
cases once is trying them twice, needlessly so. At that first
mention of a possible mistrial, Arizona law allows-it
doesn't require-it depends on the circumstances, judge's
discretion, to ask the deliberating jury, "I received your
note. You think you've reached an impasse on one or all
counts or whatever. If you would like to do so, but only if
you want, please write down the issues that divide you that
have led to an impasse, if the issue is having to do with the
evidence, or the instructions, or a combination. And I will
take your list up with the lawyers and we'll see what, if
anything, we can do to assist you in moving along and
avoiding deadlock." And the note comes out.
Sometimes they say, "We don't want to" or "We
can't list anything. We can't even agree on what to list,
what our differences are." Or they'll list three things or
four things. Among those three or four, there are two or
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three, or maybe just one that you're able to address. You
do that through additional argument. Ask the attorneys to
supplement their argument on this point. How does the law
of conspiracy, for example, in a murder case, tie in this
particular defendant? How does it relate to this defendant?
Well, the law on conspiracy is enough to choke
even a knowledgeable Tennessee attorney and let alone lay
jurors. It's complex, heavy-duty stuff. So you allow the
attorneys, as we did, half an hour each. The jury went back
in this murder case, and an hour and a half or so later they
came out with verdicts acquitting on some counts and
convicting on others. It helped them; they said post trial in
a debriefing. Now, sometimes you can't. Your hands are
tied. You can't call in additional witnesses or something in
the record. You've got the burden of proof, the jeopardy
considerations, and all that due process. Sometimes you
can do something and save the trial, save the investment to
the public and private money.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Judge, I was just going to
follow up on what Judge McGinley said about juror
questions. The juror questions are a golden opportunity for
the lawyers to get into the minds of the jurors about what
they're thinking during the trial. And one other thing that
I've added that's not specifically provided for in our Rule:
eleven juror questions. To allow each side follow-up
questions if a witness brings out new information that
neither attorney has gotten out of their questions, then I
allow each side one opportunity to ask follow-up questions
of them.
SECOND UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I go back to direct
and cross or whatever. After I've determined the question
is appropriate with the lawyers, asked the juror the
questions, and they get the answers from the witness. And
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then I'll say, "Anything further from this side? Anything
further from that side?"
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I've had more than one
lawyer say, "Judge, that's a great question. I wish I had
thought of that."
JUDGE DANN: Thank you.
If you still miss Tom
Munsterman at this point, that's your problem.
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